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Missouri Law Review
Volume 4 NOVEMBER, 1939 Number 4
THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME
COURT FOR THE YEAR 1938
With this issue the Missouri Law Review presents its third annual
survey of the work of the Missouri Supreme Court. Emphasis has again
been placed upon decisions announcing doctrines new to Missouri law,
applying established principles of law beyond previously defined limits,
or presenting fact situations of unusual interest, in the more active fields
of litigation. It is hoped that these surveys may, in their cumulative effect,
present the part of the judicial process in the steady growth of the law.
In September, 1938, Judge Lucas was appointed to the vacancy left
by the death of Judge Frank. In other respects the personnel of the court
was unchanged from the end of the preceding year.
COURT ORGANIZATION
LAuRANCE M. HYDE*
The Committee on Improvement of Appellate Practice, of the Section
on Judicial Administration, after two years of study, reported to the
San Francisco meeting of the American Bar Association upon the matter
of methods of enlarging the capacity of courts of review. The commit-
tee considered the respective merits of a system of intermediate appellate
courts, with successive appeals from one court to another, in contrast with
the divisional system of organization in a single appellate court. The re-
port stated: "The extensive canvass which the committee has made among
*Commissioner of the Supreme Court of Missouri. A. B., University of Mis-
souri, 1914, LL. B., 1916.
(345)
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the judges of these courts of last resort which sit in divisions, has disclosed
no instance of dissatisfaction with the practical operation of the system.
We believe that a simple, speedy and inexpensive method of dealing with
appeals is a matter of vital importance for restoring public confidence in
the capacity of the courts to render satisfactory service at reasonable cost
and without undue delay. We therefore recommend, as the most satisfac-
tory method of dealing with appeals from courts of general jurisdiction,
that a single appellate court should ordinarily be employed, with final ju-
risdiction in all cases, to be organized into as many divisions as may be nec-
essary to deal with the cases brought before it." It was also suggested tlhat
this recommendation might be "subject to the limitation, if any, which
experience may justify regarding the number of divisions which can effec-
tively work together;" but that "whether or to what extent this would be
true can be determined only by future experience, since no American or
English courts have operated with more than three divisions." There
was a dissent from this recommendation by the California member and
the California Bar Association has since approved a report unfavorable
to its adoption in California. States of considerable population living in
great areas like Texas and California prefer the intermediate appellate
court system, with each intermediate court having a limited territorial
jurisdiction, and with a final reviewing court over them all.
Few states have had as long experience with the divisional system as
Missouri. The Mlissouri Supreme Court, with seven judges, has operated
in two divisions since 1891. Three judges (sitting as Division 2) hear all
appeals in criminal cases. For many years they have been able to keep the
criminal docket on a current basis (all cases heard at the return term of
the appeal), and to also have time to hear many of the appeals on the civil
docket. The other four judges (sitting as Division 1) hear appeals in civil
cases only. Cases in which there is a dissent, in either division, may be
transferred to the court en bane and heard by all seven judges. Cases may
be also transferred on the court's own motion and cases involving matters
of great public importance are frequently heard en bane without being first
heard in a division.'
The divisional system has unquestionably enabled the court to hear and
determine almost double the number of cases that it could have disposed
of if all eases had to be heard by the court en bane. Even with the aid
1. Mo. CONSr. art. VI, amend. of 1890.
[Vol. 4
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1939], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss4/1
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1938
of divisional organization, it has not been possible for the supreme court to
keep up with the rapid increase of cases on its civil docket during the past
50 years. In 1920, a constitutional amendment was proposed to add two
more judges so that the supreme court could sit in three divisions of three
judges each. The amendment did not receive a majority vote and the
proposition has never been resubmitted. Additional judges have been
provided by the statutory method of creating and continuing a commission
of six members, three of whom sit with and write opinions in each division;
opinions written by the commissioners becoming the court's opinion when
adopted by a majority vote of the judges of the division in which the cases
were heard. By this method, the court has been able to gain materially
toward bringing its civil docket to a current basis.
Missouri's three courts of appeals, which are composed of three
judges each, having limited territorial jurisdiction, are not true inter-
mediate appellate courts because their decisions are final in the cases they
are authorized to hear. (Cases involving $7500.00 or less unless constitu-
tional or certain other questions are involved.) 2 Since there is no appeal
to the supreme court from their decisions, they serve to a considerable ex-
tent, in effect, as additional divisions of the supreme court. Like such
divisions, they may transfer cases to the supreme court for further con-
sideration, which is usually done where there is a dissent, or where there
is conflict between the courts of appeals. (Whether these are heard there
in division or en banc is determined by the supreme court.) There is, of
course, also a limited review by certiorari in the supreme court, for
conflict with its decisions only, for the purpose of preventing inconsistent
appellate rulings of law. However, in the great majority of the courts of
appeals cases, there is no attempt made to obtain further review and these
courts thus relieve the supreme court of a vast amount of work.
The work done by the Missouri Supreme Court in the last decade
(1927-1937) for which statistics have been published in the State Official
Manual (Blue Book) is shown by Table I on the following page.
This table shows that during this ten year period (1927-37) the court
has disposed of 4085 cases by written opinions. Of these, 892 opinions were
written in criminal cases in Division 2. The remaining 3193 opinions were
in civil cases; the majority written in Division 1, but many in Division 2
2. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 12; art. V, amend. of 1884.
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and a considerable number en bane. In addition, 1411 applications for
writs (all of which required research on the part of at least one member of
the court) were disposed of in conferences of the court en bane; 3491 cases
were dismissed for failure to perfect appeal or otherwise disposed of with-
,o .- .4- q110
00 ~ ~ ~ C CD 0i t-0 D 0L
CSH o '- 10O~~
- o .' COo,.- C,,-, ,-,
& 9 00o I I
00
00V-










30r.r CO-Co -4,-4.-401t CO S*4~CCCj'000. L = 00CI1'q -1
_0o : -E -. .oC oC oCoC1.II -010i0C 0o C





• E.EI4 E -
-I N
i CS0 m mc c mc1
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1939], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss4/1
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1938
out opinion in the two divisions and en bane, and it is safe to say that at
least 500 of these also required some research and conference discussion,
either in division or en bane. Thus the court, during this ten year period,
disposed of almost 9000 cases, of which more than 4000 required written
opinions and at least 2000 more required research and conference discus-
sion. In short, 9000 cases were finally disposed of and of these, at least
two-thirds, or 6000 cases, required either written opinions or research on
the part of some member of the court and time in conference for dis-
cussion (either in division or en bane) prior to their final disposition.
It is obvious that this amount of judicial work could not have been
done if all cases had to be heard en bane. Nor does the determination of
these cases constitute all the work of the court. During the above period,
the judges have been called upon to do a constantly increasing amount of
administrative work in connection with regulation of the practice of law.
For many years, the- matter of admission to the bar has been under the
complete supervision of the court. More recently, certain unwholesome
conditions have made it necessary for the court to take charge of the ethics
and discipline by formulation of rules and organization of enforcement
committees. This work has certainly brought about beneficial results which
have materially increased public respect for bench and bar. The court
has also concerned itself with the matter of unlawful practice and, through
its judicial council, with improvement of procedure. A resolution of the
last (1939) legislature has called upon the court to consider and make rec-
ommendations to its 1941 session for the modernization of procedure in
accordance with the precedent established by the Congress and Supreme
Court of the United States in revising federal procedure. Except for the
efficiency of the divisional system in disposing of judicial business, and
the relief of divisional dockets by the many cases decided by commissioners'
opinions, the judges certainly could not undertake these essential additional
activities. Perhaps they may require further consideration of the 1920
proposal to add a third division by providing for two more judges so that
the court could be organized into three divisions, each with three judges
and two commissioners.
In opposition to the divisional system the argument is made that in-
consistent opinions from different divisions of the court would unsettle
the law, and fear is expressed that sessions en bane would not be able to
harmonize them. Certainly, almost a half century's experience with the
divisional system in Missouri tends to show that inconsistent opinions from
different divisions have never been a serious problem. Such a complaint
19391
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is seldom heard in arguments before the court. Of course, there will
never be complete harmony of decisions, even in a one division court, be-
cause judges will disagree. Perhaps, a practical reason for the success of
the divisional system in the Missouri Supreme Court is that all the judges
and commissoners live in the capital city, have their offices, hold their ses-
sions, and do their work in the same building. (It may be noted that this
is true of the Supreme Court of England where even the trial courts, as
well as the appellate courts, are housed in the Law Courts Building in
London.) Working together in the same building makes for much more
collaboration between members of different divisions and tends to bring
about harmony of decision by the practical method of individual consulta-
tion while opinions are being written. In this way, if there is a difference
of views between divisions or members of a division, it is more likely to be
known immediately and the case can go at once to the court en bana for
the matter to be settled. It seems apparent that the divisional system will
work much better where close association in the work of the court is made
possible by having the judges of all divisions located in the same building,
holding all court sessions at the same place, and doing all the work of the
court there. It also seems reasonable to believe that there is a limitation
on the number of men and the number of divisions that can thus work
well together. Our system of courts of appeals, which are courts of last
resort in a large class of cases, is an extension of the divisional system and
a reasonable compromise between the system of the one appellate court
(which might become unwieldy if organized into too many divisions), and
the system of intermediate appellate courts with successive appeals from
one to another, authorized in every case, which is likely to result in exces-
sive expense and unnecessary delay in too many cases. Surely one of
the most important accomplishments of any appellate system, both for the
benefit of the legal profession and in the public interest, is to solve the
problem of getting its dockets up to date and keeping them on a current
basis so that eases will be finally determined without undue delay. Missouri
experience with the divisional system shows it can be a valuable aid to
such accomplishment without sacrificing accuracy of decision.
[Vol. 4
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STATISTICAL SURVEY
RALPH J. TucR*
The activity of the court during the past year is disclosed by the fol-
lowing tables. There was relatively little change in the volume of litigation
in the past two years, as may be seen by reference to Table I. A somewhat
higher percentage of cases was disposed of by opinion in 1938. Comparison
with a similar table published in November, 1937,1 shows a considerable
decrease in total litigation from the preceding biennium.
TABLE 12
SUPREME CouRT DOCKET
January 1, 1937 to December 31, 1938
Number of cases on the docket January 1, 1939 - 391
Number of cases filed in 1937 and 1938
Civil Writs Criminal
1937 .......... 340 195 91
1938 .......... 429 200 68
Number of cases disposed of by opinions
Civil Criminal
1937 .......... 248 60
1938 .......... 251 52
Number of cases disposed of by motion, etc.
Civil Writs Criminal
1937 .......... 305 131 41
1938 .......... 206 148 24
Number of cases under submission ................ 44
Number of cases on docket January 1, 1937 ........ 288
Number of cases filed 1937-1938 .................. 1323










*Chairman of the Board of Student Editors.
1. See The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1936 (Statis-
tical Survey) (1937) 2 Mo L. REv. 393, 394.
2. Table I was prepared by the clerk of the court.
1939]
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Table II shows the manner in which the litigation was disposed of.
As might perhaps be expected, the judgments of the lower courts were up-
set somewhat less frequently than they were sustained (though it is not
always possible to determine from a mere statistical study every case in
which the appellant might have considered the result to have justified his
appeal or petition). There was a slight increase from the preceding year
in the proportion of successful appeals.
TABLE II
DisPosiTiON oF LITGATioN
Judgments affirmed .................................... 113
Affirmed on condition (enter remittitur) ................ 5
Awarding of new trial by trial court affirmed ............ 1
Affirmed and remanded ................................ 5
Reversed and remanded ................................ 58
Reversed with directions to enter decree accord a permanent
injunction ........................................ 1
Reversed and remanded as to one defendant, reversed as
to others .......................................... 1
Reversed and remanded on condition (fie remittitur) .... 1
Judgments reversed .................................... 25
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part ........ 1
W rit quashed .......................................... 17
W rit granted .......................................... 6
W rit denied ........................................... 1
Rule absolute .......................................... 2
Case transferred to court of appeals .................... 16
Record quashed ........................................ 3
Appeal dismissed ...................................... 6
Petitioner discharged .................................. 4
Petitioner remanded .................................... 1
Opinion quashed ...................................... 1
Peremptory writ issued ................................ 1
Record and opinion quashed ............................ 5
Motion overruled ...................................... 1
Respondent ousted from office .......................... 1
Writ and prohibition made permanent in part, quashed in part 1
Record and opinion quashed in part .................... 1
Alternative writ quashed and peremptory writ denied .... 1
Table III is an attempt to show the relative appellate activity in the
several fields of law. Though the classification must in many cases represent
the arbitrary judgment of the individual attempting the allocation-espe-
cially in the many cases clearly involving several legal issues-it is interest-
ing to observe how constant a relationship is maintained from year to year.
Thus, in every table presented in this review, approximately one-sixth of
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the cases have been classified as concerned primarily with negligence. The
percentage of criminal cases has decreased slightly each year (in number
from 58 in 1936 and 53 in 1937 to 48 in 1938), whereas practice issues have
dominated an increasingly large proportion.
It is not pretended that the table represents relative activity in trial
courts. The jurisdictional limitations on the supreme court do not operate
uniformly in all branches of the law, a fact which in itself prevents this
list from being a fair sample of all lifigation.
TABLE III
ToPIcAL ANALYsis op DECISIONS
Administrative Law .................................... 1
A gency ................................................ 1
Appeal and Error ...................................... 13
Attorney and Client .................................... 2
Bills and Notes ......................................... 3
Carriers ............................................... 2
Certiorari Proceedings .................................. 5
Constitutional Law ...................................... 10
Contracts .............................................. 6
Criminal Law .......................................... 48
Creditors Rights ........................................ 2
Domestic Relations ...................................... 3
Eminent Domain ........................................ 5
E quity ................................................ 2
Evidence .............................................. 4
Habeas Corpus Proceedings .............................. 4
Insurance .............................................. 13
Mandamus Proceedings .................................. 2
Master and Servant ....... ............................ 5
M ortgages ............................................. 4
Municipal Corporations .................................. 6
Negligence (Automobiles) ................................ 14
Other Negligence ....................................... 20
Partnership ............................................ 2
Pleading .............................................. 7
Practice and Procedure .................................. 20
Prohibition Proceedings ................................. 2
Quo Warranto Proceedings .............................. 2
Real Property .......................................... 21
Receivership ........................................... 2
Sales .................................................. 1
School and School Districts .............................. 1
States ................................................. 1
Statutory Construction .................................. 16
Taxation ............................................... 8
Torts (other than negligence) ............................ 3
Trusts ................................................. 5
Wills and Administration ................................ 10
Workmen's Compensation ............................... 1
9
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The average number of opinions -written by the members of the Mis-
souri Supreme Court during the year was sixteen, though there was a
very considerable variation between the several judges. The average num-
ber of opinions written by commissioners was twenty-eight. There were
three per curiam opinions. There was slightly less-unanimity in the court
than during the preceding year. In four cases dissenting opinions were
read, and in nine cases one or more judges dissented without opinion.
APPELLATE PRACTICE
CuArims V. GARNETT*
I. TmE JuRIsDIcTroN OF THE SUPREME COURT
The supreme court is not a court of general jurisdiction. To the con-
trary, its jurisdiction is confined and limited by constitutional provisions.
Consequently, as again suggested in Rust Sash & Door Co. v. Gate City
Building Corp.,' the court must first inquire into its own jurisdiction,
whether or not the question of jurisdiction is raised by the parties. So,
also, the record must affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction. Two
decisions of the court, in Koch v. Meacham,2 and Crescent Planing Mill Co.
v. Mueller,3 resulted in transfers to the proper court of appeals because of
the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively the jurisdictional facts.
And, in determining whether or not the jurisdictional facts exist, the court,
as is pointed out in General Theatrical Enterprises v. L-yris,4 will not be
bound by the amount claimed in the petition, but will look to the entire
record to determine the amount actually in dispute.
While it would seem that, where the amount involved is relied upon to
confer jurisdiction, the determination of such amount should be a mere
matter of simple arithmetic, the trial courts are still granting appeals to
the wrong court, due almost entirely to failure to recognize the rule that,
as stated in Ross v. Speed-O Corporation of America,5 "... where relief
*Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. 342 Mo. 206, 114 S. W. (2d) 1023 (1938).
2. 116 S. W. (2d) 16 (Mo. 1938).
3. 117 S. W. (2d) 247 (Mo. 1938).
4. 121 S. W. (2d) 139 (Mo. 1938).
5. 343 Mo. 500, 121 S. W. (2d) 865 (1938).
(Vol. 4
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other than recovery of a money judgment is sought, the 'amount in dispute'
is determined by the value in money of the relief to the plaintiff or by the
loss to the defendant should the relief be granted." The rule is a simple
one and should be emphasized. It is a matter of regret that long delays
have resulted in so many cases because of the failure of the trial courts to
apply it. The docket of the supreme court is still somewhat congested. The
allowance of appeals to that court where the jurisdiction is in the courts of
appeal not only adds to that congestion but also inevitably results in a delay
of from one to three years for the litigant in the particular case.
Under the clause of the constitution conferring jurisdiction upon the
supreme court in cases "involving the title" to real estate, more difficult
questions arise. In the case of Ballenger v. Windes,6 decided in 1936, the
court held that in an ordinary action in ejectment, that is, one which did not
raise equitable defenses amounting to an assertion of title, the case involves
only questions of possession of real estate as distinguished from title to real
estate, and that the jurisdiction is in the appropriate court of appeals. A
strong dissenting opinion was filed in that case, pointing to the fact that
historically an ejectment action has always been recognized as a proceeding
to try title. But the court en bane in Gibbany v. Walker,7 after reviewing
numerous authorities, some of which are overruled by it, has now approved
the doctrine of the Ballenger case, and has definitely ruled that "an ordinary
action in ejectment does not involve title within the meaning" of the con-
stitutional provision here in question. The same result has also been
reached in Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Bross,8 where the court again
cites the Ballenger and Gibbany cases in holding that an action in ejeetment
where "the pleadings do not require the judgment to and the judgment
does not adjudicate a title controversy," title is not involved in the con-
stitutional sense. "Title," says the court in the case last cited, "is inci-
dentally or collaterally involved, but this is not sufficient." The holding
is again followed in Frederich v. Tobaben,9 the court pointing out that "in
this case, judgment was sought and rendered for possession only, defendants
did not seek any affirmative relief, and their answers did not even assert
a claim of ownership."
While it thus appears that it is not always easy to determine the ap-
6. 338 Mo. 1039, 93 S. W. (2d) 882 (1936).
7. 342 Mo. 156, 113 S. W. (2d) 792 (1938).
8. 116 S. W. (2d) 6 (Mo. 1938).
9. 117 S. W. (2d) 251 (Mo. 1938).
19391
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pellate jurisdiction in ejectment actions, the determination is facilitated
by the rule, as stated in State ex reZ. Pemberton v. Shain,1 that ". .
where the judgment sought or rendered would take title from one litigant
and give it to another, title would be involved within the meaning of the
Constitution and jurisdiction of the case would be vested in this court."
If that rule is kept firmly in mind, much delay in taking appeals to the
wrong court can be obviated.
That suits for adjudication of liens are not reviewable in the supreme
court on the theory that they involve title to real estate is again pointed out
in Rust Sash & Door Co. v. Gate City Building Corp. ;1 nor, as was held in
that case, can jurisdiction flow from the fact that the amount sought to be
established as a lien is in excess of $7500, unless the amount is "in dispute."
But, as was held in Proffer v. Proffer,12 suits to contest wills devising real
estate fall within the jurisdiction of the supreme court. In that case, the
court said: "The cases are numerous that a suit to set aside a deed involves
title to real estate, and we can perceive no difference in reason and principle,
so far as concerns the question of title, in a suit to set aside a deed that
conveys real estate, and a suit to set aside a will that devises real estate."
These and other cases dealing with questions of jurisdiction suggest
again the advisability of an analysis both by counsel and by the trial courts
of the jurisdictional facts at the time appeals are allowed. All too frequent-
ly cases are sent to the wrong court, only to await transfer and the long
delays resulting therefrom. If the bench and bar will give proper attention
to the question of appellate jurisdiction before the appeal is taken, such
delays can be avoided.
II. RECORDS AND BRIEFS
Some improvement in the situation with respect to the dismissal of
appeals for faulty records and briefs seems to have been made by the bar
during the period under review. Dismissals are being reduced in number,
and the court, following principles previously declared, has refrained from
dismissals unless the infractions of its rules have been of a flagrant type.
In Harris v. Missouri Pacific R. B. Co.,"3 the court refused to dismiss an
appeal for want of a proper bill of exceptions because of the failure of re.
10. 124 S. W. (2d) 1087 (Mo. 1939).
11. 342 Mo. 206, 114 S. W. (2d) 1023 (1938).
12. 342 Mo. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938).
13. 342 Mo. 330, 114 S. W. (2d) 988 (1938).
[Vol. 4
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spondent to discover the defect in time, under the rule, to ifie an additional
abstract showing the defect. The court comments: "There is no claim of
fraud or sharp practice which prevented plaintiff from discovering the
situation sooner. In the circumstances, that plaintiff did not discover the
situation in time to comply with Rule 11, cannot alter the rule. Clearly,
umder the rule, plaintiff waived the right to complain.. "
In Weller v. Searcy, 4 there were numerous defects in appellant's
abstract and brief. The abstract (originally filed in the court of appeals)
was typewritten and not printed, the index was improper, and there was no
showing as to when and where the suit was filed. The brief, also, was de-
fective and not in strict compliance with the terms of Rule 15. But not-
withstanding all these defects, the court refused to dismiss the appeal,
commenting that "the abstract and brief cannot be recommended as models
but we are of opinion that their defects are not such as to justify the
drastic penalty of dismissal of the appeal."
Again, in Dreyer v. 1Videmschek, 5 although the case was one in equity,
entitling the court to review the evidence de novo, the court refused to
dismiss the appeal because the abstract was fragmentary and did not in-
elude all of the evidence, the court holding that it could get a fair under-
standing of the case from the record before it.
These and other cases indicate the trend of the court toward a decision
on the merits, notwithstanding infractions of its rules, to the end that the
substantial rights of the litigants may not suffer for the sins of their legal
representatives.
III. Tm. WRiT op" CERTIORARI
The year's decisions have included a large number of cases reaching
the court by writ of certiorari to the courts of appeal. They are reviewed in
detail in the section on Extraordinary Legal Remedies. It is appropriate
here, however, to point out that certiorari is so often used as a means for
reviewing the decisions of the courts of appeal in order to bring them into
harmony with controlling decisions of the supreme court that there is a
tendency to lose sight of the fact that harmony of decision is not the only
ground for review by certiorari. In State ex rel. Pemberton v. Shain,16 the
writ was issued, not because the court of appeals had rendered an opinion
14. 343 Mo. 768, 123 S. W. (2d) 73 (1938).
15. 123 S. W. (2d) 63 (Mo. 1938).
16. 124 S. W. (2d) (Mo. 1939).
19391
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out of harmony with controlling opinions of the supreme court, but because
the case was one over which the court of appeals had no jurisdiction, because
of the fact that title to real estate was involved. Pointing out the rule that
certiorari is the proper remedy to confine an appellate court within the
limits of its constitutional and legal authority, the proceedings of the court
of appeals were quashed, and the supreme court retained jurisdiction of the
appeal for the purpose of deciding it upon its merits. In order to determine
the fact that the court of appeals was without jurisdiction of the appeal,
the supreme court refused to be bound by the rule-applicable to writs
issued to preserve harmony of decision-that it was limited to the facts
stated in the opinion of the court of appeals, and held that, because
"this proceeding in certiorari . . . is for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction . . . the entire record is
before us for examination." The same principle is involved in State ex rel.
Terminal R. R. Ass'n v. Hostetter,17 and in State ex rel. Clark v. Shain,18 but
in both of those cases the court found that the court of appeals had not
exceeded its jurisdiction, and reviewed the opinions only for the purpose of
determining questions of conflict.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
WmLiAm R. COLLIN ON*
Our supreme court wrote sixteen opinions in 1938 in which constitu-
tional questions were mentioned or discussed. The court upheld the val-
idity of a constitutional amendment, and held that the amendment super-
seded a section of the constitution. The court held four statutes and one
city ordinance void because they were in conflict with provisions of the con-
stitution, and upheld the validity of three statutes which were challenged
as unconstitutional. In three cases the court held that the constitutional
point had not been properly raised. The court ruled that five different
sections of our state constitution were self-enforcing, in one instance over-
17. 342 Mo. 859, 119 S. W. (2d) 208 (1938).
18. 343 Mo. 66, 119 S. W. (2d) 971 (1938).
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ruling a previous decision of the court. It is here attempted to classify
the decisions under the same general headings used in the digest system.
I. SEPARTION OF POWERS
In the case of State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wymore,' the jurisdiction of
the court to entertain a quo warranto suit, brought to oust the respondent
from the office of prosecuting attorney, was challenged by a motion to quash
the information. Respondent contended that Section 7, article XIV of the
constitution provides for the exclusive manner in which he could be re-
moved from office. This section is a grant of power to the legislature to
enact laws to provide for the removal from office of county, city, town and
township officials, and under the authority thereof the legislature had en-
acted Sections 11202-11209, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, which the
respondent contended were the exclusive remedy. The court held that
Section 7, article VI, of the constitution, which provides that the supreme
court shall have jurisdiction to issue, hear, and consider writs of quo war-
ranto, was not limited in any way by Section 7, article XIV, and that, of
course, the legislature could not limit the jurisdiction of tlie court'by any
statutory enactment. The court laid down the rule that the courts are with-
out authority to create a forfeiture of office, and that the forfeiture can
only be created and declared by constitutional or legislative enactments,
but that it may be enforced by an action of quo warranto.
In a concurring opinion, three judges held that Section 7, article XIV
does not exist in the form in which it appears in the Revised Statutes of
1929. As the section is now officially published it combines the full text
of the section, as it existed before the Constitutional Convention of 1922-23,
with the full text of an amendment thereto, which was submitted by the
Convention and duly adopted by the people. The concurring opinion holds
that the amendment, although it did not expressly purport to repeal the
old section, did "repeal all the section amended and not embraced in the
amended form."
In Ex parte Marsh v. Bartlett,2 one of the grounds of attack upon the
validity of "Amendment No. 4" (the amendment creating the Conserva-
tion Commission) was that it was completely incongruous with our three-
fold separation of governmental powers, and was in direct conflict with
1. 343 Mo: 98, 119 S. W. (2d) 941 (1938).
2. 343 Mo. 526, 121 S. W. (2d) 737 (1938).
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Section 1, article IV: "The legislative power, subject to the limitations
herein contained, shall be vested in 'The General Assembly
' . The court held that one of the "limitations herein contained"
was the initiative and referendum amendment, Section 57, article IV, where-
by the people recalled all legislative power and made it subject to the ini-
tiative and referendum. The court upheld the validity of the amendment,
without going into the question of the legislative power of the commission.
The opinion does hold that a regulation of the commission is the effective
law in force, even though in conflict with a specific legislative enactment.
It is submitted that the position of this commission of appointed officials,
created by a constitution, with power to enact regulations having the force
of law, is unique in this country; and this opinion recognizes that the people
have withdrawn certain legislative power from their general assembly and
vested it in a four-man commission.
In Ex parte Diemer v. Weiss,3 the court held a city ordinance which
prohibited picketing invalid for uncertainty and unintelligibility. The
court stated that when the language of an act appears to have a meaning,
but that the meaning cannot be given any precise application in the cir-
cumstances under which it was intended to operate, the courts cannot sup-
ply the deficiency or make the act certain.
The case of State v. Kennedy,4 in which the constitutionality of certain
sections of the Liquor Control Act was attacked, holds that the wisdom
of legislative enactments was not a question for the courts in determining
their constitutionality.
In State ex rel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, the opinion
stated that the supreme court's constitutional power is limited to constru-
ing a statute as it stands. The construction placed on the statute in ques-
ion involved no constitutional question. The case is discussed further in
the section devoted to insurance law.
II. DEi@EGATioT OF LEGISLATIVE PowER
The case of Ex parte Marsh v. Bartlett' contains a brief discussion of
the constitutionality of delegation of legislative power and the distinction
between administrative and legislative powers, but since the case was con-
3. 343 Mo. 626, 122 S. W. (2d) 922 (1938).
4. 343 Mo. 786, 123 S. W. (2d) 118 (1938).
5. 343 Mo. 252, 121 S. W. (2d) 141 (1938).
6. 343 Mo. 526, 121 S. W. (2d) 737 (1938).
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cerned with a commission created by the constitution and not by the legis-
lature, the actual question of delegation of legislative power was not before
the court.
III. DUE PROCESS
In State ex rel. Webster Groves Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Smith,7 the
constitutionality of sections 11071e-25 to 11071e-31, Mo. St. Ann.; Mo. Laws
1933-34; Ex. Sess., pp. 119-136; which provide for the organization of sani-
tary sewer districts and the financing of sewers by bonds to be paid out of
annual rentals, was challenged. One of the objections was that although
the bonds were paid by special assessments against all abutting landowners,
non-resident landowners could not vote in the bond election. The court
overruled this contention on the authority of Miners' Bank v. Clark8 and
Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving CoY Another constitutional point raised
was that the manner in which subdistricts, the bond-issuing agencies, were
created did not provide for a hearing for the landowner, and for this rea-
son denied him due process of law. The court pointed out that the subdis-
tricts were simply administrative agencies of the entire sewer district and
that the landowner had had his opportunity to be heard upon the organiza-
tion of the whole district.
In State v. King,10 the negro defendant moved to quash the indictment
on the ground that in the selection of the grand jury which indicted him all
negroes were systematically excluded, even though there were numerous
qualified negroes in St. Louis. The motion to quash was not filed until two
and a half months after the grand jury was sworn, and the state cited
the provisions of Sections 3514, 3515, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929.
These sections provide that exceptions to the competency of grand jurors
must be made before they are sworn. The court pointed out that the rule
of this statute had been relaxed where the defendant could show facts
which excused his failure to do so, and intimated that if the defendant had
not been apprehended at the time the grand jury was sworn, this would be
a valid excuse. But in this case the defendant had been in custody over
three months prior to the impanelling of the grand jury and had had ample
opportunity to challenge it before the members were sworn, and no facts to
7. 342 Mo. 365, 115 S. W. (2d) 816 (1938).
8. 252 Mo. 20, 158 S. W. 597 (1913).
9. 194 U. S. 618 (1904).
10. 342 Mo. 975, 119 S. W. (2d) 277 (1938).
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excuse his failure were pleaded or proved. The court held that under
these circumstances the statute applied, and refused to rule that the in-
dictment should have been quashed. The court did not pass upon the merits
of the defendant's motion."
This same question was also before the court in the case of State v.
Richetti. 2 The defendant in that case moved to quash the indictment be-
cause ". . . the Grand Jury wheel from which the names are drawn
and were drawn to comprise the Grand Jury that returned the indictment
in the present case does not include the names of any citizens of Negro,
Italian, Greek, Chinese or Japanese extraction or race, although there are
many of such Negro, Italian, Greek, Chinese and Japanese citizens of Jack-
son County who are duly qualified to serve as Grand Jurors in Jackson
County, Missouri . . ." It appears that the defendant was an Italian
or of Italian extraction. This motion was filed at the beginning of the trial,
long after the grand jury had been sworn. The defendant had been in
custody for sixteen weeks before the grand jury was sworn. The court cited
the provisions of Sections 3514-15 and discussed their applicability. The
exact wording of these sections limits the grounds of challenge of prospec-
tive grand jurors to two matters: that the prospective juror is the prosecu-
tor or complainant of a charge against the person making the challenge, or
that he is a witness on the part of the prosecutor. And then, of course, these
sections provide that the challenges must be made before the jury is sworn.
The court pointed out that under previous decisions it was well established
that the statute could not deprive the accused of any constitutional rights
of challenge which he might have, such as equal protection of the law, and
that insofar as the cited sections attempted to limit this right they were
unconstitutional. However, the court upheld the limitation of the statute
as to the time of making the challenge, and held that in the absence of
pleaded and proved facts excusing the failure to challenge the jurors be-
fore the panel was sworn, the defendant's attack came too late.'" The court
also stated that they were not ruling that appellant's motion stated a good
cause of action as to the exclusion of persons of foreign extraction of other
nationalities than appellant.
11. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935).
12. 342 Mo. 1015, 119 S. W. (2d) 330 (1938).
13. See also State v. Warner, 165 Mo. 399, 65 S. W. 584 (1901); State v.
Bobbst, 269 Mo. 214, 190 S. W. 257 (1916); State v. Shawley, 334 Mo. 352, 67
S. W. (2d) 74 (1933) ; State v. Logan, Ill' S. W. (2d) 110 (Mo. 1937).
[Vol. 4
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1939], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss4/1
1939] WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1938 363
In Hann v. Fitzgerald,4 the court held that "neither the revocation of
(liquor) licenses issued to plaintiffs and interveners, nor the prosecution of
plaintiffs and interveners for selling non-intoxicating beer on Sunday could
be an invasion of their property rights" because the right to sell intoxicat-
ing liquor is not a natural right and is subject to limitation by the state.
IV. EQuAL. PROECTION
Although there is a fundamental distinction between the prohibition
against local and special laws in the Missouri Constitution (Section 53,
article IV) and the equal protection clause of our Federal Constitution
(Section I of the 14th Amendment), the applicability of the two provisions
is generally the same, and they will both be treated under this heading for
the purpose of this article.
The case of State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley,'5 holds part of Section
10619, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, unconstitutional and void as a
violation of Section 53, article IV, of the Missouri constitution. Said Sec-
tion 10619 applies only to cities having over 100,000 inhabitants and dif-
fers from the general law applicable to all other parts of the state in that
it provides that ballots shall not be destroyed within twelve months after
an election if an election contest, grand jury investigation, or prosecution
is pending at the expiration of the twelve months. Section 10315, which
applies to all the state, provides unconditionally that all ballots shall be
destroyed twelve months after an election. The court held that laws re-
lating to crime must operate equally upon every person in the state, and
that, therefore, Section 10619 is unconstitutional. Although the opinion,
by its express language, condemns the entire statute, it seems reasonable to
believe that the court only had in mind the proviso section, since that is
the only part of the statute which violates the constitution.
It has frequently been held that Section 53, article IV, does not pre-
vent the enactment of a law which is applicable alike to all of a given class,
if the classification is not unreasonable and arbitrary.1 6 This case is strong
authority for an argument that there could be no "reasonable" classifica-
tion by statute in any matter involving criminal law or procedure.
14. 342 Mo. 1166, 119 S. W. (2d) 808 (1938).
15. 342 Mo. 641, 117 S. W. (2d) 319 (1938).
16. See City of Springfield v. Smith, 322 Mo. 1129, 19 S. W. (2d) 1 (1929);
Orthwein v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 261 Mo. 650, 170 S. W. 885 (1914) ; Miners'
Bank v. Clark, 252 Mo. 20, 158 S. W. 597 (1913).
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In Idel v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 17 the court held Sections 4601-06,
Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, void as being in violation of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and in violation
of Section 53, article IV of our state constitution. These statutes, briefly
summarized, declare it unlawful for any corporation to move, abandon or
discontinue, to any material extent, any factory or other establishment of
the corporation from any place within the state, without first repaying and
restoring any and all money, bonds, lands and other property which may
have been given or granted as a consideration for the location or construc-
tion of the said establishment. The statute provides for heavy penalties,
and makes the officers of the corporation guilty of a misdemeanor. This
suit was a civil suit for the recovery of money by the trustees of a city
"Booster Club," but the plaintiffs relied upon the above sections.
The court held that said sections were unconstitutional because they
only applied to corporations which had received a bonus. This decision was
based solely upon the case of State ex rel. Rolston v. Chicago, B. & Q. B.
B.18 Although criticism and comparison of decisions is hardly within the
scope of this article, it should be noted that there is a real distinction be-
tween the two cases. The Rolston case involved a statute which required
a railroad to secure the permission of the board of railroad and warehouse
commissioners before abandoning a depot which had been erected in con-
sideration of a donation of land, but did not require this permission to be
acquired to abandon a depot which had not been erected in consideration of
a bonus. That opinion pointed out that the legislature had a broad dis-
cretion with respect to classifying persons and objects for the purpose of
legislation, and that the courts can only interfere when it "clearly and
beyond a reasonable doubt appears that the legislative power has been
transcended and that a particular act arbitrarily, unjustly and unreason-
ably marks particular persons or things as the objects of burdensome legis-
lation and exempts therefrom others of the same natural class. . ."
It is suggested that in the Idel case the court overlooked this last phrase.
The court said in the Rolston case that there seemed to be no valid reason,
of a public nature, to exempt from the provisions of the statute railroads
which had erected depots without a grant of land as consideration. By the
very nature of the statute in the Idel case, and the nature of the evil
17. 343 Mo. 373, 121 S. W. (2d) 817 (1938).
18. 246 Mo. 512, 152 S. W. 28 (1912).
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sought to be remedied, there were no other corporations "of the same nat-
ural class."
The court specifically cites subdivision 26 of article IV, Section 53, as
the constitutional provision which is offended by the legislative act. Subdi-
vision 26 prohibits the granting of "any special or exclusive right, privilege
or immunity." The court must have had in mind the word "immunity,"
since there could be no contention that the statute granted anyone a special
or exclusive right or privilege; and it seems the statute in the Rolston case
was held void because it granted an immunity to railroads which had con-
structed depots without a bonus. The application of subdivision 26 seems
warranted in that case because those railroads were granted an immunity,
not from returning the bonus, but from having to apply for and secure the
permission of the board. In the Idel case it is difficult to see how any im-
munity was granted to a corporation which had not received a bonus, be-
cause there could never be any obligation on it to return something which
it had never received.
A fine discussion of the tests and principles by which a legislative act
is considered in determining whether it makes a reasonable classification,
or whether arbitrary distinctions have been drawn in violation of the equal
protection and special or local law provisions of our state and national con-
stitutions, is found in State v. Kennedy.19 This case involved the section
of the Liquor Control Act which provides for the issuing of saloon licenses.
Tinder this act licenses may be issued for the sale, by the drink, of malt
liquor, containing not more than 5% alcohol, to any person in the state.
Licenses for the sale, by the drink, of liquor containing more than 5%
alcohol may not be issued to persons in rural districts, in unincorporated
towns, nor in towns having less than 500 inhabitants. In cities having 500,
but less than 20,000 inhabitants, licenses may be issued only after an af-
firmative vote of a majority of the qualified voters of the city, and in cities
having over 20,000 inhabitants, licenses may be issued without any election.
The opinion points out that "acts of the legislature are presumed to be con-
stitutional until the contrary is clearly shown" and that "one who assails
the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it
does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary."
Applying these principles the court held that the auestioned provision (See.
19. 348 Mo. 786, 123 S. W. (2d) 118 (1938).
1939]
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13a, Mo. St. Ann. § 4525g-15, p. 4689) of the Liquor Control Act is not a
special or local law, and is constitutional.
V. CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The court had before it a very interesting question of constitutional
construction in the case of State ex inf. McKittrick v. Bode.20 The consti-
tutional amendment (which was proposition 4 on the ballot, and is popular-
ly referred to as amendment 4) which created the conservation commission,
provides that "a director of Conservation shall be appointed by the Com-
mission . .," and that "the Commission shall determine the qualifica-
tions of the director . . ." Section 10, article VIII, of the constitution,
which was in force at the time of the adoption of amendment 4, provides
that "no person shall be elected or appointed to any office in this state,
who shall not have resided in this state one year next preceding his
election or appointment." The conservation commission appointed a direc-
tor -who had not been a resident of this state one year prior to his appoint-
ment, and this suit in quo warranto was instituted to oust him from the of-
flee.
The majority opinion first discussed the definition of a "public officer"
within the meaning of the constitution, and held that the director is a
public officer. The opinion then discussed the rule that constitutional pro-
visions should be harmonized if possible, but pointed out that amendments
are usually adopted for the express purpose of making changes in the exist-
ing system. In this particular case the language of the amendment is
unambiguous in that it provides that the conservation commission shall
"determine the qualifications of the director," which is in direct conflict
with Section 10, article VIII. Since there is a direct conflict, the latest
expression of the people, i. e., the amendment, will prevail.
The separate concurring opinion in which three of the judges joined,
held, from an analysis of the duties of the director, that his position was
more analogous to that of the president of the state university or one of the
state teachers colleges, that he was not a public officer, and that for this
reason Section 10, article VIII did not apply.
In Ex parte Marsh v. Bartlett,2' the court again had amendment 4 be-
fore it for construction. This was an original proceeding in habeas corpus,
20. 342 Mo. 162, 113 S. W. (2d) 805 (1938).
21. 343 Mo. 526, 121 S. W.' (2d) 737 (1938).
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and the petitioner had been convicted of catching a bass on May 28, 1939,
in violation of the express wording of Section 8270, Missouri Revised Stat-
utes 1929. The conservation commission, however, had promulgated a res-
olution opening the season on bass on that date. Amendment 4 provided
that "the control, management, restoration, conservation and regulation of
the bird, fish, game, forestry and all wild life resources of the State
shall be vested" in a conservation commission, and that "all existing laws
inconsistent herewith shall no longer remain in force or effect." The court
held that Section 8270, being a legislative regulation of fish, was inconsistent
with the amendment and was expressly repealed by its adoption. The court
refused to pass on which other sections of the statutory fish and game code
were repealed and which were not repealed by the adoption of the amend-
ment, except to indicate that some of the penalty sections were not repealed.
In several cases the court considered whether various provisions of
out state constitution were self-enforcing. In State ex rel. Miller v. O'Mal-
ley,22 it was held that that portion of Section 3, article VIII, authorizing the
use of ballots as evidence in grand jury investigations was self-enforcing.
In State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wymore,28 the court approved the ruling in
State ex inf. Norman v. Ellis,24 that Section 13, article XIV (providing for
a forfeiture of office for nepotism) was self-enforcing, and reversed the rul-
ing in State ex rel. Letoher v. Dearing,5 that Section 24, article XII, (pro-
viding for a forfeiture of office for acceptance of a railroad pass) was not
self-enforcing. In Ex parte Marsh v. Bartlett,21 the court had a more
complicated question before it. Amendment 4 provided that it should be
self-enforcing, but also provided that "the General Assembly may enact
any laws in aid of but not inconsistent with the provisions of this amend-
ment." No laws had been enacted in "aid of" the amendment at the
time this case was decided. The court ruled that the amendment was not
held in abeyance until such legislation was enacted, and pointed out, in
addition, that there were statutes in force fixing penalties for violation of
provisions of the Fish and Game code which would apply to regulation of
the commission. In State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. O'Maley,27 the court
held, in line with many previous decisions, that Section 21, article II, pro-
22. 342 Mo. 641, 117 S. W. (2d) 319 (1938).
23. 343 Mo. 98, 119 S. W. -(2d) 941 (1938).-
24. 325 Mo. 154, 28 S. W. (2d) 363 (1930).
25. 253 Mo. 604, 162 S. W. 618 (1913).
26. 343 Mo. 526, 121 S. W. (2d) 737 (1938).
27. 343 Mo. 658, 122 S. W. (2d) 940 (1938).
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viding that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation, was self-enforcing.
In State ex rel. Webster Groves Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Smith,28 the
court reiterated the well established rule that where a statute is capable of
two interpretations, one of which is constitutional and the other unconstitu-
tional, the courts will interpret the language so as to uphold the constitu-
tionality of the statute.
In Ex parte Diemer v. Weiss, 29 the court held that a city ordinance
which prohibited picketing was so indefinite, uncertain, and unintelligible
that it was void for uncertainty.
VI. RETROSPECTIVE AND EX POST FACTO LAws
In the case of State ex rel. Clark v. Shain,80 the relator claimed that a
ruling of the Kansas City Court of Appeals violated Section 15, Article II
of our constitution, the section prohibiting the enactment of ex post facto
and retrospective laws by the General Assembly. The court pointed out
that this provision of the constitution applies only to legislative acts and
not to decisions of courts.81
VII. JUST COMPENSATION
In the case of State ex ret. City of St. Louis v. O'Malley, 2 the court
had before it the propriety of a suit brought by an abutting property owner
for consequential damage caused by change of grade of a street. The suit
as brought was predicated upon Section 7222, Missouri Revised Statutes
1929. The court held that this was not the applicable statute, because the
charter of St. Louis provided its own method of assessing damages, which
superseded the statutory provision. The court also pointed out that if there
were no effective statutory provision for the ascertainment and payment
of compensation in an action by the property owner, that Section 21, article
II had always been held self-enforcing, and the property owner could bring
a common law action that would afford him adequate relief.8
28. 342 Mo. 365, 115 S. W. (2d) 816 (1938).
29. 343 Mo. 626, 122 S. W. (2d) 922 (1938).
30. 343 Mo. 66, 119 S. W. (2d) 971 (1938).
31. Hilgert v. Barber Asphalt Pay. Co., 173 Mo. 319, 72 S. W. 1070 (1903).
32. 343 Mo. 658, 122 S. W. (2d) 940 (1938).
33. Tremayne v. City of St. Louis, 320 Mo. 120, 6 S. W. (2d) 935 (1928).
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VIII. SEPARABILITY OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The case of State ex inf. McKittriek v. Cameron,"' involved the con-
stitutionality of the act of 1933 which repealed Sections 9572 and 9574
of the Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, relating to school board elections in
cities of over 500,000, and enacted a new section providing for a new meth-
od. The court had previously held in the case of State ex rel. Preisler v.
Woodward,85 that parts of the amending act were unconstitutional as being
in conflict with Section 9, article II, which provides that "all elections shall
be free and open." The question raised by this case was whether the act,
as it remained after striking out the unconstitutional portions, was the
valid controlling law under which an election should have been held and
the results ascertained. After examining the act as a whole and the pur-
pose for which it was enacted, the court held that after discarding the part
previously held valid there was not enough left to show the legislative in-
tent and to furnish sufficient means to effectuate that intent, and that for
that reason the entire act of 1933 was invalid. The court further held that
since the repealing clause (repealing Sections 9572 and 9574) was inci-
dental to the rest of the act and the act was unconstitutional, the repealing
clause was likewise invalid and the prior general law was left unrepealed.
IX. _mCELLANEOUS
In Ex parte Marsh v. Bartlett,8 the court discussed a number of at-
tacks upon the validity of amendment 4. It was asserted that it violated
that part of Section 2, article XV which provides that "No proposed amend-
ment shall contain more than one amended and revised article of this Con-
stitution or one new article which shall not contain more than one subject
and matters properly connected therewith," because it did contain more
than one subject, and because in the form it was submitted to the voters it
contained no expression identifying the number of the particular article
or section in the constitution which it was to amend or affect, or to what
provision of the constitution it related. The court overruled both these
contentions, and in respect to the latter left an inference that the same
ruling might not apply to an amendment which was not initiated. The
court further ruled that Sections 24 to 34 of Article IV of the constitution
34. 342 Mo. 830, 117 S. W. (2d) 1078 (1938).
35. 340 Mo. 906, 105 S. W. (2d) 912 (1937).
36. 343 Mo. 526, 121 S. W. (2d) 737 (1938).
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only apply to legislative acts, and that the numbering and arranging of the
sections of the constitution and the amendments thereto is expressly dele-
gated by Section 4 of the schedule of the constitution to the secretary of
state as an administrative duty.
It was also contended in this case (by the attorney general) that the
amendment was invalid because in the form it was submitted to the voters it
did not contain any direct expression identifying it as an amendment to
the constitution, or state by its terms that it amended the constitution, and
that the voters may have thought they were voting an initiative statute. The
court pointed out that in the form it appeared on the ballot it contained a
title, prepared by the attorney general, stating that it was a proposal to
amend the constitution, and that the last two sentences of the proposal said
"The General Assembly may enact any laws in aid of but not inconsistent
with the provisions of this amendment and all existing laws inconsistent
herewith shall no longer remain in force or effect. This amendment shall
be self-enforcing and go into effect July 1, 1937." Another contention
which the court overruled was that the amendment was not valid because in
effect it was not organic law but a legislative act anrelated to and incon-
gruous with the constitution.
In the case of State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley,37 the court held that a
statute which was unconstitutional at the time of its enactment was not
validated by subsequent constitutional amendment, except, perhaps, in case
the amendment ratifies and confirms the statute.
In State v. Merchant,8 the court held that an objection that evidence
"was not the best evidence" raised no constitutional point, and that the ob-
jection that the admission of the evidence violated the constitutional right
of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face came too late
in the motion for new trial. "Constitutional rights must be seasonably
asserted, even in criminal cases."
In Hann et al. v. Fitzgerald,39 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defend-
ant from enforcing the Sunday provisions of the Intoxicating Liquor Act,
Laws 1935, p. 267, Mo. St. Ann., Sections 4525g-16, p. 4689. The petition
alleged that the law "violated terms of the Constitution of the State of
Missouri and of the United States." The court held that without alleging
violation of particular provisions of the constitution, the petition presented
no constitutional question.
37. 342 Mo. 641, 117 S. W. (2d) 319 (1938).
38. 119 S. W. (2d) 303 (Mo. 1938).
39. 342 Mo. 1166, 119 S. W. (2d) 808 (1938).
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CRIMINAL LAW
J. HuGo GRmm*
During the year 1938 the supreme court decided fifty criminal appeals,
three less than in the preceding year, affirming the trial courts in thirty-
four, or one less than in the preceding like period.
Since practically all crimes now recognized in this state are statutory
and the elements of these as well as of the few surviving common law crimes
have been defined by the court, and moreover, since the procedure in crim-
inal cases is largely regulated by statutes which the court has had frequent
occasion to consider and pass upon, it is obvious that cases of first impres-
sion and entirely novel questions of law will not often arise, but the court
will in most cases be called upon to apply established rules and principles
to novel situations. It is, therefore, not surprising to note that in almost
one-half of the cases decided in the past year questions of the admissibility
or competency of evidence have not only been passed upon but have also
largely determined the decisions. And in some twelve to fifteen cases the
decisions turned largely upon the substantial or formal correctness of in-
structions given or refused, and the sufficiency of indictments and informa-
tions received the court's attention in some ten or more cases.
Only such cases will be noted as present matters of unusual public in-
terest, the extension of established principles to new situations or where
former views have been modified or entirely changed or disapproved.
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. Challange of array or of individual grand juror
Where a negro defendant was arrested and charged with offense more
than three months before the grand jury was impaneled, his objection that
negroes were discriminated against in selection of the grand jury, made af-
ter the grand jury was sworn, came too late to be considered, in view of
Sections 3514 and 3515, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929.1 But where
before the grand jury is sworn the defendant requests and is denied the
right to appear before the grand jury and challenge the array or an indi-
*Atorney, St. Louis. LL.B., Washington University, 1886; Ph.B., St.
Louis University, 1888. Former circuit judge.
1. State v. King, 342 Mo. 975, 119 S. W. (2d) 277 (1938).
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vidual before the jury is sworn, he does not lose his right, but may exercise
it later, the statute notwithstanding.2
B. Jurors-competency
Since jurors must be impartial and unprejudiced, deputy sheriffs are
not competent to serve on juries, for their official duties may well conflict
or be inconsistent with the duties of a juror.8
C. Indictment or information
The court followed an unbroken line of decisions holding that an in-
formation charging burglary was fatally defective if it failed to allege that
the burglary was committed feloniously or with a felonious intent.4
II. TRIAL PROCEDURE
A. Evidence
In a prosecution based upon an information charging defendant with
an assault upon a certain person with intent to maim, the evidence showed
that the assault was committed by throwing acid upon the left side of a
moving taxicab while the person alleged to be the object of the assault sat
in the right side as a passenger, it being night at the time. It was held
that failure to show that defendant knew that the alleged object of the as-
sault was in the taxicab at the time constituted a failure of proof and re-
quired the reversal of a judgment of conviction.5
*Where there is substantial conflicting evidence on the question of
whether a confession is voluntary, the issue of voluntariness should in most
cases be submitted to the jury, although the court may exclude it not with-
standing there is substantial evidence indicating that it was voluntary.
Where defendant objects to the admission of a confession on the ground
2. State v. Richetti, 342 Mo. 1015, 119 S. W. (2d) 330 (1938). This Richetti
case and the King case were both decided on August 17, 1938, and in each the
opinion was written by Judge Ellison. In each case the court gives the history
of sections 3514 and 3515 and the reasons leading to their enactment.
3. State v. Langley, 342 Mo. 447, 116 S. W. (2d) 38 (1938).
4. State v. Pryor, 342 Mo. 951, 119 S. W. (2d) 253 (1938).
5. State v. Martin, 342 Mo. 1089, 119 S. W. (2d) 298 (1938), (1939) 4
Mo. L. Rnv. 319. This is a very interesting case. The opinion which was written
by Judge Ellison contains a review of pertinent cases, including State v. William-
son, 203 Mo. 591, 102 S. W. 519 (1907), in which Faris, J. concurred only reluct-
antly in the decision. However, the decided cases seem to fully sustain the
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that it is involuntary, the court should grant a request for a preliminary
hearing out of the presence of the jury.-
B. Instructions
Where the court in the main instruction tells the jury that if they find
the facts as therein set forth, they should find the defendant guilty, but
that "unless you so find the facts to be you will acquit the defendant," it
need not give the converse of such instructions unless requested to do so by
defendant, and it seems that it will not be reversible error to refuse to give
such instruction, though requested, where other instructions given by it
fully cover the point.7
Only a prima facie or substantial showing of the elements of self-de-
fense is necessary to raise the issue, and when raised, the burden rests on
the state to prevail thereon beyond a reasonable doubt.8
It is prejudicial error to instruct the jury to consider together all state-
ments made by the accused relative to the offense after the commission
thereof, and to declare that the unfavorable statements are presumed to
be true, even where there is evidence tending to establish both the favorable
and unfavorable statements.'
6. State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S. W. (2d) 88 (1938). In this case
no brief was filed for appellant, but the court, mindful of the duty cast upon it
by the statute, carefully examined into the twenty-seven assignments of error set
out in the motion for new trial, and finding reversible error sent the case back
for retrial. The decision turned entirely upon the failure of the court to instruct
the jury with respect to the confessions which had been read in evidence, having
refused the instructions asked by defendant to the effect that if they found that
the confessions were not voluntarily made, they should disregard them. The
court goes into the whole matter of confessions and the procedure in the trial court
with regard to them with painstaking care and cites practically all the Missouri
cases pertaining to the matter, reviewing many of them.
7. State v. Fraley, 342 Mo. 442, 116 S. W. (2d) 17 (1938). This case is im-
portant because it is a clear departure from the earlier cases, principal among
them State v. Sloan, 309 Mo. 498, 274 S. W. 734 (1925). It seems to the writer
that the court could have gone further and held that the trial court might, in
some complicated cases at any rate, be required to give the converse of the
state's instructions even without a request.
8. State v. Strawther, 342 Mo. 618, 116 S. W. (2d) 133 (1938); State v.
Davis, 342 Mo. 594, 116 S. W. (2d) 110 (1938). In the former case Judge Leedy
reviews the Missouri cases on this point.
9. State v. Busch, 342 Mo. 959, 119 S. W. (2d) 265 (1938). In this case
Commissioner Cooley's opinion, adopted by the court, condemns an instruction
which formerly was freely given. The instruction was sharply criticized by
the court in State v. Johnson, 333 Mo. 1008, 1013, 63 S. W. (2d) 1000, 1002
(1933), approving a motion for rehearing. Later, in State v. Duncan, 336 Mo.
600, 80 S. W. (2d) 147 (1935), the court, speaking through Judge Ellison, again
condemned the instructions as invading the province of the jury.
29
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The cases in equity decided by the supreme court in 1938 were not
marked by any new developments in this branch of jurisprudence, and
involved merely the application of recognized principles to the particular
facts.
Since the appellate court in equity reviews the facts as well as the law,
it is not surprising to find that the opinions of the court in the past year
dealt exhaustively with the facts. None the less, one is impressed with the
careful consideration and analysis which the opinions disclose are given.
to the facts, and with the frequency of the occasions on which the conclu-
sions drawn by the supreme court upon the facts differ from the conclusions
drawn by the chancellor. Where the findings of fact of the trial court
lead to an unreasonable or inequitable result, the supreme court has not
hesitated to substitute its own findings. In Peikert v. Repple,' the court
stated it would not hesitate to make findings adverse to the chancellor,
where the result reached by the chancellor upon the facts did not seem
reasonable.
To the writer, this attitude seems a most salutary one, and indicates
the presence of that active, critical spirit, characteristic of the inquiring
mind bent only upon the purpose of ascertaining the true facts to the end
that equity be done.
It is believed that the bar, generally, is in wholehearted accord with
this approach to the decision of equity cases on appeal, consistently mani-
fested by the supreme court.
In several cases it was held that where a creditor having a bona fide
claim against a debtor is a party to a fraudulent scheme with the debtor,
whereby the debtor makes a conveyance to him for the purpose of defeating
the claims of another creditor, the claim of the creditor who is a party to
the fraud will be postponed and subordinated to the claim of the creditor
whom it was intended to defraud.2
*Attorney, St. Louis. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1918.
1. 342 Mo. 274, 114 S. W. (2d) 999 (1938).
2. Peikert v. Repple, 342 Mo. 274, 114 S. W. (2d) 999 (1938); Citizens
Bank of Pleasant Hill v. Robinson, 342 Mo. 697, 117 S. W (2d) 263 (1938).
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The principle of equitable estoppel was applied in Boone v. Oetting,
where it was held that remaindermen who had accepted the proceeds of a
void partition sale with knowledge of the facts were estopped in equity
from asserting any further interest in the lands which had been the subject
of the sale.
An interesting discussion of option contracts is found in the case of
Suhre v. Busch,4 which was a suit in equity to compel specific performance
of an agreement for the resale of stock purchased from the plaintiff by the
defendant. At the time defendant purchased the stock from the plaintiff,
he agreed that the plaintiff could repurchase the same at a specified price
at any time within a specified period. There was a limited extension of
that period subsequently given. Within the time as extended, plaintiff
appeared at the office of the defendant and was advised that the defendant
was ill and not in the office. Plaintiff made no tender of the amount re-
quired to be paid in order to repurchase the stock. Two years later, and
after the stock had become more valuable, plaintiff tendered the amount
required, and when the tender was rejected, brought suit for specific per-
formance. In reversing the decree for the plaintiff, the supreme court held
that tender of perforfance upon the part of the plaintiff was essential, as
time was clearly of the essence. The court further held that even if tender
within the specified time was excused by reason of the acts of the defendant,
the plaintiff only had a reasonable time thereafter in which to tender per-
formance, and that the period of two years during which she waited, and in
which period the stock had become much more valuable, was not a reason-
able time. The court further held that since the evidence clearly demon-
strated that the plaintiff was not able to tender performance, she could not
recover.
In Long v. Long,5 a contract was entered into under which a business
was given to the defendant and the defendant was to make certain stipu-
lated payments. The defendant failed to make such payments, and can-
cellation of the contract was sought. It was held that plaintiff had an
adequate remedy at law in damages for the amounts which the defendant
had agreed to pay, and the failure of the defendant to make the payments
did not justify cancellation of the contract.
In several cases, it was held that mere lapse of time was not sufficient
3. 342 Mo. 269, 114 S. W. (2d) 981 (1938).
4. 343 Mo. 170, 120 S. W. (2d) 47 (1938).
5. 121 S. W. (2d) 800 (Mo. 1938).
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to support the defense of laches. In Bickel v. Argyle 17v. Co.,G the court
said:
"Laches . . cannot be invoked to defeat justice; and it will be
applied only where the enforcement of the right asserted would work in-
justice."' "The defense that a claim is stale is purely an equitable one
and unless there is some natural justice back of it a court of equity will not
entertain it."'8  Before laches can be invoked, ". . . the delay must
have been such as practically to preclude the court from arriving at a safe
conclusion as to the truth of the matters in controversy, and thus make the
doing of equity either doubtful or impossible ,, Mere lapse of
time is not sufficient to support laches.
In Waugh v. Williams,0 the court reaffirmed the principle that where
a court of equity has once taken jurisdiction, it will not relax jurisdiction
until full and complete justice has been done.
In State ex rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe, " ' it was held that
all persons legally or beneficially interested in the subject matter of a suit
in equity, no matter how numerous, should be made parties, so there might




The doctrine of judicial notice has apparently not been extended to
any new fields by the supreme court during the year 1938.
Judicial notice was taken that bank deposits were guaranteed by the
United States Government, under its laws, on May 13, 1935.1 It was further
held that in determining whether a petition against directors of a failed
bank sufficiently charged their assent to the reception of deposits, the
6. 343 Mo. 456, 121 S. W. (2d) 803 (1938).
7. 21 C. J., § 212, p. 214.
8. Bucher v. Hohl, 199 Mo. 320, 330, 97 S. W. 922, 925 (1906).
9. 21 C. J., § 219, p. 223.
10. 342 Mo. 903, 119 S. W. (2d) 223 (1938).
11. 343 Mo. 580, 122 S. W. (2d) 909 (1938).
*Attorney, Moberly, Missouri. A. B., University of Missouri, 1917, L. L. B.,
1920.
1. Peikert v. Repple, 342 Mo. 274, 114 S. W. (2d) 999 (1938).
[Vol. 4
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1939], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss4/1
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1938
court was required to consider certain statutory provisions in connection
with the specific allegations of the petition, and that the court would take
judicial notice of the statutes without their being pleaded.2
Judicial notice of land descriptions in government surveys was taken,3
and this doctrine was applied to make certain a land description which
would have otherwise been uncertain, because of the failure to recite the
county and state in which the land was located, for the reason that the
court judicially knows a given section, township and range to be in a
definite county in this state, but does not judicially know any such location
outside this state.
4
As to values, the court judicially noticed that the term "money", as
commonly used and understood, is something which has value,5 and in
considering provisions of a will, it was held that it was common knowledge
that a $500.00 interest-bearing security, bequeathed therein, might be
selling on the market either at a discount or at a premium, and that accrued
interest thereon would have to be taken into consideration in determining
its value.6
The doctrine of judicial notice was applied to certain matters of com-
mon knowledge--notably, that a person or object can be recognized for a
period of about thirty minutes after sunset and for a similar period before
sunrise. It was further stated that the time of sunrise on a particular
morning would be judicially noticed.7
And the court, in Pearrow v. Thompson," judicially noticed that the
trend from rural to urban life had caused the roar of motors in cities to
replace the more pastoral sounds of the barn-yards, and that dwellers in
large cities necessarily must know more about machinery than about farm
animals.
The court judicially noticed geographical facts, locations and bound-
aries, in that it judicially noticed that Bolivar is only twenty-eight miles
from Springfield, on State Highway 13, and that a person travelling at
ordinary speed, by automobile, could have been in Springfield at 11:00
2. Hutcherson v. Thompson, 343 Mo. 884, 123 S. W. (2d) 142 (1938).
3. Frazier v. Shantz Real Estate and Inv. Co., 343 Mo. 861, 123 S. W. (2d)
124 (1938).
4. Curry v. Crull, 342 Mo. 553, 116 S. W. (2d) 125 (1938).
5. State v. Gabriel, 342 Mo. 519, 116 S. W. (2d) 75 (1938).
6. Marr v. Marr, 342 Mo. 656, 117 S. W. (2d) 230 (1938).
7. State v. Perkins, 342 Mo. 560, 116 S. W. (2d) 80 (1938).
8. 343 Mo. 490, 121 S. W. (2d) 811 (1938).
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A. M. and in Bolivar in the afternoon by 4:00, 3:00 or even 2:00 o'clock,
a period of time which no doubt may be reduced in the future.9
Further, the court, where proof showed that a murder had been com-
mitted adjacent to U. S. Highway 63, about two miles south of Pomona,
judicially noticed that Pomona was in Howell County, Missouri, and that
the point described was also in Howell County, and it was stated that the
court could judicially notice the location of roads in the highway system
and the distances therealong, in line with the general doctrine authorizing
the court to note judicially facts which are a part of the general knowl-
edge of the country, and which are duly authenticated in public reposi-
tories open to all.10
Judicially noticing habits, acts and customs of the people, the court, in
Bitehler v. Festus Mercantile Co.," recognized that it is common knowledge
that occupants of automobiles rely on a driver, who has exclusive control
and management of the vehicle, to exercise the required degree of care in
its control and management, the court saying that for that reason, it could
not be a hard and fast rule that the occupants were negligent in so doing.
And the court further noticed that automobiles on through-streets pass over
intersections at a considerable rate of speed, on the assumption that cars
approaching on intersecting streets governed by stop-signs will obey the
signs. 2
In Houck v. Little River Drainage District,"' the court took judicial
notice of its own records in a former case, to learn how a rock road had its
origin and when it was constructed. And again, judicial notice was taken
to determine that an appeal in another case had been dismissed. 14
In one instance at least, the court refused to extend the doctrine, by
holding that it could not take judicial notice of the professional reputation
of defendant's attorney."
II. PREsumpTIo , INmERENcE AND BURDEN OF PRooF
Every adult is presumed to be of sound mind, and capable of com-
mitting crime.1 6
9. State v. Ashcraft, 342 Mo. 608, 116 S. W. (2d) 128 (1938).
10. State v. Kenyon, 343 Mo. 1168, 126 S. W. (2d) 245 (1938).
11. 343 Mo. 139, 119 S. W. (2d) 961 (1938).
12. Hangge v. Umbright, 119 S. W. (2d) 382 (Mo. 1938).
13. 343 Mo. 28, 119 S. W. (2d) 826 (1938).
14. State v. Bockman, 124 S. W. (2d) 1205 (Mo. 1939).
15. State v. Davit, 343 Mo. 1151, 125 S. W. (2d) 47 (1938).
16. State v. Corrington, 116 S. W. (2d) 87 (Mo. 1938).
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Concerning presumptions as to knowledge of law and fact, it was held
that a voter is presumed to know the law, but not a candidate's qualifica-
tions for office-such as his age, residence, want of naturalization and
political or religions beliefs."
A mortgagee who held a junior deed of trust was charged with a
knowledge of the law with respect to the rights of the holder of the senior
deed of trust, where in the absence of fraud or deception, said holder
released the senior deed of trust and accepted a renewal deed of trust.1 8
In Russefl v. Franks,'9 the court states that the failure of a party,
having knowledge of facts and circumstances vitally affecting the issues
on trial, to testify in his own behalf or to call other witnesses within his
power, who have knowledge of such facts and circumstances, raises a
strong presumption and inference that the testimony of such persons would
have been unfavorable and damaging to the party failing to proffer them,
but in this suit to set aside a trust deed as in fraud of creditors, no un-
favorable presumptions against the defendants arose, because of their
failure to testify, until the plaintiff had made a prima facie case.
The court held that the burden of proving legitimacy rests on the party
alleging it, and that any presumption of legitimacy affected only the duty
of going forward with the evidence, and not the burden of proof.2 0
And the burden of proof as to fraud, which is an affirmative defense,
was held to be upon the party setting up the defense.21
Concerning the presumption in favor of official acts, the court held
that where the Liquor Control Act made it mandatory upon the attorney
general to enforce the Act, without requiring him to await the request or
direction of the governor, the presumption of right and lawful conduct
on the part of an assistant attorney general, in signing a complaint under
the Act, would apply, even though there was no request from the governor.22
III. ADMISSIONS AND DEcLARATIoNs
In a controversy over property, where the plaintiff claimed the de-
fendant's testator had only a life interest therein, and that plaintiff was
17. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Cameron, 342 Mo. 830, 117 S. W. (2d) 1078(1938).
18. State ex rel. Breit v. Shain, 342 Mo. 1148, 119 S. W. (2d) 758 (1938).
19. 343 Mo. 159, 120 S. W. (2d) 37 (1938).
20. Clapper v. Lakin, 343 Mo. 710, 123 S. W. (2d) 27 (1938).
21. Greene v. Spitzer, 343 Mo. 751, 123 S. W. (2d) 57 (1938).
22. State v. Kennedy, 343 Mo. 786, 123 S. W. (2d) 118 (1938).
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entitled to a share therein as a remainderman after the life estate, a state-
ment by the defendant's testator that everything she had came to her
under the will of her deceased husband, which gave her a life estate, was
admissible as a statement opposed to her interest, and was admissible
against her devisee, the defendant.23
In State v. King,24 the statement of defendant to a police officer that
a taxi driver, upon his arrival in the city, had told him that if the driver
was needed, to call him, was admissible against the interest of the defendant,
after the defendant had denied that he knew the taxi driver in question or
had ridden with him.
IV. PAROL AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE, AFFECTING WRITINGS
In Robinson v. Field,25 the rule is reaffirmed that the consideration
expressed in a deed is open to explanation by parol evidence.
V. OPINION EVIDENCE
The court, in two cases, reaffirmed the well-settled rule that before
a lay witness can testify to the insanity of a person, he must first detail
facts and acts upon which he bases the opinion, but that this is not neces-
sary where the witness testifies to the sanity of the person.20
In Berry v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,27 it was held that a
physician may give his expert opinion of the condition of a patient, founded
on his observation or on the patient's present subjective symptoms, or
both, and in giving his opinion, the physician may testify not only as to
what he observed but as to what the patient told him about his present
symptoms, but such opinion must not be based on the statement of the
patient as to his past physical condition or symptoms, this being mere
hearsay.
In Jones v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R.,28 the court said that
although the ultimate issuable fact for the jury was whether the bridge in
question was adequate for the purposes it was expected to serve, never-
theless, expert testimony by an engineer upon the question was not an
23. Graham v. Stroh, 342 Mo. 686, 117 S. W. (2d) 258 (1938).
24. 342 Mo. 1067, 119 S. W. (2d) 322 (1938).
25. 342 Mo. 778, 117 S. W. (2d) 308 (1938).
26. State v. Todd, 342 Mo. 601, 116 S. W. (2d) 113 (1938); Platt v. Platt,
343 Mo. 745, 123 S. W. (2d) 54 (1938).
27. 341 Mo. 658, 121 S. W. (2d) 825 (1938).
28. 343 Mo. 1104, 125 S. W. (2d) 5 (1938).
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invasion of the province of the jury, and that the jury was entitled to the
aid of such expert testimony in resolving conflicts in evidence upon this
issue. It was further stated that where the source and extent of the re-
spective experiences and capacity of expert witnesses was revealed to the
jury, the question of whether the experts lacked the necessary knowledge
and information of the facts upon which to have based a worthwhile
opinion affected only the weight and value of their testimony and not its
competency.
Where a witness disclaims ability to form an opinion on a subject,
such as speed, he should not be urged or allowed to guess on the matter
under the guise of an opinion. 29
VI. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Where facts tending to show self-defense are intermingled with the
State's evidence, the defendant can claim advantage of them.30
Concerning the credibility of witnesses, the court, in Siegel v. Missouri-
Kansas-Texas R. R.,31 held that a brakeman who had testified in his action
for injuries received while engaged in a switching movement, that he
was rendered unconscious from the time of the injury for almost a month,
and did not have testimonial knowledge of switching movements subse-
quent to the fall, could not give testimony of probative value concerning
the switching movements of the train subsequent to his fall. It was said
that where a witness testifies to contradictory facts, the one cancels the
other, and no evidence is left from the witness on that point.
In Clapper v. Lakin,32 the rule is recognized that a party is not ordi-
narily concluded by his testimony in a case where subsequently, upon some
excuse of mistake, oversight, misunderstanding or lack of definite recol-
lection, he denies his former statements, but that if the party makes no
correction, or merely states facts diametrically opposed without explanation,
he is concluded. In the instant case, it was held that the testimony of one
party plaintiff, as to her age, was not so conclusive as to bind other plaintiffs.
In Rucker v. Alton R. R.,33 the defendant had produced testimony that
the deceased stopped before entering on defendant's tracks, and in absence
29. Gorman v. Franklin, 117 S. W. (2d) 289 (Mo. 1938).
30. State v. Davis, 342 Mo. 594, 116 S. W. (2d) 110 (1938).
31. 342 Mo. 1130, 119 S. W. (2d) 376 (1938).
32. Clapper v. Lakin, 343 Mo. 710, 123 S. W. (2d) 27 (1938).
33. 343 Mo. 929, 123 S. W. (2d) 24 (1938).
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of the showing of a mistake as to such testimony, the defendant was con-
cluded thereby, and was not entitled to an instruction predicated on de-
cedent's not stopping before entering on the track.
In Platt v. Platt,34 the court, in an action to cancel a deed, where
respondents had introduced a witness who testified to grantor's mental
capacity, held that in the absence of countervailing testimony, the re-
spondents could not ask the court to disregard the testimony of this
witness for whom they stood sponsor.
VII. DOCUMENTARY EVIDExCE
In Lynch v. Baldwin,35 the court held it was not error to introduce
photographs of the plaintiff, showing him wearing a Thomas collar extend-
ing from his waist to his mouth, while he was being treated for spinal
injuries, there being nothing grewsome about the pictures, tending to
excite sympathy. The pictures were admissible as showing the extent
of the inconvenience and pain suffered by plaintiff, in the necessary treat-
ment of his injuries. The court, however, expressly failed to approve the
use of such pictures, saying merely that their introduction was not enough
to require a reversal, under the circumstances, and adding that the device
could have been explained to the jury.
VIII. WITNEssES
A. Competency
In State v. Morefield,5 it was stated that the rule that one coindictee
may not testify against another does not apply where the defendants were
charged in separate indictments, although charged with the same offense.
B. Examination
The trial court has a discretionary right to control the length of a
cross-examination and its course, and will not be charged with error in
the absence of the abuse of discretion .
A witness, on cross-examination, may be asked any question which
tends to test his accuracy, veracity or credibility, or to shake his credit by
34. Platt v. Platt, 343 Mo. 745, 123 S. W. (2d) 54 (1938).
35. 117 S. W. (2d) 273 (Mo. 1938).
36. 342 Mo. 1059, 119 S. W. (2d) 315 (1938).
37. State v. Davit, 343 Mo. 1151, 125 S. W. (2d) 47 (1938).
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injuring his character, and he may be compelled to answer, no matter how
irrelevant or disgraceful it may be, except in instances where the answer
might expose him to a criminal charge, but the examiner is bound by the
answer. However, questions tending to show merely that the witness has
been charged with crime and arrested, without conviction, cannot be
asked.28
In State v. Busch,39 it was held that where defendant's witness had
testified that he was in jail at a certain time, it was not error for the state
to ask, on cross-examination, if he was now out on bond on the charge for
which he was jailed, since it could not possibly do any harm.
C. Credibility, impeachment and corroboration
In State v. McDonald,40 it was held that a motion to require the pro-
duction and inspection of the minutes of a grand jury, for the purpose of
providing defendant with a possible means of impeachment of witness, was
properly denied, and it was further added that a grand jury's minutes are
not substantive proof of a defendant's guilt or innocence, and are not
admissible in evidence as such.
It was held that while a witness may be cross-examined as to specific
acts, for the purpose of impeachment, he nevertheless may not be impeached
by independent proof of such specific acts, where the proof is offered solely
for the purpose of impeachment; and where a witness has testified to cer-
tain facts, he may be asked, on cross-examination, about extra judicial
statements he may have made to the contrary, and if he denies same or
equivocates, he may be impeached on rebuttal, by proof of such extra ju-
dicial statements.4'
In State v. Pyle,4 2 it was held not to be error to exclude evidence
offered by the defendant in chief of prior specific acts of misconduct on
the part of the prosecutrix, in a forcible rape case, which were offered for
the purpose of impeachment of the prosecutrix as a witness.
In Arnold v. Alton R. R.,4 3 an attorney who had represented an orga-
nization which plaintiff at one time sued, and who did not live in plaintiff's
community, was offered as an impeaching witness on the question of plain-
38. State v. Perkins, 342 Mo. 560, 116 S. W. (2d)' 80 (1938).
39. 342 Mo. 959, 119 S. W. (2d) 265 (1938).
40. 342 Mo. 998, 119 S. W. (2d) 286 (1938).
41. State v. Perkins, 342 Mo. 560, 116 S. W. (2d) 80 (1938).
42. 343 Mo. 876, 123 S. W. (2d) 166 (1938).
43. 343 Mo. 1049, 124 S. W. (2d) 1092 (1938).
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tiff's reputation for truth and veracity. The attorney had made a trip
to plaintiff's home town to investigate plaintiff's reputation for truth
and veracity, and it was held that the discretion of the trial court in
permitting the witness to testify as an impeaching witness would not be
disturbed, it being stated that the knowledge of the general reputation,
necessary to make the impeaching witness competent, depended on the
means and extent of his information, rather than on the place of his resi-
dence.
In a suit involving title to land, where defendant contradicted testi-
mony given by him in a divorce suit between plaintiff and defendant some
four months prior, and disclaimed recollection of the testimony there given
by him as to the title to the land, such contradictions and disclaimer could
be considered in determining the weight and credibility to be given de-
fendant's testimony.44
In 0 'MaZey v. City of St. Louis,4 5 it was held that where plaintiff had
testified that the light where she tripped was poor, her prior written state-
ment that the absence of light at the place where she tripped did not cause
her to fall, was entitled to consideration as substantive evidence. The
effect of this ruling will no doubt encourage the practice of procuring,
where possible, written statements from parties to law suits, prior to the
trial of such suits. This is apparently an extension of the rule heretofore
stated in Pulitzer v. Chapman,46 that prior contradictory statements made
in a deposition in the same case by a witness who testified at the trial, and
which were used to impeach his testimony at the trial, might be accepted
as substantive proof of the facts stated.
IX. RELEvANCY AND REs GESTAE
In State v. Richetti,4 7 it was held that to warrant the admission in evi-
dence of a weapon as the weapon with which a crime was committed, clear,
certain and positive proof is not required, but that all that was necessary
to justify the admission of the weapon was a prima facie showing of identi-
ty and connection with the crime-as, that the weapon was found near the
time and scene of the crime, and might have been used in committing
the crime. Such prima facie showing is sufficient without connecting the
44. Rhoads v. Rhoads, 342 Mo. 934, 119 S. W. (2d) 247 (1938).
45. 343 Mo. 14, 119 S. W. (2d) 785 (1938).
46. 85 S. W. (2d) 400 (Mo. 1935).
47. 342 Mo. 1015, 119 S. W. (2d) 330 (1938).
[Vol. 4
40
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1939], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss4/1
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1938
weapon with the accused. The case further holds that it was not necessary
to produce the photographer who took finger prints on a bottle, used for
the purpose of comparison with finger prints of the defendant, when the
expert who was present when the pictures of the prints on the bottle were
taken was present at the trial and identified the photograph.
In Sconce v. Jones,48 the court reaffirms and restates, in a carefully
written opinion, the doctrine of res gestae. In that case, plaintiff, who was
riding in a truck which went off the road, was so penned in the cab of the
truck that he was not released therefrom for sometime after the occurrence.
The court had under consideration the admissibility of statements ex-
planatory of the occurrence, made by plaintiff sometime after the occur-
rence, in response to questions, and while plaintiff was still penned in the
cab of the truck. The court declares that there are two kinds of statements
which may be received in evidence as res gestae-first, that type of state-
ment which can be classified as a verbal act, and which is actually a part
of the transaction under investigation; second, statements made by a
person involved in or present at an accident, in which are declared the
circumstances of the injury, at or after its occurrence. Such statements
are admissible as res gestae when the utterance is a spontaneous and
sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions of the speaker,
produced by the shock. Exceptions to the second class of admissible state-
ments are, first, that the statements cannot be a reflective narration of past
events; second, they cannot be a mere opinion; and third, they cannot be
a conclusion of fact, reached by the process of reasoning on the part of
the speaker, from other facts. The true test is not the time or place of
the statement, but whether it is a spontaneous statement, produced by the
event itself, time and place being merely the fact evidentiary of its spon-
taneous character. Both classes of statements are exceptions to the hear-
say rule and if not admissible as res gestae, would be excluded, because
the party making the statement was not subject to cross-examination at the
time of making it. In the instant case, plaintiff's statement was that the
brakes on the truck had grabbed, which statement involved a process of
reasoning on the part of the plaintiff, making the statement inadmissible as
res gestae, under the third exception above set out.
Examples of statements which were admitted as res gestae, apparently
following the classification of verbal acts, are found in the case of State v.
48. 343 Mo. 362, 121 S. W. (2d) 777 (1938).
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Allen,49 where the defendant, in the course of an attempted robbery in
which witness's husband was killed, and shortly before the shooting,
threatened to rape witness, the threat being admitted as res gestac; and in
State v. Peters,5 where the court held that the acts and declarations of
persons actually committing a robbery of participants in a gambling
game in a barn, were admissible against the defendant as res gestac, where
the defendant stood guard outside the barn during the robbery. In this
case, the defendant was a co-conspirator with the actual robbers.
In State ex rel. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Shaim,'l a suit
was instituted upon an insurance policy, based upon the theory that the
insured was dead after the lapse of more than seven years, and that he
died within the time that the policy was in force. The unsworn statement
of third persons, such as insured's landlord, during the seven-year period,
were introduced in evidence, upon the theory that they were admissible as
res gestae. The court held that such statements were improperly admitted,
since they were not spontaneous, instinctive exclamations or utterances,
directly arising out of the act, event, transaction or occurrence itself, and
so closely connected therewith as to be a very part thereof, and did not
exclude any idea of design, afterthought or premeditation, or of being a
mere retrospective narration or restatement. Apparently, such statements
could not have possibly come under the second classification of statements
admissible as res gestae, as set out in Sconce v. Jones, and the court ruled
in effect that they could not constitute a verbal act, under the first classifica-
tion there set out.
X. CxmmAL LAW
A. Acts and declarations of co-conspirators and co-defendants
In State v. Pierson5 2 the court ruled that a conspiracy may be proven
by evidence of co-conspirators who were also accomplices.
In State v. Richetti,9 ' the court overruled prior decisions to hold that
the acts and declarations of a co-conspirator, made before the inception of
a conspiracy, are not admissible against a conspirator who afterwards en-
ters a conspiracy with the one making the declarations or performing the
49. 342 Mo. 1043, 119 S. W. (2d) 304 (1938).
50. 123 S. W. (2d) 34 (Mo. 1938).
51. 343 Mo. 435, 121 S. W. (2d) 789 (1938).
52. 343 Mo. 841, 123 S. W. (2d) 149 (1938).
53. 342 Mo. 1015, 119 S. W. (2d) 330 (1938).
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acts, but that such acts and declarations of a co-conspirator are admissible
if made after the inception of the conspiracy, although the defendant did
not join the conspiracy until after the acts and declarations were made.
B. Admissions and confessions
In State v. Todd,5 4 the well-settled rule that voluntary statements or
admissions of the accused against his interests are admissible in evidence
against him, is reaffirmed.
In State v. Hesselmeyer, the court held that where there is a joint
charge pending against husband and wife, a statement of one, made out
of the presence of the other, is not admissible against the other; and it
was further held, in State v. Williamson, 6 that a promise of leniency, made
after a confession, cannot make it inadmissible, nor is a confession inad-
missible which is made after a prior confession which was inadmissible
because of inducements, unless a connection exists between the latter con-
fession and the prior inducements. However, the influence which induced
the prior confession is presumed to continue until its cessation is affirma-
tively shown, and evidence to overcome or rebut this presumption of its
continued existence must be clear, strong and satisfactory.
In State v. King 7 it was held that a confession induced by a promise
that the making of it would save a third person from mistreatment is not
thereby invalidated.
Concerning admissions by silence, the court, in State v. Kissinger,58
ruled that where the silence of the accused is maintained under such cir-
cumstances that only a guilty party would remain silent, statements made
in his presence, which are not denied, are admissible as implied admissions.
But where the statement was by the wife of the accused, in response to a
question addressed to her by an officer, this was not true, since it would
have been an intrusion for the defendant to have interfered in a conversa-
tion to which he was not a party, and it is further held that in no event is
silence an admission where the defendant is in either actual or constructive
custody of an officer at the time.
In State v. Gi-bilterra,9 the court re-examined and reconsidered the
54. 342 Mo. 601, 116 S. W. (2d) 113 (1938).
55. 343 Mo. 797, 123 S. W. (2d) 90 (1938).
56. 343 Mo. 732, 123 S. W. (2d) 42 (1938).
57. 342 Mo. 1067, 119 S. W. (2d) 322 (1938).
58. 343 Mo. 781, 123 S. W. (2d) 81 (1938).
59. 342 Mo. 577, 116 S. W. (2d) 88 (1938).
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proper procedure to be followed, where an objection is made to the volun-
tary character of a confession, and stated the rule to be that if a defendant
objects to the confession on the ground that it was not voluntary, and re-
quests a preliminary hearing out of the presence of the jury, it should be
granted. At such hearing, if the evidence is substantial and conflicting,
the court may determine the mixed question of the law and fact by weigh-
ing the evidence, and should rule as he is convinced by the evidence. The
court is not bound to refer the question to the jury if there is substantial
evidence that the confession is voluntary, but where there is substantial con-
flicting evidence and the question is close, the voluntary nature of the
confession should be referred to the jury, and the court can still exclude it
if the evidence produced before the jury, together with that introduced on
preliminary examination, convinces the court that the confession was
involuntary. The appellate court will defer to the trial court's ruling,
unless manifest error appears therein. If all the evidence upon this ques-
tion shows a confession admitted in evidence to be voluntary, the court need
not instruct the jury in relation to its voluntary character, even though
requested, and where there is a conflict of evidence upon the question of
whether the confession is voluntary, even then the court need not give such
an instruction as a part of the law of the case, but should give such an
instruction if requested, and if the requested instruction be not in proper
form, the court should prepare and give a proper instruction on the ques-
tion, unless sufficiently covered by other instructions.
C. Proof of other offenses, and character of accused
In State v. King,0 the court reiterated the rule that proof of inde-
pendent crimes should be excluded in a criminal prosecution, because they
deprive the defendant of the presumption of innocence and of his con-
stitutional right to be informed by indictment or information of the charge
against him. The exceptions are stated to be that where the independent
crimes show (1) motive, (2) intent, or (3) in statutory rape, prior acts
between the same parties constitute a foundation of an antecedent proba-
bility. In the instant case, the defendant, testifying for himself under a
charge of statutory rape, said in effect that he had not had sexual inter-
course with any of the girls at the school where he was employed, and
which the prosecuting witness attended. The state was allowed to cross-
60. 342 Mo. 975, 119 S. W. (2d) 277 (1938).
[Vol. 4
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1939], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss4/1
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1938
examine defendant upon this point, and to show that he had sexual inter-
course with another pupil prior to the offense with which he was charged.
The court said that proof of such acts, prior to the offense charged, was
corroborative, and while the state could not have shown such prior acts
in chief, still, since the defendant initially made a showing on the question,
the state was entitled to meet it on rebuttal, and it could not, under such
circumstances, be contended that such rebuttal evidence was impeachment
upon an immaterial matter. The court distinguishes the case of State v.
Buxton,61 saying that there is a difference in fact between the two cases, but
also saying that the Buxton case squarely upheld defendant's contention in
this case, so leaving it doubtful whether the Buxton case was in effect over-
ruled. Under ordinary circumstances, it is said that where the state injects
collateral crimes or other immaterial matters into its examination, for the
purpose of discrediting defendant, the state is bound by defendant's an-
swers and cannot impeach him. However, this is not true where, as here,





A. To Review Record of Proceedings in Circuit Court
After a comparatively recent original announcement by the Supreme
Court of Missouri of the doctrine that under the constitution of this state
the supreme court has authority to quash judgments of the courts of ap-
peals that conflict with prior decisions of the supreme court,1 by far the
61. 324 Mo. 78, 22 S. W. (2d) 635 (1929).
*Attorney, Cape Girardeau. A.B., University of Missouri, 1916. Author
Of PLEADING, PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND FoRis IN MissouRI (1937).
1. The first case in which the Supreme Court of Missouri exercised its
power to quash an opinion of a court of appeals through the use of the extraordi-
nary writ of certiorari and stated the doctrine under which it held that it was
vested with such power was State ex rel. Curtis v. Broaddus, 238 Mo. 189, 142 S.
W. 340 (1911). For a discussion of the origin and early application of the doctrine,
see McBaine, Certiorari From the Missouri Supreme Court to the Courts of Ap-
peals (1916) 13 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 30; Graves, Certiorari as Used by the
Supreme Court in the Interest of Harmony of Opinion and Uniformity of the
Law (1922) 24 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SEn. 3.
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most frequent use made of the writ of certiorari by the supreme court has
been in the exercise of its power under that doctrine. But that it may also
use the extraordinary writ of certiorari to review and quash proceedings
in other inferior courts where such courts are proceeding beyond their
jurisdiction or have entered orders or judgments that are illegal and be-
yond their power2 is demonstrated by three instances of the use of certiorari
against circuit courts during the year 1938.3
In State ex rel. Miller v. 0'Malley,4 it was held that certiorari may
be used against a circuit judge of St. Louis to review his action in denying
an application for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum commanding the
Secretary of the Board of Election Commissioners to produce ballots in
connection with a grand jury investigation of an election, and after review-
ing the action in that case the writ of certiorari was quashed.
Under a writ of certiorari in State ex ret. Renner v. Alford, the court
reviewed an order of a circuit court overruling a motion to dismiss a
habeas corpus action brought by a mother to recover the custody of a child
adopted in a proceeding in which it was alleged the mother was not noti-
fied as required by law. The supreme court held that the trial court
properly overruled the motion to dismiss, for a decree for the adoption of
a child may be collaterally attacked by a parent in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding where the parent was not a party to the adoption proceedings and
had no action or constructive notice thereof.
A statute6 fixes the date when registration for any election in Kansas
City shall close. Three days after a close of registration for a city election
a prospective voter asked the Board of Election Commissioners to permit
her to register. The Board refused. After various intermediate proceed-
ings the circuit court ordered the board to permit the applicant to register.
The board applied to the supreme court for a writ of certiorari to have the
record and order of the circuit court quashed. Upon a review of the record
under the writ of the supreme court, in State ex rel. Woodmansee v. Ridge7
2. For a discussion of the use of the writ of certiorari generally see Mc-
Baine, The Writ of Certiorari in Missouri (1915) 6 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 3.
For a statement of the rule in a late case, see State ex rel. Woodmansee v. Ridge,
343 Mo. 702, 123 S. W. (2d) 20 (1938).
3. State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117 S. W. (2d) 319 (1938);
State ex rel. Renner v. Alford, 343 Mo. 576, 122 S. W. (2d) 905 (1938); State
ex rel. Woodmansee v. Ridge, 343 Mo. 702, 123 S. W. (2d) 20 (1938).
4. 342 Mo. 641, 117 S. W. (2d) 319 (1938).
5. 343 Mo. 576, 122 S. W. (2d) 905 (1938).6. Mo. Laws 1937, pp. 294-341.
7. 343 Mo. 702, 123 S. W. (2d) 20 (1938).
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held that the statute fixing the time when registration should close was
mandatory, and quashed the record of the circuit court ordering the board
to register the applicant on the ground that the action of the circuit court
was beyond its powers.
B. To Review Opinions of Courts of Appeals
During 1938 the supreme court reviewed the opinions of the courts of
appeals on certiorari in eighteen cases. In nine of these cases the opinions
of the courts of appeals were quashed,8 and in nine of the opinions reviewed
the writs of certiorari were quashedY Of the cases reviewed, six were de-
termined by division one of the court,10 three by division two of the court,"
and eight by the court en banc.'2
Although the opinions in most of these cases repeat principles already
well known, there are instances where these principles are enlarged, and,
8. State ex rel. Heuring v. Allen, 342 Mo. 81, 112 S. W. (2d) 843 (1938) ;
State ex rel. Security Benefit Ass'n v. Shain, 342 Mo. 199, 114 S. W. (2d) 965
(1938); State ex rel. Steinbruegge v. Hostetter, 342 Mo. 341, 115 S. W. (2d)
802 (1938) ; State ex rel. Trading Post Co. v. Shain, 342 Mo. 588, 116 S. W. (2d)
99 (1938); State ex rel. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Shain, 342 Mo. 1049,
119 S. W. (2d) 309 (1938); State ex rel. Breit v. Shain, 342 Mo. 1148, 119 S.
W. (2d) 758 (1938); State ex rel. Fourcade v. Shain, 342 Mo. 1190, 119 S. W.(2d) 788 (1938); State ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shain, 343 Mo.
435. 121 S. W. (2d) 789 (1938); State ex rel. Clark v. Shain, 343 Mo. 542. 122
S. W. (2d) 882 (1938).
9. State ex rel. Washington Fidelity National Ins. Co. v. Hostetter, 342
Mo. 843, 117 S. W. (2d) 1083 (1938); State ex rel. Terminal R. R. Ass'n v.
Hostetter, 342 Mo. 859, 119 S. W. (2d) 208 (1938); State ex rel. Public Serv.
Comm. v. Shain, 342 Mo. 867, 119 S. W. (2d) 220 (1938); State ex rel. Ben
Hur Life Ass'n v. Shain, 342 Mo. 928, 119 S. W. (2d) 236 (1938) ; State ex rel.
Reeves v. Shain, 343 Mo. 550, 122 S. W. (2d) 885 (1938); State ex rel. Brother-
hood of L. F. & E. v. Shain, 343 Mo. 666, 123 S. W. (2d) 1 (1938) ; State ex rel.
Clark v. Shain, 343 Mo. 66, 119 S. W. (2d) 971 (1938); State ex rel. Wors v.
Hostetter, 343 Mo. 945, 124 S. W. (2d) 1072 (1938).
10. State ex rel. Heuring v. Allen, 342 Mo. 81, 112 S. W. (2d) 843 (1938);
State ex rel. Security Benefit Ass'n v. Shain, 342 Mo. 199, 114 S. W. (2d) 965
(1938); State ex rel. Washington Fidelity National Ins. Co. v. Hostetter, 342 Mo.
843, 117 S. W. (2d) 1083 (1938); State ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Shain, 343 Mo. 435, 121 S. W. (2d) 789 (1938); State ex rel. Brotherhood of L.
F. & E. v. Shain, 343 Mo. 666, 123 S. W. (2d) 1 (1938) ; State ex rel. Fourcade
v. Shain, 342 Mo. 1190, 119 S. W. (2d) 788 (1938).
11. State ex rel. Ben Hur Life Ass'n v. Shain, 342 Mo. 928, 119 S. W.
(2d) 236 (1938); State ex rel. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Shain, 342 Mo.
1049, 119 S. W. (2d) 309 (1938) ; State ex rel. Trading Post Co. v. Shain, 342
Mo. 588, 116 S. W. (2d) 99 (1938).
12 State ex rel. Steinbruegge v. Hostetter, 342 Mo. 341, 115 S. W. (2d)
802 (1938); State ex rel. Terminal R. R. Ass'n v. Hostetter, 342 Mo. 859, 119 S.
W. (2d) 208 (1938); State ex rel. Public Serv. Comm. v. Shain, 342 Mo. 867,
119 S. W. (2d) 220 (1938) ; State ex rel. Breit v. Shain, 342 Mo. 1148, 119 S. W.(2d) 758 (1938); State ex rel. Clark v. Shain, 343 Mo. 542, 122 S. W. (2d) 882
(1938) ; State ex rel. Reeves v. Shain, 343 Mo. 550, 122 S. W. (2d) 885 (1938) ;
State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter, 343 Mo. 945, 124 S. W. (2d) 1072 (1938); State




et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
for the reason that there is some value to be derived from an application
of any principle to a different set of facts, reference is hereby made to the
most important points considered in each case.
In State ex rel. Ben Hur Life Ass'n v. Shain,13 State ex rel. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Shain,14 and State ex rel. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R. B. Co. v. Shain,' the court repeated that the object of the constitutional
provision giving the supreme court a superintending control over the courts
of appeals through the use of certiorari was to secure uniformity in judicial
decisions and preserve harmony in the law.
Although it was said in State ex rel. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v.
Shain,6 that in a certiorari proceeding the supreme court is concerned
only with the question of conflict, and in State ea, rel. Brotherhood of L. P.
& E. v. Shain 7 that the court was concerned only with whether or not the
opinion of the court of appeals is in conflict with the last controlling deci-
sion of the supreme court on the points ruled, and in State ex rel. Ben Hur
Life Ass'n v. Shain,18 that on a writ of certiorari the determination of error
is limited to the finding of a conflict between the opinion of the court of ap-
peals under review and the latest ruling opinion of the supreme court on
the subject, it should be added, as was said in State ex rel. Clark v. Shain,19
that when a court of appeals had jurisdiction otherwise to render the par-
ticular judgment under review, the supreme court cannot quash its opin-
ion unless that opinion contravenes some controlling opinion of the supreme
court. Conversely, as the court properly ruled in State ex rel. Clark v.
Shain,20 and in State ex rel. Terminal B. R. Ass'n. v. Hostetter,21 when a
court of appeals has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it, or wheN it ex-
ceeds its jurisdiction by undertaking to exercise unauthorized powers, the
supreme court has the power under a writ of certiorari to quash its opinion,
even though there is no conflict between the opinion of the court of ap-
peals and the controlling decisions of the supreme court.
13. 342 Mo. 928, 119 S. W. (2d) 236 (1938).
14. 343 Mo. 435, 121 S. W. (2d) 789 (1938).
15. 343 Mo. 961, 124 S. W. (2d) 1141 (1939).
16. 342 Mo. 1049, 119 S. W. (2d) 309 (1938).
17. 343 Mo. 666, 123 S. W. (2d) 1 (1938).
18. 342 Mo. 928, 119 S. W. (2d) 236 (1938).
19. 343 Mo. 542, 122 S. W. (2d) 882 (1938).
20. Ibid.
21. 342 Mo. 859, 119 S. W. (2d) 208 (1938).
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1. What Constitutes Conflict
(a) Construction of statutes
In State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter,2 2 it was held that the courts of ap-
peals, within the range of their respective jurisdictions, have the same
rights as the supreme court to construe statutes. In State ex rel. Heuring
v. Allen,23 it was held that the supreme court will not construe a statute on
certiorari where the statute has not been construed by a court of appeals
in a manner that contravenes a construction of the statute made in some
prior decision of the supreme court. In State ex rel. Clark v. Shain,24 the
court laid down the following rules as to the construction of statutes in
certiorari proceedings by the supreme court to review decisions of the courts
of appeals: First, when a statute or contract plainly has but one meaning
under canons of construction established by the supreme court and a court
of appeals gives such statute or contract some other meaning, the opinion
of the court of appeals will be quashed. Second, when a statute or con-
tract is open to construction because its meaning is debatable, a court of
appeals has the right to apply established canons of construction to it and
to declare its meaning according to its own views; and even though the
supreme court does not approve such construction it cannot quash the opin-
ion of the court of appeals unless it contravenes a prior controlling deci-
sion based on the same or similar facts, or unless it is in conflict with a
prior decision of the supreme court construing the same statute or con-
tract. With these rules the opinion in State ex ret. Wors v. Hostetter 5 is
in accord. Applying these rules, it was held in State ex rel. Heuring v.
Allen,"8 that a decision by a court of appeals that there is nothing to pro-
hibit an applicant for insurance from contracting for the kind of insurance
he wants and that interested parties may make such a contract of insurance
as they wish, contravenes decisions of the supreme court determining that
statutes relating to nonforfeiture of insurance policies cannot be waived
and that the parties are limited to methods fixed in the statute for applica-
tion of reserves upon default of a premium payment.
In State ex rel. Security Benefit Ass'n. v. Shain,27 an opinion of a
22. 343 Mo. 945, 124 S. W. (2d) 1072 (1938).
23. 342 Mo. 81, 112 S. W. (2d) 843 (1938).
24. 343 Mo. 542, 122 S. W. (2d) 882 (1938).
25. 343 Mo. 945, 124 S. W. (2d) 1072 (1938).
26. 342 Mo. 81, 112 S. W. (2d) 843 (1938).
27. 342 Mo. 199, 114 S. W. (2d) 965 (1938).
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court of appeals to the effect that a foreign insurer claiming the privileges
of fraternal insurance societies was liable as an old line company and its
certificates issued to members constituted the contracts with the members
because of the failure of the company to comply with the fraternal insur-
ance code in issuing its certificates, was quashed because it was in conflict
with prior decisions of the supreme court28 holding that under the provi-
sions of the applicable statute29 the rights of members of a fraternal benefit
society are not fixed by the terms of the certificate issued, as is true in
the case of policies issued by old line life insurance companies, but depend
also on the constitution and by-laws of the society, which, with the certifi-
cate, constitute the contract.
(b) Prior contrary decision of same point
There is a conflict of decision where an opinion of a court of appeals
rules differently from the supreme court's ruling as to the legal effect of
the same or substantially similar facts or contravenes a general principle of
law stated in a prior controlling decision of the supreme court. This was
held in State ex rel. Heuring v. Allen.Y' Thus, where the supreme court has
held that a homicide is within the res gestae of the initial crime and is an
emanation thereof, as where a robber has been compelled to flee without
obtaining any property,31 a decision by a court of appeals, in a suit for
double indemnity on a policy where the deceased was killed in a neutral
position where burglary had been attempted, contrary to that principle is
such conflict as will call for the quashing of the opinion of the court of ap-
peals. 2 Thus, also, where a court of appeals held in an action for damages
that proof of knowledge of a certain condition was sufficient to take the
case to the jury on the question of notice, when the supreme court had held
that under similar facts evidence of notice was insufficient for the jury,33
there was conflict, as decided in State ex rel. Trading Post Co. v. Shan.34
And there was conflict where a court of appeals, after having found that
there was no controversy as to fact that plaintiff in an action for loss of
28. State ex rel.'Knights & Ladies of Security v. Allen, 306 Mo. 633, 269
S. W. 388 (1924); Biggs v. Modern Woodmen of America, 336 Mo. 879, 82 S. W.
(2d) 898 (1935).
29. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 5997.
30. 342 Mo. 81, 112 S. W. (2d) 843 (1938).
31. See State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S. W. (2d) 632 (1936).
32. State ex rel. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Shain, 342 Mo. 1049, 119
S. W. (2d) 309 (1938).
33. McKeighan v. Kline's Inc., 339 Mo. 523, 98 S. W. (2d) 555 (1936).
34. 342 Mo. 588, 116 S. W. (2d) 99 (1938).
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his injured wife's services was damaged because of her injuries, failed
to follow a previous decision of the supreme court 5 holding in a similar case
that the failure of plaintiff's main instruction to require a finding of such
fact was not prejudicial error warranting reversal of judgment on ver-
dict for plaintiff.3 6 Also, there was conflict, as decided in State ex rel.
Steinbruegge v. Hostetter,37 where a court of appeals, in an action for in-
juries to a pedestrian struck by a dealer's automobile while being driven by
a salesman, held that the presumption that the automobile was driven by
a regular employee of the dealer within the scope of his employment did
not disappear upon the dealer's introducing substantial evidence to the
contrary, when the supreme court in a former controlling opinion 8 had
ruled otherwise.
(c) Decision contrary to rule of supreme court
In State ex rel. Clark v. Shain,3 9 it was held that a decision of a court
of appeals in an action to disbar an attorney that both the jurisdiction of
the court to disbar and the exercise of that jurisdiction are limited by
statute, and the action to disbar was based on the statute, was in conflict
with the former opinions of the supreme court" which held that the action
was based on the rules of the supreme court.41 Announcing a new reason
why an opinion of a court of appeals will be quashed on certiorari, the
court held that the opinion of the court of appeals was in conflict with
35. Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 726, 98 S. W. (2d) 978 (1936).
36. State ex rel. Fourcade v. Shain, 342 Mo. 1190, 119 S. W. (2d) 788
(1938).
R 342 Mo. 341,115 S. W. (2d) 802 (1938).
38. Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215, 198 S. W. 854 (1917).
39. 343 Mo. 542, 122 S. W. (2d) 882 (1938).
40. State ex rel. McKittrick v. Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852, 102 S. W. (2d)
895 (1937), (1938) 3 Mo. L. REv. 391; Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S. W.(2d) 977 (1937); In re Sparrow, 338 Mo. 203, 90 S. W. (2d) 401 (1935); In re
Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933).
41. The opinion of the court of appeals in the case reviewed (In re Wil-
liams, 113 S. W. (2d) 353 (Mo. App. 1938) was held to be particularly out of
harmony with the following language in In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W.
(2d) 672, 675 (1933): "It is not always easy to determine what objects are
naturally within the range or orbit of a particular department of government,
but it will scarcely be denied that a primary object essentially within the orbit
of the judicial department is that courts properly function in the administration
of justice, for which purpose they were created, and in the light of judicial his-
tory they cannot long continue to do this without power to admit and disbar
attorneys who from time immemorial have in a peculiar sense been regarded as
their officers. Since the object sought is not naturally within the orbit of the
legislative department, the power to accomplish it is in its exercise judicial and
not legislative, although in the harmonious co-ordination of powers necessary to
effectuate the aim and end of government it may be regulated by statutes to aid
in the accomplishment of the object but not to frustrate or destroy it."
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certain specific rules of the supreme court, which rules have the force and
effect of a decision of the supreme court, and when a court of appeals de-
cides a case contrary thereto its opinion will be quashed.
2. 'What Does Not Constitute Conflict
In State ex rel. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. v. Hostetter,42 it was held that
in an action for damages, where plaintiff offered no instructions except on
the measure of damages and the court of appeals decided that the jury was
sufficiently instructed on the issues by instructions given at the request of
the defendant, there was no conflict with prior decisions by the supreme
court, for under such decisions 43 the way is left open for the courts of ap-
peals and trial courts to decide whether the lack of instructions for plain-
tiff's side of the case prejudiced, and when a court of appeals so decides,
its decision is not in conflict with the opinion of the supreme court. The
same rule holds relative to a denial to defendant's attorney of the right to
comment on plaintiff's failure to offer instructions.
In State ex rel. Clark v. Shain,4 it was held that even though it is
urged that a construction of a bond by a court of appeals is erroneous and
in violation of constitutional rights, the supreme court cannot interfere on
certiorari if the court of appeals had jurisdiction to construe the bond and
its decision did not conflict with a prior decision of the supreme court.
State ex rel. Brotherhood of L. F. & E. v. Shain4l held that in an action on
a disability benefit insurance contract, where the trial court tried the case
on the theory that the company was an old line company and the court of
appeals affirmed the case, although it held the company was a fraternal
benefit association, there was no conflict between the court of appeals' de-
cision and prior decisions of the supreme court that recovery cannot be had
in an appellate court on a different theory from that on which the case was
tried. In State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter,4 6 it was held that where the su-
preme court had never ruled whether the Workmen's Compensation Com-
mission in awarding compensation necessarily decided that employee was
not engaged in interstate commerce when injured, even though there was
no such issue presented or expressly decided, a decision by a court of ap-
42. 342 Mo. 859, 119 S. W. (2d) 208 (1938).
43. Freeman v. Berberich, 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393 (1933); Dorman
v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 335 Mo. 1082, 75 S. W. (2d) 854 (1934); Yerger v.
Smith, 338 Mo. 140, 89 S. W. (2d) 66 (1935).
44. 343 Mo. 66, 119 S. W. (2d) 971 (1938).
45. 343 Mo. 666, 123 S. W. (2d) 1 (1938).
46. 343 Mo. 945, 124 S. W. (2d) 1072 (1939).
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peals that an award against employee's immediate employer and accep-
tance thereof by employee barred employee's action under Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act against third persons, did not contravene decisions of
the supreme court. State ex rel. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. B. Co. v. Shain47
held that a decision of a court of appeals that an interstate railroad's em-
ployee who was struck by an automobile while waiting for a street car to
carry reports relating to cars moving in interstate transportation from a
yard office in Kansas to state office in Missouri was not engaged in "inter-
state commerce" within the Federal Employer's Liability Act and his
death was not compensable under the state law, did not conflict with
any supreme court opinion.
3. What May be Considered on Certiorari
Quoting its own language used in a former case,48 the supreme court in
State ex rel. Public Serv. Comm. v. Shain,49 said that in a certiorari case it
looked only to the opinion of the court of appeals for the facts. And in
State ex ret. Brotherhood of L. F. & E. v. Shain,5 the court said that as to
the facts it was limited to such as appear in the opinion of the court of
appeals, though when reference is made in an opinion of the court of ap-
peals to pleadings and documents, these may also be considered as though
set out in full in the opinion.15
In State ex rel. Terminal R. R. Assn'. v. Hostetter,5 2 while recognizing
the rule that it was confined to the opinion of the court of appeals for the
"evidentiary facts," the court pointed out that certiorari brings up the
record proper in the case for review for the purpose of having jurisdictional
questions determined, and said that for the purpose of determining whether
the court of appeals had jurisdiction to render a certain opinion the su-
preme court could examine the record proper for errors, even though such
errors are not disclosed by the opinion of the judges.
4. What May Not Be Considered
In State ex rel. Public Serv. Comm. v. Shain,5 3 the court reannounced
the rule that evidence not considered by the court of appeals is not review-
able by the supreme court on certiorari.
47. 343 Mo. 961, 124 S. W. (2d) 1141 (1939).
48. State ex rel. Missouri Mut. Ass'n v. Allen, 336 Mo. 352, 78 S. W. (2d)
862 (1935).
49. 342 Mo. 867, 119 S. W. (2d) 220 (1938).
50. 343 Mo. 666, 123 S. W. (2d) 1 (1938).
51. Ibid.
52. 342 Mo. 859, 119 S. W. (2d) 208 (1938).
53. 342 Mo. 867, 119 S. W. (2d) 220 (1938).
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In State ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shain,"4 it was held that
an alleged error not assigned in or considered by the court of appeals can-
not be considered by the supreme court on certiorari, the concern of the
reviewing court being that of rulings actually made, either expressly or by
necessary implication.
In State ex rel. Brotherhood of L. F. & E. v. Shain," the court ruled
that cases decided by the courts of appeals cannot be considered in certiorari
to quash an opinion. The same ruling was made in State ex ret. Ben Hur Life
Ass'n v. Shain."
In State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter,7 and in State ex rel. Ben Hur
Life Ass'n v. Shain,"s it was held that the supreme court on certiorari can-
not consider cases from other states bearing on the construction of a stat-
ute by the court of appeals in its opinion under review, the object of the
supreme court in such case being that of determining whether the court
of appeals opinion contravenes a ruling of the supreme court of this state.
That a point not considered or discussed and a contention not decided
by a court of appeals cannot be considered in the supreme court on certio-
rari was held in State ex rel. Public Serv. Comm. v. Shain,"9 and in State ex
rel. Breit v. Shain.60
It is not within the power of the supreme court in reviewing a decision
of a court of appeals on certiorari to determine whether the court of ap-
peals correctly ruled the question under review.81 Neither is it within the
province of the supreme court on certiorari to determine whether the rul-
ing of the court of appeals was sound or unsound. 2
5. What Supreme Court Cannot Do on Certiorari
In State ex rel. Clark v. Shain,63 the supreme court held that under the
constitution it does not have appellate jurisdiction over the courts of ap-
peals, and, as said in State ex rel. Terminal R. R. Ass'n v. Hostetter," in
54. 343 Mo. 435, 121 S. W. (2d) 789 (1938).
55. 343 Ma. 666, 123 S. W. (2d) 1 (1938).
56. 342 Mo. 928, 119 S. W. (2d) 236 (1938).
57. 343 Mo. 945, 124 S. W. (2d) 1072 (1939).
58. 342 Mo. 928, 119 S. W. (2d) 236 (1938).
59. 342 Mo. 867, 119 S. W. (2d) 220 (1938).
60. 342 Mo. 1148, 119 S. W. (2d) 758 (1938).
61. State ex rel. Ben Hur Life Ass'n v. Shain, 342 Mo. 928, 119 S. W. (2d)
236 (1938).
62. State ex rel. Public Serv. Comm. v. Shain, 342 Mo. 867, 119 S. W. (2d)
220 (1938).
63. 343 Mo. 542, 122 S. W. 882 (1938).
64. 342 Mo. 859, 119 S. W. (2d) 208 (1938).
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certiorari cases the supreme court does not sit as a court of appeals, but as
a supervisory court.
Even though a court of appeals uses unnecessary language in stating its
decision, if its decision does not conflict with a prior controlling decision of
the supreme court, the latter will not alter the language used by the court
of appeals, for, as held in State ex rel. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. v. Hostetter,"
it is not the function of the supreme court on certiorari to edit the opinions
of the courts of appeals.
I. HABEAs CoRPus
A. Extradition of Paroled Convict
In 1938 the supreme court announced few new principles of the law
of habeas corpus, but provided several illustrations of the use of the writ.
In Ex parte Kabrich,16 it was held in a habeas corpus proceeding by
a person who was paroled in California and permitted to go to Mlissouri,
where he was later convicted, and who, following his release from the Ms-
souri penitentiary, was arrested and placed in the custody of California
officials under an extradition warrant issued by the governor of Mffissouri,
and sought release therefrom on the ground that California waived juris-
diction by requiring him to leave that state, that even though California
lost jurisdiction of the person of petitioner he was under the restraint of the
conditions of the parole, and when petitioner violated a condition of the
parole he acquired the status of an escaped convict and as such was subject
to extradition under the federal Constitution, and should be remanded to
the California officials.
The technique of drafting amendments to the constitution of Mlissouri
was considered in Ex parte Marsh v. Bartlett 7 where the amendment pro-
viding for the creation of a conservation commission was declared valid.
Contending that the amendment had no section number and contained no
means of identifying it as an amendment to any particular article or sec-
tion of the constitution and was, therefore, invalid and of no effect, a justice
of the peace issued a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with violat-
ing the old law which the amendment to the constitution sought to abrogate.
After he had been convicted he brought a habeas corpus proceeding to se-
65. Ibid.
66. 343 Mo. 196, 120 S. W. (2d) 42 (1938).
67. 343 Mo. 526, 121 S. W. (2d) 737 (1938).
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cure his release, claiming that the amendment nullified the statute he was
charged with violating. The court upheld the validity of the amendment,
ruled that it repealed the law under which the petitioner was convicted, and
directed that he be discharged.
In Ex parte Carney v. Ramsey,68 and Ex parte England, 9 it was held in
habeas corpus proceedings that by virtue of the provisions of the "three-
fourths" statute7 0 any convict who has served three-fourths of his sentence
in an orderly and peaceable manner, without having any infraction or pri-
son rules recorded against him, should be discharged as if he had served his
full sentence.
An ordinance of the City of Kirkwood provided that it was unlawful
to interfere with the operation of an established business by picketing. Pe-
titioner was convicted in the city court for violating the ordinance and
sought his discharge by an action in habeas corpus. In Ex parte Dierter v.
Weiss,71 it was held an ordinance of a regulatory nature must be clear, def-
inite and certain, so that the average man may, with due care, after reading
the same, understand whether or not he will incur a penalty for his actions,
and since the ordinance under which the petitioner was convicted was
vague, indefinite and uncertain, it was void, and the petitioner should be
discharged.
III. MANDAMUS
An appeal in a mandamus action decided in 1937 but not becoming
final until 1938 was that of State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,2 which was a
proceeding by a negro to compel the registrar and curators of the Univer-
sity of Missouri to admit him as a student in the School of Law. Holding
that the established public policy of the state was to segregate the white and
negro races for the purpose of education in the common and high schools,
and that, since there was no constitutional provision against the authority
of the legislature to enact laws providing for such separation for the pur-
pose of higher education, and since there is a legislative declaration of a
purpose to establish a law school for negroes at Lincoln University when-
ever necessary or practical, and pending the establishment of such a school
68. 343 Mo. 556, 122 S. W. (2d) 888 (1938).
69. 122 S. W. (2d) 890 (Mo. 1938).
70. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 8442.
71. 343 Mo. 626, 122 S. W. (2d) 922 (1938).
72. 342 Mo. 121,113 S. W. (2d) 783 (1938).
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adequate provision had been made for the legal education of negro students
in recognized schools outside of this state, the court affirmed the judgment
of the circuit court quashing the alternative writ and denying a peremptory
writ.7 3
In State ez reZ. Consolidated School Dist. v. Smith,7 4 there was an
original mandamus proceeding to compel the state auditor to register an
issuance of refunding bonds of a consolidated school district. The consoli-
dated district embraced what was originally six separate common school dis-
tricts, all but one of which had outstanding bonds at the time of consoli-
dation. The consolidated district issued bonds to refund all the out-
standing issues which were in default. Applying to consolidated school
districts the general rule that where one corporation goes entirely out
of existence by being annexed to or merged in another corporation,
then the subsisting corporation will be entitled to all the property and
answerable for all the liabilities, the court held that upon the con-
solidation of the several districts their indentities disappeared and a
new entity arose, which assumed the old debts, and in refunding such
debts, which process merely changed the form of an existing debt, the
provisions of the constitution of Missouri relative to incurring indebt-
edness do not apply, and it was not necessary to submit the proposi-
tion of issuing the refunding bonds to a vote of the people in the district.
As a result of the decision that the peremptory writ issue compelling the
registration of the bonds, the property in the district which had no outstand-
ing bonds at the time of the consolidation became liable with that in the
other districts for taxation for the payment of the refunding bonds.
State ex rel. Melrose Sewer Dist. v. Smith5 was an original proceeding
in mandamus to compel the state auditor to register bonds of a sewer dis-
trict of St. Louis County created under statutory authority. A part of
the funds for the construction of sewers in the district was contributed by
WPA, and the amount thereof together with that raised by a bond issue
against the property in the district exceeded the constitutional limitation
73. This cause went to the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of
certiorari and was there reversed and remanded on the ground that by the opera-
tion of the laws of Missouri a privilege for white law students which is denied to
negroes because of their race is contrary to the "equal protection" provision of
the Constitution of the United States, and this notwithstanding the fact that there
is but a limited demand in Missouri for legal education of negroes. State of
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938).
74. 343 Mo. 288, 121 S. W. (2d) 160 (1938).
75. 343 Mo. 207, 120 S. W. (2d) 1102 (1938).
76. Mo. Laws 1933-1934, Ex. Sess., p. 119.
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of indebtedness of the district. The court held that the act under which
the district was incorporated presupposed that outside aid would be forth-
coming, and in view of that fact the court incorporating the district could
properly approve the project.
In State ex rel. Howe v. Hughes,7 7 an alleged creditor of an estate in
the process of administration obtained an alternative writ of mandamus in
an original proceeding in the supreme court to compel the probate court to
set aside an order of partial distribution made in such estate and to recall
the property distributed pursuant to the order. Following the established
rule that mandamus cannot be used to perform the office of an appeal or
writ of error, the court held that the order of partial distribution made by
the probate court was not as a ministerial act but it was entered in the
performance of a judicial function, and the relator's remedy was by ap-
peal from that order and not by mandamus.
State ex rel. Pryor v. Anderson7 8 'was an original proceeding in man-
damus in the St. Louis Court of Appeals 9 and reached the supreme court
on certification due to a dissent by one of the judges of the court of ap-
peals. A childless widower of unsound mind, for whom a guardian had
been appointed, died in Missouri. On the day of his death the public ad-
ministrator of the county of decedent's residence applied for and was
granted letters of administration after a showing was made that deceased
left no heirs residing in Missouri. Fifty-nine days after decedent's death,
relatrix, a niece of deceased who had long resided in California, returned
to Missouri for the purpose of establishing a legal residence in this state,
that she might administer on decedent's estate. Having thereafter promp-
tly applied for an order to revoke the appointment of the public admin-
istrator that she might in his stead be appointed administratrix, which ap-
plication was denied, she applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the
probate court to set aside the order appointing the administrator. Affirm-
ing the judgment of the court of appeals quashing the alternative writ,
the supreme court held that under the provisions of the statute" the
probate court properly appointed an administrator of the estate of deceased
when proof was made that no persons having a preferential statutory right
to administer"' resided in this state, notwithstanding the fact that such
77. 343 Mo. 827, 123 S. W. (2d) 105 (1938).
78. 343 Mo. 895, 123 S. W. (2d) 181 (1938).
79. State ex rel. Pryor v. Anderson, 112 S. W. (2d) 857 (Mo. App. 1938).
80. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 9.
81. By virtue of Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 7.
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appointment was made prior to the expiration of thirty days after the death
of the intestate and distributees did not file a renunciation of their prefer-
ence.
State ex rel. Henry v. State Auditor82 was an original action in man-
damus against the state auditor, county judges, and liquidating officer of a
special road district to compel the levy, certification and collection of taxes
to pay past-due bonds of the district. A peremptory writ was awarded
against the state auditor to compel him to make the levy in accordance with
the statute,83 the court holding that even though the demand for the levy
was not made within the time fixed by law, that part of the statute fixing
the time for the levy was only directory, and by other statutory provisions 8-
assessments for taxes are not illegal on account of the fact that they are not
made or completed within the time required by law.
State ez rel. Webster Groves Sanitary Sewer District v. Smith8 5 was a
proceeding in mandamus to compel the state auditor to register a bond is.
sued by a subdistrict of a sanitary sewer district. The state auditor ques-
tioned the constitutionality of the statute under which the district was
created. 0 The court held that since the bond was payable out of the reve-
nue received from special assessments levied on the benefited property it
was not a debt within the meaning of the provision of the constitution
limiting the amount of indebtedness created to five percent of the value
of the taxable property in the district; that the fact that the statute lim-
ited the right to vote in the subdistrict bond elections to resident owners of
realty did not deny to nonresident owners equal protection of the laws or
due process ;87 and that the fact that no hearing is allowed at the time of
the creation of subdistricts does not violate the due process clause of the
constitution, for the property owners had their opportunity to be heard on
the organization of the whole district.
IV. PROHIBITION
Of the six cases the supreme court decided in 1938 involving the extra-
ordinary writ of prohibition all originated in the supreme court and in
82. 342 Mo. 797, 118 S. W. (2d) 19 (1938).
83. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 8182.
84. MO. REV. STAT. (1929) § 9791.
85. 342 Mo. 365, 115 S. W. (2d) 816 (1938).
86. Mo. Laws, 1933-1934, Ex. Sess., pp. 119-136.
87. Their position being analogous to nonresident owners of property abut-
ting on a street to be improved, who are denied by statute the right to protest
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each case the writ was directed against a circuit judge. Two of the cases
were determined by division one of the court,s8 and the remainder by the
court en bano. 9 In one of these cases the relator was an individual,0 in
another a municipal corporation,9' in another the state superintendent of
insurance, and in the others private corporations.0  In two of the cases
the preliminary writ was dissolved 94 and in the other four cases the pro-
visional rule was made absolute.9
State ex rel. Hannigan v. Kirkwood" held that where a circuit court
appointed a receiver for a partnership of lawyers on application of one
of the partners without notice to the other partner, who was then a non-
resident of M~issouri, and where it appeared that irreparable injury would
probably ensue unless the court took some action, the appointment of a
receiver was proper.
Where the supreme court entered a judgment directing the return of
impounded funds held by a custodian appointed by a circuit court to the
insurance superintendent for distribution to policy holders, on the ground
that the circuit court had no jturisdiction of the subject matter, and there-
after the circuit court entered judgment on the mandate of the supreme
court undertaking to retain jurisdiction to direct the distribution of such
funds by "the insurance superintendent, prohibition was used, in State
ex rel. Robertson v. Sevier,97 to stop the action of the circuit court in
88. State ex rel. Hannigan v. Kirkwood, 342 Mo. 242, 114 S. W. (2d) 1026(1938) ; State ex rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 343 Mo. 580, 122 S. W.
(2d) 909 (1938).
89. State ex rel. Robertson v. Sevier, 342 Mo. 346, 115 S. W. (2d) 810(1938); State ex rel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 343 Mo. 252, 121 S. W.(2d) 141 (1938); State ex rel. Carwood Realty Co. v. Dinwiddie, 343 Mo. 592,
122 S. W. (2d) 912 (1938); State ex ret. City of St. Louis v. O'Malley, 343 Mo.
658, 122 S. W. (2d) 940 (1938).
90. State ex rel. Hannigan v. Kirkwood, 342 Mo. 242, 114 S. W. (2d) 1026
(1938).
.91. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. O'Malley, 343 Mo. 658, 122 S. W. (2d)
940 (1938).
92. State ex rel. Robertson v. Sevier, 342 Mo. 346, 115 S. W. (2d) 810
(1938).
93. State ex rel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 343 Mo. 252, 121 S.
W. (2d) 141 (1938); State ex rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 343 Mo.
580, 122 S. W. (2d) 909 (1938); State ex rel. Carwood Realty Co. v. Dinwiddie,
343 Mo. 592, 122 S. W. (2d) 912 (1938).
94. State ex rel. Hannigan v. Kirkwood, 342 Mo. 242, 114 S. W. (2d) 1026(1938); State ex rel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 343 Mo. 252, 121
S. W. (2d) 141 (1938).
95. State en rel. Robertson v. Sevier, 342 Mo. 346, 115 S. W. (2d) 810(1938); State ex ret. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 343 Mo. 580, 122 S.
W. (2d) 909 (1938); State en rel. Carwood Realty Co. v. Dinwiddie, 343 Mo.
592, 122 S. W. (2d) 912 (1938); State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. O'Malley, 343
Mo. 658, 122 S. W. (2d) 940 (1938).
96. 342 Mo. 242, 114 S. W. (2d) 1026 (1938).
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refusing to obey the mandate of the supreme court and in attempting to
exercise jurisdiction it was held not to possess.
State ex rel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris,98 held that pro-
hibition would not lie to stop a circuit court from proceeding in a case
against a foreign insurance company which had been brought into court
on a summons served on the superintendent of insurance, where it appeared
that the suit was on policies existing and unsatisfied in Missouri, though
the company had ceased to do business in the state. The opinion traces
the history of legislation and the decisions on service of process on insur-
ance companies doing business in Missouri, and holds that the statute
authorizing service of process on state insurance superintendent in pro-
ceedings against foreign insurance companies licensed to do business in
Missouri provides the sole method of obtaining service. The opinion is a
valuable one.
In State ex rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 99 prohibition was
used to stop a circuit court from trying issues raised by interrogatories and
answers in proceedings to discover assets of the estate of a decedent in
probate court, since the probate court has the exclusive original jurisdic-
tion to try such issues.
In State ex rel. Carwood Realty Co. v. Dinwiddie,10 it was held that,
in view of the decision by the supreme court that the circuit court of Cole
county'0 1 was without jurisdiction to supervise the distribution of insur-
ance funds to policy holders, prohibition would lie to prevent a circuit
court in another county from proceeding in a case where supervision by
such circuit court is sought in the distribution of such funds.
In State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. O'Malley,0 2 prohibition was used
to stop a circuit court from proceeding in an action against the city by
property owners for the assessment of damages to their property occasioned
by the lowering of a street grade, the court holding that the statutes au-
thorizing such actions had been superseded by the provisions of the city
charter of the City of St. Louis.
97. 342 Mo. 346, 115 S. W. (2d) 810 (1938).
98. 343 Mo. 252, 121 S. W. (2d) 141 (1938).
99. 343 Mo. 580, 122 S. W. (2d) 909 (1938).
100. 343 Mo. 592, 122 S. W. (2d) 912 (1938).
101. State ex rel. Robertson v. Sevier, 342 Mo. 346, 115 S. W. (2d) 810(1938). See ante, this article, n. 97.
102. 343 Mo. 658, 122 S. W. (2d) 940 (1938).
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V. Quo WARRANTO
State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wymore'0° was an original quo warranto
proceeding by the state on the relation of the attorney general against a
prosecuting attorney to determine the question of his title to the office of
prosecuting attorney. Although the consideration of the case involved
only a motion to quash the information, the opinion in the case restates a
large part of the law concerning the extraordinary writ of quo warranto
as it pertains to the right to determine title to public office. The court
held that it had jurisdiction to determine the title of the respondent to his
office, overruled the respondent's motion to quash the information, and
granted him time within which to plea.
State ex inf. McKittrick v. Bode"" was an original proceeding in quo
warranto on the information of the attorney general of Missouri to oust
the director of conservation appointed to a position created by constitu-
tional amendment.10 5 Relator contended that the respondent was a public
officer and not a mere employee, and that he should be ousted because he
had not resided in this state one year next preceding his appointment.'"0
The court held that the constitutional amendment giving the conservation
commission power to determine the qualifications of the director is in di-
rect conflict with and a limitation on the constitutional provision that no
person shall be elected or appointed to any office who shall not have re-
sided in this state one year next preceding his election or appointment, to
the extent of authorizing the commission to determine the necessary quali-
fications of the director, and the court could not oust the director even
though he had not resided in the state one year next preceding his ap-
pointment.
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
Wn&iAm H. BECKER, JR.*
In 1938, the supreme court en banc reversed itself upon one of the two
important rulings of the much discussed case of Perkins v. Terminal Rail-
103. 343 Mo. 98, 119 S. W. (2d) 941 (1938).
104. 342 Mo. 162, 113 S. W. (2d) 805 (1938).
105. Mo Laws 1937, p. 614.
106. Mo. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 10.
*Attorney, Columbia. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.
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road Ass'n.1 This action occurred in the case of Buehler v. Festus Mercan-
tile (o., 2 the only significant decision of the court en banc involving the hu-
manitarian doctrine. It was not entirely unexpected." During the same
year, division one followed the other important aspect of the Perkins case.4
That secret nightmare of courts engaged in interpreting the Missouri
humanitarian doctrine, the determination of the rights of two oblivious
claimants colliding at an intersection, appeared in division two but was
temporarily dispelled by limiting the ruling to a narrow decision upon an
instruction.5 Division one contributed two clearly stated formulae, one
defining the zone of peril in cases of vehicular collisions where neither opera-
tor is oblivious, the other eliminating the humanitarian rule in ordinary
cases where the plaintiff or his vehicle strikes the defendant's vehicle in the
side.6
The cases involving the humanitarian doctrine generally were con-
cerned with matters of practice. Nevertheless, at the close of the decisions
for 1938 there persisted an undertone of unrest which presages at least a
clearer statement of the nature of the humanitarian rule which may widen
or narrow its functional aspects.
It is apparent that the widely accepted last clear chance rule must be
distinguished from the humanitarian doctrine by the court before any true
analysis of the humanitarian doctrine is attempted. Throughout 1938 the
court continued to use the expression "humanitarian rule" as comprehend-
ing the ordinary last clear chance rule and something more.
I. Tam COURT EN B c
The only decision of the court en bane, involving the humanitarian rule,
resulted in condemnation of an instruction predicating liability upon the
failure of the defendant to act after having knowledge that the defendant
was "approaching and in a position of imminent peril.' '7 The opinion was
approved by Judges Ellison, Douglas, Gantt and Leedy. Therefore, the
attitude of the new member of the court, Judge Clark, should not cause a
re-examination of this ruling.
1. 340 Mo. 868, 102 S. W. (2d) 915 (1937).
2. 343 Mo. 139, 119 S. W. (2d) 961 (1938).
3. See Becker, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1987(The HumanitaHan Doctrine) (1938) 3 Mo. L. REv. 392.
4. Barnes v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n., 343 Mo. 589, 122 S. W. (2d) 907 (1938).
5. State ex rel. Grisham v. Allen, 124 S. W. (2d) 1080 (Mo. 1939).
6. Lotta v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 342 Mo. 743, 117 S. W. (2d) 296
(1938).
7. Buehler v. Fes-us Mere. Co., 343 Mo. 139, 119 S. W. (2d) 961 (1938).
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II. Dvsroq ONE
In Barnes v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n.,8 division one followed the rul-
ing in the Perkins case, holding that in a humanitarian case in which the
peril of the plaintiff is caused by obliviousness, it is not necessary to require
a finding of obliviousness in the instructions, because such a finding is com-
prehended in the ordinary requirement that "imminent peril" be found.
So it appears that this aspect of the Perkins case is settled for some time
at least.
Lotta v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,9 is notable for its clear state-
ment that, in the absence of obliviousness, the danger zone or position of
imminent peril of a person approaching the path of a moving vehicle reaches
no farther beyond the direct path of the moving vehicle than the distance
within which the approaching person is unable by his own efforts to stop
short of it. The case is also interesting because of its sweeping assertion:
"Usually a humanitarian negligence case must fail when the plaintiff or
his vehicle comes to an intersection last and runs into the side of the other
vehicle." 1 0 This last statement was the basis for the reversal outright of a
judgment for personal injuries.
Massman v. Kansas City Public Service Co.1" involved a complicated
situation where a pedestrian was struck either by a street car or automobile
converging upon her. By applying familar principles, the court found
that there was a submissible case of humanitarian negligence against the
street car operator. In disposing of error assigned for the giving of in-
structions, the court made the interesting, if not novel, ruling that the
failure to request an appropriate instruction upon a submissible ground of
negligence is such an abandonment of that ground of negligence that the
adverse party may ignore it in the framing of his instructions.
In Lynch v. Baldwin,12 it was held error to instruct that the defendant
had a right to assume that the plaintiff would exercise the highest degree
of care and stop at a railroad crossing until it became apparent from the
circumstances that the plaintiff would not stop. Such an instruction was
held to inject contributory negligence in the case. The soundness of this
ruling is questionable. There is much which can be said in answer to it.
8. 343 Mo. 589, 122 S. W. (2d) 907 (1938).
9. 342 Mo. 743, 117 S. W. (2d) 296 (1938).
10. Id. at 302.
11. 119 S. W. (2d) 833 (Mo. 1938).
12. 117 S. W. (2d) 273 (Mo. 1938).
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Burow v. Red Line Service, nc.,13 Kick v. Franklin,14 and Gorman
v. Franklin 5 involve no remarkable holdings.
III. DiwsioN Two
In State ex ret. Grisham v. Allen, 6 division two was confronted with
a case which might well have caused a re-examination of the humanitarian
doctrine and an exposition of its true nature. The case involved a collision
of two automobiles which were meeting upon the highway. The plaintiff
counted upon both primary and humanitarian negligence. The defendant
answered with a general denial, a plea of contributory negligence, and a
counterclaim based upon primary negligence and humanitarian negligence.
The plaintiff made a humanitarian case against the defendant. The defend-
ant submitted his defense, as well as his counterclaim, in a single instruction
apparently based upon primary negligence, attempting to meet the plain-
tiff's humanitarian case by requiring a finding that the defendant was "at
the time in the exercise of the highest degree of care upon his part." De-
fendant secured a substantial verdict and judgment.
The court limited its ruling to a finding that the defendant's principal
instruction was erroneously drawn. The opportunity to settle the riotous
confusion of practice and principle which occurs in such a situation was
lost. Some day the court will have to determine and declare in a case in-
volving an automobile collision (1) whether each operator can recover
against the other simultaneously upon the humanitarian rule; (2) whether
the humanitarian rule is a doctrine of proximate cause, comparative negli-
gence, or liability without fault; and (3) what instructions may be properly
given on behalf of each party in such a situation. Until these questions are
answered the humanitarian doctrine must remain a mystery.
It is hard to reconcile the decision in the case of Hangge v. Umbright, 7
involving a collision of two automobiles at an intersection, with the ruling
in State ex rel. Grisham v. Allen. The petition was based upon the humani-
tarian rule and plaintiff's case submitted thereunder. The defendant filed
a counterclaim based upon primary negligence and submitted his counter-
claim thereunder. In the defendant's instruction, submitting a counter-
13. 343 Mo. 605, 122 S. W. (2d) 919 (1938).
14. 343 Mo. 715, 117 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938).
15. 117 S. W. (2d) 289 (Mo. 1938).
16. 124 S. W. (2d) 1080 (Mo. 1939).
17. 119 S. W. (2d) 382 (Mo. 1938).
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claim, there was no reference to the plaintiff's humanitarian case but only
a requirement that the jury find "that the defendant at all times was ex-
ercising the highest degree of care and that the damage to defendant's car
was the direct result of plaintiff's negligence." This instruction was up-
held, in sharp contrast to the ruling in State ex rel. Grisham v. Allen. In
this case it was also held that an abstract instruction properly stating the
law regarding the right of way at intersections should not be given in a case
submitted under the humanitarian rule.
The remaining cases decided by division two in 1938 involve routine
application of accepted principles to various fact situations and various in-
structions. In State ex rel. Baldwin v. Shain,1 8 it was held that a humani-
tarian case for failure to slacken a vehicle cannot be made on behalf of a
pedestrian where slackening would afford no more than a bare possibility
that the injury would be avoided. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Servioe
Co. v. Shain19 is notable for its observation that the ". . . humanitarian
doctrine may be something more than an exception to the law of contribu-
tory negligence -.2o In Clarke v. Jackson,21 it was held that a hu-
manitarian case was made by the operator of one of two automobiles
colliding at night on the highway while traveling toward each other. Each
claimed to be on his right hand side of the road, and each insisted that there
was no sudden turning. The court held under these circumstances that
the plaintiff made a humanitarian case. Radabaugh v. Williford,22 and





Section 5894 of the Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, as in force until
May 29, 1939, required that as a condition of doing business within the
18. 125 S. W. (2d) 41 (Mo. 1938).
19. 343 Mo. 1066, 124 S. W. (2d) 1097 (1939).
20. Id. at 1099.
21. 342 Mo. 537, 116 S. W. (2d) 122 (1938).
22. 342 Mo. 528, 116 S. W. (2d) 118 (1938).
23. 343 Mo. 899, 123 S. W. (2d) 158 (1938).
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., University of
Wisconsin, 1931, LL.B., 1935.
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state, foreign insurance corporations should fie an irrevocable power of
attorney with the superintendent of insurance, authorizing him to receive
service of process on behalf of such company, "in any court of this state
or of the United States in this state." It further provided that
"service of process . . . as aforesaid, upon the superintendent shall
be valid and binding . . . upon such company, so long as it shall have
any policies or liabilities outstanding in this state, although such company
may have withdrawn, been excluded from or ceased to do business in this
state. "
In 1916 the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted this statute to give
jurisdiction over a foreign insurance company doing business in Missouri
in a suit by a non-resident of Missouri upon an insurance contract made in
a foreign state, the defendant company having been brought in only by
service upon the insurance commissioner.1 In other words, the court gave
literal effect to the first quoted provision 6f the statute.
In 1927 the court squarely reversed itself, holding that such service
did not give the Missouri courts jurisdiction over the non-resident company
on those facts.2 Investigating the history and antecedents of the statute,
the court found that the second clause was not an independent provision
concerned only with the retention of jurisdiction over companies no longer
legally doing business within the state, and declared that it was to be read
with, and as modifying, the first. That is, it held that not only must there
be "policies or liabilities outstanding in this state," but the suit must be
upon one of those contracts or liabilities. As to when a contract could be
said to be "outstanding in this state," the court implied that a policy either
issued and "outstanding" in Missouri or payable to a Missouri citizen,
though issued elsewhere, fell within the statute.
In 1938 the court en bano considered a suit brought by a non-resident
assignee of a resident beneficiary, upon a contract of insurance issued in
Missouri upon the life of a Missouri citizen, against an non-resident com-
pany doing business here.3 Service was had only upon the insurance com-
missioner. Jurisdiction was maintained upon the ground that the policy
1. The Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 267
Mo. 524, 184 S. W. 999 (1916). Such exercise of jurisdiction was held not to
violate the provisions of the United States Constitution. Pennsylvania Fire Ins.
Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917).
2. State ex rel. American Central Life Ins. Co. v. Landwehr, 318 Mo. 181,
300 S. W. 294 (1927).
3. State ex rel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 343 Mo. 252, 121 S.
W. (2d) 141 (1938). The assignment was made to prevent removal to the fed-
eral court upon the ground of diverse citizenship.
1939]
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sued upon by the foreign plaintiff was "outstanding" in this state, because
(a) the policy issued here (b) upon the life of a Missouri citizen.
It is evident that in the Landwehr case4 the court considered that the
policy or liability had its situs with the owner of the claim, a not unfamiliar
doctrine of conflict of laws. By this view, a policy or liability would be
outstanding in Missouri if, and only if, its owner were resident here. In
the instant case that rationalization, if not the holding, was explicitly re-
jected. The two essential requirements are for the policy to have been writ-
ten here upon a life or property here, it being the purpose of the statute to
regulate business done in Missouri.
That the court was not satisfied with the social consequences of its
decision is clear from its plea to the legislature for revision of the statute.
The suggestion fell on fertile soil. By Mo. Laws 1939, p. 451 (which is a
repeal, revision and re-enactment of Section 5894, Missouri Revised Statutes
1929) it is declared that service upon the superintendent of insurance is
proper in all actions "by residents of this state upon any policy issued or
matured, or upon any liability accrued in this State, or on any policy issued
in any other state in which such resident is named beneficiary, and in all
actions brought by non-residents of this State upon any policy issued in
this State in which such non-resident is named beneficiary or which has been
assigned to such non-resident and in all actions brought by non-residents
of this State on a cause of action, other than an action on a policy of in-
surance, which arises out of business transacted, acts done, or contracts
made in this State."
The statute broadens the law, but who will say it settles it beyond
controversy ?
II. CONSTRUCTION OP PoLICIEs
In an action upon an employer's liability policy, the court employed
the familiar principle that the construction of their own language by the
parties to a contract should control in its interpretation to find that the oc-
cupational disease of silicosis was a "bodily injury, accidentally sus-
tained. "5 Plaintiff introduced in evidence a letter to the employer from an
4. State ex rel. American Central Life Ins. Co. v. Landwehr, 318 Mo. 181,
300 S. W. 294 (1927).
5. Tomnitz v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 343 Mo. 321, 121 S. W.(2d) 745 (1938). Judgment for plaintiff was reversed for lack of substantial
evidence that plaintiff incurred the disease, which was shown to be a matter of
the cumulative effect of repeated inhalation over a considerable period of time-
which period varied greatly among individuals-during the duration of the policy.
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inspector of the defendant company, suggesting various ways of reducing
"accidents" among the employees and including, among its recommenda-
tions, the use of respirators for certain types of work. The court evidently
did not wish to hold that silicosis and other occupational diseases were
necessarily to be considered "bodily injuries, accidentally sustained," for
Soukup v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp.,6 which had been thought7 to
lay down that rule, was said to rest upon the ambiguity of the particular
policy.
Where death occurs as the result of bullet wounds received in flight
.after the commission of, or an attempt at, burglary, it is not "accidental"
so as to permit double recovery as provided for death by "external, violent
and accidental means." 8  The opinion of the court of the appeals to the
contrary was quashed as in conflict with State v. Adams,9 a criminal case
in which it was held that homicide committed while attempting to escape
was murder in the first degree. The mortal injury was received in the one
instance and inflicted in the other within the res gestae of the principal
offense, and was an emanation therefrom.
In Swanson v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp.,10 the policy read, "
to indemnify the assured for all loss by burglary . . . occasioned by
any person or persons making felonious entry . . . by actual force or
violence when such premises are not open for business, of which force and
violence there shall be visible marks made upon such premises at the place
of such entry by tools, explosives, electricity, or chemicals . . ." The
italicized portion was held a valid limitation on the liability of the insurer,
not a void attempt to limit the character of the evidence by which the forci-
ble entry might be proved.
In State ex rel. Brotherhood, etc. v. Shain, 1 the by-laws of relator
fraternal benefit society provided that where any member felt himself ag-
grieved by any action taken by any constituted authority of the lodge, he
might appeal to the president and then to the board of directors. Only
after such unsuccessful appeals and after giving 30 days' notice of inten-
tion to sue at law, might he bring his action. An opinion of the court of
appeals that such provisions were unreasonable and void, and were not a
6. 341 Mo. 614, 108 S. W. (2d) 86 (1937).
7. See Note (1938) 112 A. L. R. 158.
8. State ex 'el. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Shain, 342 Mo. 1049, 119 S. W. (2d)
309 (1938).
9. 339 Mo. 926, 98 S. W. (2d) 632 (1936).
10. 343 Mo. 350, 121 S. W. (2d) 783 (1938).
11. 343 Mo. 666, 123 S. W. (2d) 1 (1938).
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defense to an action begun without satisfying them, was held not in con-
flict with holdings of the supreme court that a new contract may not be
made for the parties. A distinction must be observed between conditions
of liability and matters of procedure within the order before redress might
be had in the courts.
In construing the contracts of a fraternal benefit association, said the
court in State ex rel. Security Benefit Ass'n v. Shain,12 the charter, consti-
tution, and by-laws, as well as the certificate issued to the member must be
considered. "Contract" is not synonymous with "certificate" in Section
6005, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, and the mere fact that the certificate
which expressly declares itself subject to the charter, constitution, and by-
laws of the society, does not contain provision for contribution by other
members, does not make the contract an "old line" insurance contract,
where that stipulation (necessary for classification as a fraternal benefit
contract) appears in the by-laws.
III. NoN-FORpFiEuR PRovIsioNs
Sections 5741-5744, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, provide in sub.
stance that "after the payment of three or more full years' premiums on a
policy, upon default in the payment of any subsequent premium, the policy
will not be forfeited but the net reserve or cash value of the policy will be
taken as a net single premium to continue the policy for its original amount
as temporary or extended insurance, for such time as the net cash value of
the policy will carry it . . ., unless the policy contains a provision for
its unconditional commutation for nonforfeitable paid-up insurance
,,13 for life in such amount as the policy provides conformable to stat-
ute, or for unconditional surrender in cash of the reserve, or for surrender
of the policy for other adequate consideration, or for exchange of the policy
for another form of policy from the company within sixty days from de-
fault (always preserving to the insured the right to extended insurance if
he so elects). These provisions cannot be waived or contracted away by
the parties. A decision of the court of appeals validating an automatic
premium loan provision of a policy, which would utilize the cash reserve
in case of default to keep the policy alive by advancing the premiums there.
fore as long as the amount of reserve permits (but because of the higher
12. 342 Mo. 199, 114 S. W. (2d) 965 (1938).
13. Frank, J., in State ex Tel. Adams v. Allen, 343 Mo. 1191, 1196, 125 S.
W. (2d) 854 (1939).
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cost of the level premiums, terminating the "coverage" at an earlier date
if the policy is not carried on by the insured than would be the case if the
statutory single premium extended insurance were employed), because the
parties might contract as they pleased, conflicts with supreme court de-
cisions. A decision that the provision was valid within Section 5744 would
not conflict, the supreme court never having passed on that issue.1 A
similar policy was upheld under a somewhat similar statute by the Michi-
gan Supreme Court.
The statutes are strictly construed. If a policy, as is common, offers
several options to the insured who has defaulted after paying three years'
full premiums, and further provides that upon default, "if the insured has
selected no other option, the company, without any action upon the part of
the insured, will continue this policy as a paid-up non-participating whole
life policy for the amount stated in the table," it has not provided for that
"unconditional commutation" within Section 5744 which may replace the
extended insurance required under Section 5741.16 A distinction was at-
tempted between this provision and that in the policy before the court in
State ex rel. Clark v. Becker,17 which stated that upon default, "without
action upon the part of the holder, the policy will be continued for its full
value in participating paid-up life insurance . . ., or, if the holder so
elect," he might avail himself of either of two other options. It was felt
that in the instant case, the failure to elect another option, with the con.
sequent uncertainty of the time of effectiveness, was a condition precedent
to the operation of the "auto-matic" clause, whereas in the Becker case the
contract gave the holder the right to change the option after the "auto-
matic" provision had taken effect.
Conceding that the distinction is theoretically sound, to draw the line
upon such slight variation in language makes hazardous the prediction of
whether any policy not actually passed upon by the court satisfies the re-
quirements of the statute.
The volume of insurance business renders commonplace a fact situation
which might otherwise appear unlikely to recur. Death not infrequently
overtakes the defaulting policy holder near the end of the period of extended
insurance brought by his cash reserve. In those cases it may be highly
14. State ex rel. Heuring v. Allen, 342 Mo. 81, 112 S. W. (2d) 843 (1938).
15. 151 Mich. 610, 115 N. W. 707 (1908).
16. State ex rel. Adams v. Allen, 343 Mo. 1191, 125 S. W. (2d) 854 (1939).
17. 335 Mo. 785, 73 S. W. (2d) 769 (1934).
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important to ascertain the precise day of default. Some time ago, our su-
preme court held18 that where the policy was delivered and the first pre-
mium paid subsequent to the date specified in the policy as the recurrent
premium date-the policy further specifying that it is not to take effect
until delivery and payment of premiums-the date of delivery and pay-
ment should control rather than the date of the poiicy. In Tabler v. Gen-
eral Am. Life Ins. Co.,'" however, the peculiar facts caused the court to
date the default from the premium date in the policy, despite delay in de-
livery and payment. Controlling was the factor that in the interim the
insured had come of an age more near to his next birthday than his past,
on which the premiums had been assessed. While it is unfair to charge a
year's premium for less than a year's insurance, the actuating principle of
the Halsey case,20 it is equally unfair to take protection at the lower pre-
mium calculated as of age 27 years and insist upon a premium date as of
age 28 years.
IV. ESTOPPEL
A clear case of estoppel was presented in State ex rel. Ben Hur Life
Ass'n v. Shain,21 where relator had taken over the assets and liabilities of
decedent's insurer, had through that insurer's agents collected a subsequent
premium and then informed decedent that his company was dissolved and
its assets wiped out, all without informing him in any way of the merger,
in consequence of which he stopped premium payments. In a suit for the
face amount of the insurance under statutory extended insurance bought
with the cash reserve when the default occurred, the insurer was not al-
lowed to set up the liens on that cash reserve imposed by the terms of the
merger it had concealed, which liens would have caused the termination of
the extended insurance before the insured's death.
V. FoRmrN LAW
A rational argument can be made that among the several sister states
of this country all questions of conflict of laws are resolved into questions
of the interpretation of the "full faith and credit" provision of the United
18. Halsey v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 258 Mo. 659, 167 S. W. 951
(1914).
19. 342 Mo. 726, 117 S. W. (2d) 278 (1938).
20. Halsey v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 258 Mo. 659, 167 S. W. 951
(1914).
21. 342 Mo. 928, 119 S. W. (2d) 236 (1938).
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States Constitution.22 This broad position has never been adopted by
federal or state courts, and for the most part "conflicts" law is considered
part of the internal law of each state. So, the Missouri Supreme Court
denies appellate jurisdiction of simple conflict of laws cases presented to it
as raising a constitutional question. However, in a few situations the
United States Supreme Court has held that the full faith and credit clause
required the application of a particular foreign law. 28
The distinguishing blements of these cases are far from obvious, 24 and
state courts have confined their rulings in accord to cases upon all fours
with the precedents.
Robertson v. Security Benefit Ass'n 5 was an action for the endowment
benefit originally promised in plaintiff's certificate of membership in de-
fendant fraternal benefit society. The certificate was issued to plaintiff
in Missouri, where he lived, but defendant was organized under the laws
of Kansas. The certificate provided that the by-laws of the association
should be part of the contract, and by them the agreement was subjected to
future changes therein and amendments thereto. Subsequent to the issu-
ance of the certificate the by-laws were changed to eliminate the endowment
feature. In addition, a subsequent Kansas statute purporting to regulate
fraternal benefit associations affirmatively permitted death and disability
benefits, but made no provision for old age (endowment) benefits. The
Kansas Supreme Court then held that the endowment promise was dtra
vires, in a case directly in point. Relying upon Modern Woodmen of Amer-
ica v. Mixer,28 division one of the Missouri Supreme Court held that it had
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, a constitutional question being involved,
and that the Federal Constitution required that the Kansas decision be
regarded as decisive of the issue.
In Clark v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 7 the court en bane reached the
22. For discussion of this proposition, see Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws
Become a Branch of Constitutional Law? (1931) 15 MINN. L. Ruv. 161; Ross,
Full Faith and Credit in a Federal System (1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 140; Dodd,
The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Con-
flict of Laws (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 533.
23. See authorities cited in note 22, supra.
24. Compare Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145
(1932) with Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Com'n, 59 S. Ct.
629 (1939). And see Beale, Social Justice and Business Costs (1936) 49 HARV. L.
Rev. 593.
25. 342 Mo. 284, 114 S. W. (2d) 1009 (1938).
26. 267 U. S. 544 (1925). The court also cited Supreme Council of the
Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1914); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber,
245 U. S. 146 (1917).
27. 343 Mo. 263, 121 S. W. (2d) 148 (1938).
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same conclusion. The association's failure to pay the endowment original-
ly provided for did not keep alive a membership upon which assessments
had not been paid, as the endowment feature was void by the law of
Kansas, to which full faith and credit must be accorded.
VI. TRIAL PRncnco
Where the liability insurer assumes the defense of an action against
the insured, it is proper for that fact to be brought to the attention of the
jury, who should "know everything that affects the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony, including their interest not
only in the subject-matter, but in the parties who are to profit or lose by
the verdict." 28  But mere employment or payment of counsel, who pre-
pares his case and subpoenas his witnesses independently of insurer's as-
sistance, will not color or affect the evidence or the merits, nor justify
informing the jury of the insurer's interest in the controversy.29
In no event is plaintiff entitled to ask the jury to return a large verdict
against the defendant because someone else will bear it. A plea that "this
suit is for $50,000 and that is the sum of money this woman is entitled to
recover, if she is entitled to recover a dime. Don't worry about who we
will collect it from . . . Leave it to the lawyers to collect it for her"
is incurably prejudicial, and it is not within the discretion of the trial
judge to refuse a new trial because the plaintiff's attorney withdrew the
remark and apologized. It, in effect, told the jury the defendant carried
liability insurance of $50,000 and requested a verdict for that amount 0
Though the court did not separate the elements of the offense, it ap-
parently emphasized the attempt to induce a larger verdict because the
defendant would be exonerated from it, which, while patently improper,
would not seem not incurable. The fatally prejudicial factor in the plea
was the inevitable implication that it was an insurance company which
would ultimately assume the loss. Indeed, the court recognizes that it is
the hope, based upon sound experience, that mere knowledge that the burden
was to be distributed through insurance would of itself move the jury to a
more generous verdict that motivates the farcical maneuverings throughout
much tort litigation to get that information to it. Whether the hope is
28. Snyder v. Wagner Electric Mfg. Co., 284 Mo. 285, 311, 223 S. W. 911,
918 (1920).
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silent or expressed, the improper communication of the fact should, by
the logic of the instant case, be ground for mistrial.
PROPERTY
WmLARD L. ECKHARDT*
I. PossEssoRy AND FUTURE INTERESTS iN LAND
Goins v. Melton1 is the most questionable decision in 1938 in the field
of estates. Robert N. Melton executed an instrument, in form a warranty
deed, purporting to convey certain real estate to his niece, Alice G. Melton.
The instrument contained the following provision: ". . the grantor
herein shall retain possession and control of all profits therefrom for and
during his natural life time, also retaining to himself the right to sell and
deed said land, or any part thereof during his life time, at his death title
to all, or whatever part thereof remains unsold, to pass to and vest in the
grantee . ." The grantor died intestate and one of his heirs brought
a suit for partition. The grantee under the instrument claimed a fee
simple absolute in the whole. It was held that the instrument conveyed no
interest whatsoever to the grantee because it was not an inter vivos con-
veyance, but was an invalid testamentary instrument not in compliance
with the requirements for a valid will.
The court acknowledges that Missouri statutes permit the creation of
an estate of inheritance to commence in the future.2 But "the deed must
vest in the grantee a present interest and an irrevocable interest" to be
inter vivos and not testamentary. "MYanifestly, the power to sell, reserved
by the grantor in the present deeds, was equivalent to a power to revoke."
Therefore, the court concluded that the instrument was testamentary. As
to any definite criteria for distinguishing testamentary and inter vivos in-
struments, the court confessed its "inability to lay down the desired uni-
form test." The court followed the brief of Alice G. Melton in analyzing
the interests allegedly created, as a fee simple in the grantee, subject to a
life estate in the grantor. It is submitted that a correct analysis is that
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.S., University of
Illinois, 1935, LL.B., 1937; graduate student, Yale, 1937-1938.
1. 343 Mo. 413, 121 S. W. (2d) 821 (1938).
2. M o. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3112: ". . . hereafter an estate of free-
hold or of inheritance may be made to commence in future by deed, in like man-
ner as by will."
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grantor had a defeasible fee simple and a limited power of appointment,
and that the grantee had a defeasible springing executory interest (spring-
ing use).
Section 3112 of the Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, permitting the
creation by deed of an estate of inheritance to commence in the future, in
like manner as by will, did not enlarge the powers of a grantor; it simply
changed his technique. After the Statute of Wills3 a testator was permitted
by direct devise without resort to technical words to create springing and
shifting executory interests, future interests which violated the common
law rules restricting the creation of remainders. A devise by a testator
"to B at age 21," is just as.effective as a devise "to T to the 11se of B at age
21." On the other hand, a grantor in an inter vivos conveyance had to
resort to technical words of use to create a future interest which violated
one of the common law rules as to remainders. A grant "to B at age 21"*
was void; to be effective the grant had to be "to T to the use of B at age
21." 4 One purpose of Section 3112 of the Missouri Revised Statutes 1929,
is to permit a grantor in Mvissouri to create a springing or shifting use
without resorting to the use technique, i. e., to create these estates by direct
grant, as always was permitted by direct devise in wills.
Much of the court's uncertainty in determining whether a conveyance
by A to B at A's death is inter vivos or testamentary is the result of a failure
to recognize an old friend, the springing use, in unfamiliar garb. The
courts would have much less trouble in dealing with an inter vivos instru-
ment by A conveying to B one day after A's death. In the principal case
of Goins v. Melton, the court said, probably correctly, that a revocable
conveyance to B at A's death is testamentary. But could the grantor in the
principal case revoke? The court asseverated but did not analyze, in
reaching the conclusion this grantor could revoke.
In a truly testamentary instrument, how extensive are the testator's
powers of revocation over a devise? First, the testator can convey the
land inter vivos for valuable consideration. Second, the testator can con-
vey the land inter vivos as a gift. Third, the testator can devise the land
to another devisee, revoking his former devise. 'What were the grantor's
powers of revocation in the principal case? He had a power "to sell and
deed" said land. This evidently meant he could not convey the land as a
gift inter vivos, or as a gift testamentary. Thus, the grantor had very
3. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540).
4. CHESHIRE, MODERN REAL PROPERTY (4th ed. 1937) 434.
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limited powers of revocation, and the grantee had a much more durable
interest in her defeasible executory interest than she would have had in
a mere expectancy under a will. It is submitting that the court might
well have reached a contrary decision if the case had been adequately
analyzed5
Three lissouri cases presented the problem of construction as to wheth-
er under particular amorphous imitations a devisee took a fee simple or
merely a life estate. Professor Atkinson discusses these cases in his sec-
tion on Wills and Administration.6 Professor Atkinson also discusses Bates
v. Bates,7 a case involving the question of whether "survivors" who are
given a remainder are to be determined as of the testator's death or as of
the life tenant's death.
Eisenhardt 'v. Siegel8 concerned a conveyance of John Eisenhardt by
warranty deed for valuable consideration to Herman Eisenhardt, provid-
ing that if the grantor should survive the grantee the land should "revert
to and become the absolute property" of the grantor. The court held "that
the title to the land in question under the deed, reverted to John upon
Herman's death" even though while insane the grantor murdered the
granteeY The court followed the plaintiff's brief in speaking of the gran-
tor's future interest in terms of reversion. The grantor cannot have a
reversion because he has conveyed to the grantee a fee simple, either de-
terminable or defeasible, and, therefore, the grantor has either a possibility
of reverter or a right of entry. The decision of the case could not be af-
fected by the type of future interest in the grantor, but the report of the
case would be more useful to the profession if our real property vocabulary
were used with less vagueness and with more accuracy.
Ahmann v. Kemper0 is concerned with tenancy by the entirety and
with homestead. This case is discussed by Professor Atkinson"- and has
been noted recently in two law reviews.12
5. Cf. the discussion by Professor Atkinson in the section on Wills, infra,
n. 18.
6. Presbyterian Orphanage of Missouri v. Fitterling, 342 Mo. 299, 114 S.
W. (2d) 1004 (1938), discussed in the section on Wills, infra, at note 8; Graham
v. Stroh, 342 Mo. 686, 117 S. W. (2d) 258 (1938), discussed in the section on
Wills, infra, at note 9; Weller v. Searcy, 343 Mo. 768, 123 S. W. (2d) 73 (1938),
discussed in the section on Wills, infra, at note 10.
7. 343 Mo. 1013, 124 S. W. (2d) 1117 (1939); discussed in the section on
Wills, infra, n. 11.
8. 343 Mo. 22, 119 S. W. (2d) 810 (1938).
9. See further discussion in the section on Wills, infra, n. 20.
10. 342 Mo. 944, 119 S. W. (2d) 256 (1938).
11. In the section on Wills, infra, at n. 19.
12. Notes (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 73, (1938) 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 135.
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Two Missouri cases examined the troublesome problem of the nature of
property interests created by rights of way.
State ex rel. Highway Comm. v. Griffith1" involved a conveyance by
warranty deed of certain described premises "as and for a right of way
for said railway." In 1932 the grantee ceased to use the land for a railroad
right of way. The highway commission, successor to any interests of the
grantor in the land, appealed from a condemnation award in favor of
Achtenberg, successor to any interests of the grantee railroad. The court
held that Achtenberg did not have a fee simple absolute, but that the rail-
road had acquired only an easement which terminated on cessation of user.
"The great weight of authority is to the effect that a conveyance of land
to a railroad company for right of way purposes only, irrespective of the
consideration, passes only an easement, and that when such use ceases, the
land reverts to the grantor or his heirs." 14
There are. at least five types of interests that could result from the
grant of land for a railroad right of way. First, grantor has a fee simple
absolute subject to an easement of way, e. g., grantor grants a railroad right
of way in Blackacre to railroad and its assigns. Second, railroad has a
determinable fee simple, and grantor has a possibility of reverter, 0. g.,
grantor grants Blackacre to railroad and assigns so long as used for rail-
road right of way purposes and no longer. Third, railroad has a defeasible
fee simple and grantor has a right of entry for condition broken, o. g.,
grantor grants Blackaere to railroad on the express condition that the land
shall be used for railroad right of way only and if not so used grantor and
his heirs may enter and terminate the estate. Fourth, railroad has a fee
simple absolute. The grantor has merely stated what prompted him to
make the conveyance. Fifth, a railroad right of way is a new type of in-
terest which does not fit into the conventional categories of interests in land,
and grantor and grantee have different interests than any of those above.
The type of interest created by a particular limitation is a matter of in-
terpretation and construction.
In the principle case, the court held that the railroad did not get a fee
simple absolute (4), but the court is not clear just what interest the rail-
road did get. It probably makes no difference in the result of this case
whether the railroad got merely an easement (1) or whether it got a de-
13. 342 Mo. 229, 114 S. W. (2d) 976 (1938).
14. Id. at 236.
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terminable fee simple (2). The court talked about the railroad having an
easement, and then spoke of the land reverting to the grantor. Language
in terms of reversion is wholly inappropriate if an easement is involved.
Language in terms of easement is wholly inappropriate if a possibility of
reverter is involved. If the court did not want to commit itself as to the
type of interest created, where such statements would be dicta, the court
ought clearly to have reserved the problem. If the court wanted to commit
itself, as it apparently did here, it should have done so on careful examina-
tion of the problem.15 Hermaphroditic concepts are not useful.
In Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist.,1 6 plaintiff's land was condem-
ned for a public road. Later the defendant, a drainage district, built a
levee along and over the road, and plaintiff asked compensation for this
additional burden on his land. Judgment for the defendant, the drainage
district, was reversed. The builder of the road who condemned the land
could not" ' obtain a fee simple title to the land over which said road should
be constructed. The only right granted to it was to obtain an easement or
right of way for its proposed road.' Thus it appears that there was a
reversionary interest in the rockroad right of way." Just as in the previ-
ous easement case, the court talked of "easements" and "reversionary in-
terests" when the two are not concomitants. The holding in this case is
right, but such terminology may lead to error in future cases.
IL. MORTGAGES
Lustenberger v. Sarkesian'7 is the culmination of the metamorphosis
of a dictum in a case involving one set of facts into a holding in a case
involving a different set of facts, by dint of repeated responsive reading,
and with no examination of the issue on its merits. An occasional examina-
tion of the judicial process, so strikingly illustrated here, is of value not
only to teachers of law and to students but also to practicing lawyers.
Lustenberger v. Sarcesian is the most important mortgage case of the
year, because it is the first holding in Missouri that a trustee under a trust
deed mortgage does not get legal title at the time the trust deed is executed.
A mortgagor executed a trust deed mortgage naming one Gow trustee, to
secure a note. The trust deed provided that "In case of breach, foreclos-
15. See 1 SIIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 184.
16. 343 Mo. 28, 119 S. W. (2d) 826 (1938).
17. 343 Mo. 51, 119 S. W. (2d) 921 (1938).
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ure could only be had 'at the request of the legal holder of said note.' ,'18
Without request of Lustenberger, plaintiff and holder of the note, trustee
Gow held a foreclosure sale and executed a trustee's deed, reciting default
and request of the legal holder of the note for foreclosure. The purchaser
at the foreclosure sale conveyed to Sarkesian, defendant, by warranty deed.
Plaintiff, the note holder, asked the court to adjudicate that he had a first
lien. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment for plaintiff,
subjecting the land to a lien. The court reasoned that both parties had
equal equities, and ". . . if the equities are equal, the established rule
is that the one who has the first lien or claim in point of time will be
protected. "1 9
On motion for rehearing the defendant argued that the court had
overlooked the fact that the trustee Gow had legal title, hence Sarkesian
acquired legal title, and the court should have applied the rule that where
equities are equal, the person with legal title prevails. 20 Thus it was neces-
sary for the court to decide who had legal title. The court held that the
trustee in a trust deed form of mortgage did not have legal title. "In the
first place we might say that the legal title, as that term is generally under-
stood, does not vest in the trustee immediately upon the execution of a deed
of trust, 'because a mortgage is but a security for the payment of the debt
or the discharge of the engagement for which it was originally given, and
until the mortgagee enters for breach of condition, and in any respect until
final foreclosure, the mortgagor continues the owner of the estate.' "21
Listenberger v. Sarkesian quotes this statement verbatim from Rey-
nolds v. Stepanek ,2 2 which quotes almost verbatim from Kennett v. Plum-
mer.
2 3 In Kennett 'v. Plummer the statement was dictum and Kent is the
only authority cited. The problem there was whether a mortgagor's lessee
without actual possession could maintain trespass. The court supported its
conclusion that he could with the passage quoted above, to the effect that
the mortgagee got merely a security interest. Most important, Kennett v.
18. Id. at 58.
19. Id. at 62.
20. Id. at 64: The court is not articulate as to this contention, merely stat-
ing: "It is stated in the motion that our opinion 'overlooks' the proposition that
the deed of trust vested in the legal title to the real estate in the trustee and
that the trustee's deed passed that title to the grantees therein, which title
vested in the Sarkesians 'two and one half years later.' " Id. at 53: This con-
tention, however, is made clear in point 6b in the abstract of the defendant's
brief: "Between equal equities, the law will prevail."
21. Id. at 64.
22. 339 Ma. 804, 99 S. W. (2d) 65 (1936).
23. 28 Mo. 142, 145 (1859).
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Plummer was dealing with a straight mortgage, a fact that was never no-
ticed in subsequent applications.
This doctrine next appears in Farmers Bank v. Bradley.2 4 The prob-
lem there was whether a mortgagee of real estate under a trust deed mort-
gage had a lien on an unsevered crop of corn superior to that of a subse-
quent chattel mortgage of the same crop. Judgment for the chattel mort-
gagee was reversed. The chattel mortgagee contended "that in this state
a deed of trust is treated as a mere security for the payment of the debt
and not as an outright conveyance of title." The court replied that even
if the mortgagor still had legal title, the trust deed was a superior lien until
severance of the crop; thus it is apparent that a decision as to the place of
legal title was not necessary in disposing of the case. The court then quoted
the scripture from Kennett v. Plummer, without noticing that the earlier
case had dealt with a straight mortgage and not with a trust deed mortgage.
Further lip-service was given in Reynolds v. Stepanek to the doctrine
that the mortgagor under a trust deed mortgage retains legal title. That
case involved the question of priority among successive deeds of trust. The
defendant claimed that the trustee under a second deed of trust had legal
title. The court said that in a deed of trust the debtor remains the owner,
citing Kennett v. Plummer (which dealt with a straight mortgage) and
Farmers Bank v. Bradley (which dealt with a deed of trust and spoke by
way of dictum.) But even in this case the court's statement was dictum
because there was an outstanding first deed of trust, and legal title would
be either in the debtor or in the trustee under the first deed of trust. Title
could not possibly be in the trustee under the second deed of trust. In
dictum, again the court applies a straight mortgage doctrine to a trust
deed type of mortgage without any examination of the issues involved.
So in Lustenberger v. Sarkesian, where for the first time in Missouri
the correct determination of a case involving a trust deed form of mort-
gage depended on the place of legal title, the court gave no deliberate
consideration to the problem, but relied solely on dicta from two earlier
cases where there had been no examination of the problem.25 The holding
24. 315 Mo. 811, 815, 288 S. W. 774 (1926).
25. The initiated have perceived for a number of years the emptiness of
such a respectable concept as "legal title." The most naive persons must be
impressed with the futility of trying to decide cases by the touchstone of "legal
title" when they meet complete frustration in working out mortgage problems
on such a basis.
Thus, apparently Missouri has adopted the rule that the trustee in a trust
deed mortgage does not get legal title. But, absent priority by recording, "there
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of the case is in accord with the views of a majority of the courts which
have considered the problem,26 and seems desirable because it eliminates
unnecessary differences between straight mortgages and trust deed mort-
gages. The case is interesting, however, for the process by which that hold-
ing was reached.
Robinson v. Fided 27 involved a conveyance absolute on its face. The
grantor proved by clear and convincing evidence that the conveyance in
fact was intended as a mortgage to enable the grantee to make cost and
appeal bonds and to secure the grantee's fees as attorney, and that the
grantee had agreed to reconvey the land when pending litigation concerning
the grantor was completed. The court held that the parol evidence rule
does not prevent proof that a deed absolute on'its face is in fact a mortgage.
This is one of the most common types of equitable mortgages, and is the
only mortgage today which closely approaches in theory the old common law
mortgage where the mortgagee had a defeasible legal title and the mortgagor
had a right of entry and in equity of redemption. It would seem that the
lien theory of mortgages could not be applied in this situation to leave
legal title in the mortgagor.
State ex rel. Breit v. Shain28 was a suit to establish priority of a mort-
gage lien. The plaintiff had a first trust deed mortgage and the defendant
a second trust deed mortgage expressly subject to the first mortgage. Then
the mortgagor executed a new mortgage to the first mortgagee who re-
leased his original mortgage, knowing of the second mortgage but intend-
ing to retain a senior lien. On the record, the second mortgagee now had
a senior encumbrance. The court held, with some slight support from
earlier cases, that one who releases an old mortgage when he takes a new
one does not lose his priority if he intends to maintain a senior lien. The
junior encumbrancer had not changed his position, and the senior mort-
gagee was not guilty of laches, hence there was no estoppel. The case
is no doubt whatever that a conveyance by the mortgagor to a purchaser for
value without notice will not affect the right of the mortgagee. This establishes
definitely that the mortgagee's interest in the land, whether it be called a lien,'
'security' or otherwise, is a legal and not an equitable interest. The necessary
effect of the adopting at law of tHe equitable theory of the mortgage is the
cutting down of the mortgagee's technical legal title to a right of securit in the
land, but what is left is a legal interest in no way subject to defeat by any
conveyance of the property to an innocent purchaser for value." WALSH, Mont-
GAGES (1934) 31.
So goes the Cadmean game.
26. 1 JONEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 66; 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed.
1928) 795.
27. 342 Mo. 778, 117 S. W. (2d) 308 (1938).
28. 342 Mo. 1148, 119 S. W. (2d) 758 (1938).
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seems to be sound. We have here a continuity of lien. "The discharge of
the earlier mortgage will not change the result provided the new mortgage
was given to take its place as security for the same debt. Its lien is con-
tinued without break in the new mortgage." 29  However, a properly ad-
vised client in such a situation will renew the old mortgage rather than
substitute a new mortgage; such procedure would have saved a suit here.
In Straus v. Tribout,30 a purchaser of mortgaged chattels "subject to"
a mortgage defended a foreclosure suit on the ground that the debt was
tainted by usury because seven per cent bonds were alleged to have been
sold at ninety. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the
loan was usurious, because even if it were, the defense of usury was not
available to the defendant. He had purchased the land subject to the
mortgage, the face value of the outstanding bonds being deducted from
the agreed purchase price; hence, the grantee was not injured by any
usury. In view of this decision, the defense of usury would rarely be
available to a grantee of the mortgagor from whom usurious interest was
being exacted unless the grantee paid the full unencumbered value of the
property to the mortgagor, not knowing of the mortgage, or relying on
the mortgagor to remove the encumbrance by paying the mortgagee.
In Farm Mtg. Holding Co. v. Homan,31 a trust deed mortgage pro-
vided that if the named trustee failed to act because of disability, the legal
holder of the note should have the power to substitute another trustee,
S..and the party so substituted shall have the same powers as the
trustee herein named, and the acts of said substituted trustee shall be as
effectual and binding upon all parties as if performed by the trustee herein
named." Pursuant to this power, the holder of the note appointed its
employee as substitute trustee. The mortgagor claimed that a foreclosure
sale by such substitute trustee was void, because the original trustee was
under a disability, and the substitute trustee was to have "the same powers"
and his acts were to be "as effectual and binding" as those of the original
trustee. Therefore, the acts of the substitute trustee were as ineffectual as
those of the original trustee -would have been. The court rejected the
argument, plausible though it was from a strictly verbal point of view.
The court pointed out that lissouri Revised Statutes 1929, Sections 3135
and 3137, are open to the same objection.
29. WALsH, M ORTGAGES (1934) 181.
30. 342 Mo. 511, 116 S. W. (2d) 106 (1938).
31. 342 Mo. 969, 119 S. W. (2d) 272 (1938).
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A more serious objection to the validity of the foreclosure sale was
that the substitute trustee was an active employee of the mortgagee and the
sale was to the mortgagee. Although the court censured the note holder for
appointing its employee, the court refused to set aside the sale in the ab-
sence of any showing of inadequate price or clear and convincing proof
that the trustee's conduct at the sale injured the debtor. It seems that
such a sale is practically a sale by a trustee to himself, and is open to the
same objections. "It has been held that the trustee in Missouri can neither
directly nor indirectly become the purchaser at his own foreclosure sale,
and such a sale has been held absolutely void." 3 2
Pueblo Real Estate Loan & Inv. Co. v. Johnsonl3 presented a similar
problem. The mortgage was an ordinary mortgage with a power of sale in
the mortgagee. The mortgagee sold to himself at foreclosure sale at an ade-
quate price and under a fairly conducted sale. If the mortgagee was ex-
pressly authorized to sell to himself, a sale to himself would foreclose the
mortgagor's equity of redemption. But if the mortgagee had no express
power to sell to himself, a foreclosure sale to himself is voidable, even if the
sale was fair and at an adequate price. The mortgagor's remedy is a bill
to redeem, with a tender of the amount owed. The whole problem of the
right of a mortgagee or trustee to sell to himself is exhaustively considered
in the light of Missouri authority in a recent comment in the Missouri Law
Review.34
III. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
There is real need for a definitive statement as to the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the supreme court.
The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction "where the amount in
dispute" exceeds $7500.35 But in Rust Sash & Door Co. v. Gate City Bldg.
Corp.,36 a proceeding to establish a mechanic's lien of $14,527.87, the court
on its own motion raised the issue of jurisdiction and disclaimed jurisdic-
tion because the defendant did not dispute the amount but only disputed
whether the lien existed; therefore, there was "no amount in dispute" over
$7500. No authority is cited for the startling proposition.
32. Comment (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 186, 189.
33. 342 Mo. 991, 119 S. W. (2d) 274 (1938).
34. Comment (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 186.
35. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 12; Amendment of 1884, § 3; Mo. REv. STAT.
(1929) § 1914.
36. 342 Mo. 206, 114 S. W. (2d) 1023 (1938).
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An ordinary action of ejectment is not a case "involving title to real
estate, " 3 7 therefore, the supreme court has no jurisdiction on appeal . 3
Previous confused Missouri authority is discussed in this case, and the
majority view in Ballenger v. Windes3 is adopted. A proceeding to es-
tablish a mechanic's lien is not a case "involving title to real estate. "40
"Actions which adjudicate only as to liens on real estate and do not direct-
ly affect the title are not actions involving title to real estate within the
meaning of that provision." Neither does a petition to cancel notes and
deed of trust securing them, for failure of consideration, present a case
"involving title to real estate. ' 4' Title is involved in the judgment only
incidentally and collaterally.
But an action of ejectment with a count to quiet title is a "case in-
volving title to real estate."4 2 Boone v. Oetting43 was an "action in eject-
ment to determine title." No one questioned the court's jurisdiction.
Quaere whether the petition contained a count to quiet title, or whether in
some other way this case difters from Gibbany v. Walker.4 Proffer v.
Proffer4 held that a suit contesting a will which devised real estate involved
title to real estate and the supreme court had appellate jurisdiction.4 6
PUBLIC UTILITIES
SmITH B. ATWOOD*
There were but few cases before the Supreme Court of Missouri during
the year 1938 which involved questions of peculiar interest in the public
utility field. Numerous cases were examined in which public utilities were
37. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
38. Gibbany v. Walker, 342 Mo. 156, 113 S. W. (2d) 792 (1938).
39. 338 Mo. 1039, 93 S. W. (2d) 882 (1936), (1937) 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 265.
40. Rust Sash & Door Co. v. Gate City Bldg. Corp., 342 Mo. 206, 114 S. W.
(2d) 1023 (1938).
41. Brutcher v. Fitzsimmons, 343 Mo. 547, 122 S. W. (2d) 881 (1938).
42. Curry v. Crull, 342 Mo. 553, 116 S. W. (2d) 125 (1938); see Gill, The
Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1937 (Property) (1938) 3 Mo.
L. REv. 398, 402: "A denial is an admission."
43. 342 Mo. 269, 114 S. W. (2d) 981 (1938); see Gill, The Work of the
Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1937 (Property) (1938) 3 Mo. L. REV. 398,
402: "An owner can have both land and purchase price."
44. 342 Mo. 156, 113 S. W. (2d) 792 (1938); the same question might be
posed as to Smith v. Wallace, 343 Mo. 1, 119 S. W. (2d) 813 (1938).
45. 342 Mo. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938).
46. See the section on Wills, infra, n. 1.
*Attorney, Jefferson City. LL.B., University of Michigan, 1914.
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incidentally involved as parties defendant, in which the crux of the action
pertained to other fields of litigation. Some of these cases were on the
border line and it was difficult to determine if the issues decided were of
general interest to the public utility industry.
I. RAmROADS
Construction and Maintenance
An instance of a border line case is Jones v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R. R. Co.,' which was an action to recover damages under Section
4765, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929. Under the provisions of this statute it
is the duty of every company owning or operating a railroad in this state to
cause to be constructed and maintained suitable openings across and through
the right of way and roadbed of such railroad so as to afford sufficient outlet
to drain off water, including surface water, along such railroad whenever
the draining of such water has been obstructed by the construction thereof.
It also gives the right to any adjoining landowner to construct such open-
ings himself, at the expense of the railroad upon its failure to do so after no-
tice, and subjects the railroad to damages for failure to comply with the
statute. On the point of contention by the railroad that the right to maintain
an action for damages from overflow resulting from failure of the railroad
to comply with the statute was limited to an adjoining landowner, the court
held that, while an adjoining landowner alone had the right to construct
the opening at the expense of the railroad after its failure to do so, one
not an adjoining landowner may maintain an action for damages under
the statute, upholding a former decision to the same effect.
II. RTs
In State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Shain,2 a petition for a
writ of certiorari, the court reaffirmed the proposition that rates established
by the Public Service Commission are prima facie reasonable, and that the
burden of showing their unreasonableness is upon the party seeldng to set
aside such rates. That such orders by the commission must be based on
competent, substantial evidence was also reaffirmed. The appellate court
had held that, in a proceeding before the Public Service Commission to fix
1. 343 Mo. 1104, 125 S. W. (2d) 5 (1939).
2. 342 Mo. 867, 119 S. W (2d) 220 (1938).
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maximum rail rates for coal, such competent evidence was not to be found
in the fact alone that truck rates for this commodity were lower than the
then existing rail rates, and an order reducing rail rates upon such evi-
dence was not justified. The supreme court refused to quash the opinion
of the appellate court in the absence of a conflict with supreme court
rulings upon the point.
Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co.3 was a suit to recover a sum paid
by the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company pursuant to an order made by
the Interstate Commerce Commission in a proceeding before that body
wherein it found that excessive rates had been charged and collected in
connection with coal shipments by defendant. The amount was paid on
the demand of defendant in accordance with the commission's rules of
practice. Thereafter, following numerous unsuccessful motions by the
railroad, the commission reopened the case and set aside its order, including
the reparation order under which the payment was made. Our supreme
court held that the payment by the railroad company was voluntary and
could not be recovered, inasmuch as it was made before the shipper had
brought proceedings to enforce the commission award, in which proceed-
ing the carrier would have had his day in court to review the order; that
said order was not a "judgment," and that because of the events that had
transpired since the payment, it would work an inequity and injustice upon
the defendant to allow a recovery.
The case was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Baldwin et al. v. Scott County Milling Co.,4 where it was held that in view
of the prima facie case against the railroad in any court in which the com-
mission's order may be reviewed, the railroad was not compelled to risk the
hazards and penalties that may have resulted from an adverse ruling, and
in this situation the payment by the railroad was not voluntary and could
be recovered. It was held, moreover, that equitable considerations may
not serve to justify failure of the carrier to collect, or retention by the
shipper of, any part of lawful tariff charges.
3. 343 Mo. 915, 122 S. W. (2d) 890 (1938).
4. 59 Sup. Ct. 943 (1939).
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I. TAXATI N OF PERSONAL PROPERTY TRANSFERRED BY CONDITIONAL SALES
CONTRACT
In Municipal Acceptance Corp. v. Canole,' Fairbanks, Morse & Co.
made a conditional sale of machinery to the city of Fayette, and the city
executed and delivered to the company, in payment, "pledge orders" to
be paid monthly, but only out of that part of the net earnings from electric-
ity generated by the use of the machinery which represented a saving over
the average cost of production for a prior year. The sales contract provided
that "title and ownership" remained in the company until final payment
was made, that the city should operate its plant in an efficient and economi-
cal manner, and that the company might inspect the plant and could re-
take the machinery in event of default. The company assigned the pledge
orders, together with its title to the machinery, to the plaintiff, which
owned $60,000.00 of them, as of June 1, 1932. The state tax commission
fixed the value of the machinery, and plaintiff appealed to the state board
of equalization, which approved the assessment. Thereupon, plaintiff
brought this suit to enjoin collection of the tax. The chancellor held that
although the weight of authority is that where the vendor under a condi-
tional sales contract reserves merely a security title, taxes are assessed
against the vendee, nevertheless the degree of control retained by the ven-
dor in this case indicated the reservation of more than a "security title,"
so as to make plaintiff liable for the taxes. Plaintiff appealed from a decree
dismissing its bill. It was held that plaintiff did not have an adequate
remedy at law; that evidence as to the ownership of the machinery did
not appear on the face of the record of the state board of equalization and,
consequently, could not be raised by certiorari; and that the point here
raised could not be asserted as a defense against an action at law to collect
the taxes because it would amount to a collateral attack upon the "judg-
ment" of the board of equalization.2 The court denied the contention of
*Attorney, St. Louis. LLB., University of Missouri, 1926. Former Judge
of the St. Louis Circuit Court.
1. 342 Mo. 1170, 119 S. W. (2d) 820 (1938).
2. The conclusion of the court as to the remedy by injunction is consistent
with established authority, a number of which are cited in the opinion.
[Vol. 4
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respondent that it was necessary for plaintiff to tender into court the
amount of taxes to be due if the judgment should be adverse. On the main
question of whether plaintiff was the owner of the machinery in such sense
as to make it liable for taxation,3 the court held that the machinery belonged
to the city, with a defeasible title in the vendor to secure the purchase
price; that the arrangement resembled a chattel mortgage; and that the
defeasible title reserved by the vendor after transfer of possession was
not such ownership as made it liable for taxes.4 The respondent also ad-
vanced the argument that since the "pledge orders" were not debts of the
city,' the transaction was not a conditional sales contract. In overruling
this contention the court said that an unconditional obligation to pay a
definite sum in a specified time is not an essential element of a conditional
sales contract." The decree of the chancellor was reversed, with directions
to grant a perpetual injunction.7
II. TAXATION OF THE SALE OF ELECTRICITY TO PUBLIC UTILITIES
In State ex reZ. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Smith,8 in a certiorari
proceeding the circuit court had quashed the record of the state auditor
in levying an additional sales tax assessment on the power company for
the sale of electric current to the Kansas City Public Service Company, to
be used to propel its street cars, and to Kansas City and the cities of Glas-
3. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) §§ 9746, 9756.
4. The weight of authority supports the rule that a purchaser in posses-
sion under a conditional sales contract is the one liable for taxes. State v. White
Furn. Co., 206 Ala. 575, 90 So. 896 (1921); State v. White Furn. Co., 18 Ala.
App. 249, 90 So. 895 (1921); Wells v. Mayor & Aldermen, 87 Ga. 397, 13 S. E.
442 (1891) ; Massey-Harris Co. v. Lerum, 60 S. D. 12, 242 N. W. 597, 598 (1932) ;
State v. J. I. Case Co., 189 Minn. 180, 248 N. W. 726 (1933); Bowls v. Oklahoma
City, 24 Okla. 579, 104 Pac. 902 (1909) ; Buttram v. Gray County, Texas, 62 F.(2d) 44 (C. C. A. 1932). In some jurisdictions governmental agencies may col-
lect either from the conditional vendor or the vendee. Weber Showcase & Fix.
Co. v. Kaufman, 45 Ariz. 397, 44 Pac. (2d) 158, 159 (1935) (under statute);
Automatic Voting Machine Corp. v. Maricopa Co., 50 Ariz. 211, 70 Pac. (2d) 447,
449 (1937) ; Jordan v. Baggett, 37 Ga. App. 537, 140 S. E. 902 (1927). And there
are cases holding that the taxes should be assessed against the vendor. Wanee
v. Thomas, 75 Cal. App. 231, 242 Pac. 509 (1925); Remington Cash Register Co.
v. State Board of Taxes & Assessments, 8 N. J. Misc. 875, 152 Atl. 330 (1930).
5. Bell v. City of Fayette, 325 Mo. 75, 28 S. W. (2d) 356 (1930), holding
that the pledge orders here involved do not amount to debts so as to obligate the
city beyond the limits set by the Mo. CONsT. art. 10, § 12.
6. In view of the holding in the Bell case, it is interesting to consider wheth-
er the pledge orders are such "credits" as might themselves be subject to taxa-
tion. Accounts receivable are, of course, generally taxable as personal property.
State ex rel. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co. v. Gehner, 316 Mo. 694, 294 S. W.
1017 (1927).
7. Opinion by Ellison, J.; all concurring except Douglas, J., not sitting
because not a member of the court when the case was submitted.
8. 342 Mo. 75, 111 S. W. (2d) 513 (1938).
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gow and Sweet Springs, to be used to pump water for their municipal
water works. The question was whether the transactions were "sales of
. . . electrical current . . . to domestic, commercial or industrial
consumers," as those terms are used in the Missouri Sales Tax Act.9 The
court, after conceding that the word "commerce" has been construed to
include transportation of passengers in cases considering the interstate
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution,10 held that if the word "com-
mercial," as used in the Sales Tax Act, is meant to include everything per-
taining to commerce, then it would also include industrial pursuits, thus
rendering the word "industrial," used in the section, meaningless. Since it
is the duty of the court to give meaning, if possible, to all of the words in
the statute, the court said :"1 "The ordinarily accepted use of the phrase
'commercial establishment' denotes a place where commodities are ex-
changed, bought, or sold, while the ordinarily accepted meaning of the
phrase 'industrial establishment' denotes a place of business 'which em-
ploys much labor and capital and is a distinct branch of trade; as, the
sugar industry'. Webster's New International Dictionary. Thus, we see
that the transportation of passengers would not come within the ordinary
meaning of either the word 'commercial' or 'industrial'."
In further support of its definition, the court pointed out that govern-
mental agencies dealing directly with electric utilities classify sale thereof
as domestic, commercial, industrial, sale of electricity to railroads, muni-
cipalities and to other utilities for resale.1 2 It is concluded that by specific-
ally enumerating classes of sales of electricity which were to be subject to
the tax, other classifications were impliedly excluded; that the sales in
question did not fall within the classes enumerated in the statute; and
that the assessment was, consequently, without support in law. The judg-
ment of the circuit court was affirmed.18
9. Mo. Laws 1933-34, Ex. Sess., p. 155, 157.
10. U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 18; Anderson v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 62 Fed.
46 (1894); Passenger Cases, 48 U. S. 283 (1848); Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. v.
Fuller, 17 Wall. 560 (U. S. 1873).
11. 342 Mo. 75, 111 S. W. (2d) 513, 515 (1938).
12. The court in this connection specifically refers to the Public Service
Commission of Missouri, the Public Utility Commission of Kansas, the NationalAssociation of Railway and Utilities Commissioners, the National Electric LightAssociation and the Federal Power Commission. Classifications on this subject
are to be found in General Order No. 5 of the Missouri Public Service Commission
effective October 15. 1913.
13. Opinion by Tipton, J.; all concur.
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III. STAT INcomE TAx ON SALARY oF EMPLOYEE OF A FEDERAL
CORPORATION
State ex rel. Baumann v. Bowles14 was a suit to collect state income
for the year 1934 upon the salary of defendant as a joint employee of four
corporations created by act of Congress, each being a unit of the Farm
Credit Administration. The sole question was whether the tax was pro-
hibited by the Federal Constitution. It was held that it did not appear
that the tax would interfere with governmental activities of the corpora-
tions involved and that the judgment in favor of plaintiff should be affirmed.
People of New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves'5 was cited -without discussion.
The court's refusal to give controlling weight to this authority is supported
by subsequent events. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Graves
v. People of State of New York,' 6 in holding that the salary of an employee
of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation may be subjected to state income
tax, expressly overrules the Rogers case'7 and other cases restricting the
right to tax salaries of federal employees.
IV. PRIORITIES
Sanders v. Banks 8 was an action to determine title to certain land.
Plaintiff's claim was based upon the purchase of the land at a sale for
the enforcement of a judgment for drainage taxes, held on March 30, 1932.
Plaintiff received a sheriff's deed dated March 31, 1932, and acknowledged
April 1, 1932, but the same was not recorded until February 20, 1934. De-
fendant Owens claimed title by a purchase on November 24, 1933, at a sale
14. 342 Mo. 357, 115 S. W. (2d) 805 (1938).
15. 299 U. S. 401 (1937).
16. 306 U. S. 466 (1939); see also State Tax Commission of Utah v. Van
Cott, 306 U. S. 511 (1939), involving the right of the state to tax salaries of
attorneys for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the original Agricul-
tural Credit Corporation.
17. Mr. Justice Stone, in a majority opinion, points out that the theory
that a tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its source is no longer
tenable, and: "Assuming, as we do, that the Home Owners' Loan Corporation is
clothed with the same immunity from state taxation as the government itself, we
cannot say that the present tax on the income of its employees lays any uncon-
stitutional burden upon it." (1. c. 601) Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
a separate opinion, concludes that Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819), that "the power to tax involves the power
to destroy," was brushed away by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion
in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (1928), where he said: "The
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." Mr. Justice Butler,
with the concurrence of Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissented in a short opinion.
18. 342 Mo. 311, 114 S. W. (2d) 1021 (1938).
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held pursuant to a judgment obtained in a suit instituted September 26,
1931, for the collection of state and county taxes. Defendant received a
sheriff's deed dated November 24, 1932, acknowledged November 27, 1933,
and recorded December 2, 1933. All admitted that the lien for state and
county taxes was paramount to all other claims and liens, but plaintiff
asserted that the statute 9 required that actions for state and county taxes
should be "prosecuted" against the owner of the property and that since
he became the owner before judgment in the tax suit he should have been
made a party thereto. The court, in ruling against this contention,
pointed out that plaintiff did not record his deed and that there was no
evidence that the collector, as plaintiff in the suit to collect state and coun-
ty taxes, had any knowledge of plaintiff's interest in the land. The court
refused to pass upon the question of whether it would have been necessary
to make the plaintiff a party if his interest had been known but it was
pointed out that plaintiff could, on his own motion, have been made a
party defendant. The action of the court in affirming judgment in favor
of defendant Owens is consistent with analogous rulings. 0
V. MISCELANMOUS
There were several cases decided during the period covered hereby
which are digested under the heading "Taxation" but which were actually
decided upon points which add little to the subject in general.
In Ellis v. Powell,2' it was held that although as a general rule a sher-
iff's sale of real estate under execution will not be set aside on mere inade-
quacy of consideration, nevertheless, where the amount paid is so grossly
inadequate as to amount in itself to conclusive evidence of fraud, relief may
be granted not on the ground of inadequacy of consideration, but on the
ground of fraud, as evidenced thereby. Here, in a sale on execution, based
upon a judgment for taxes, of property worth between two and four hun-
dred dollars, for $8.50, it was held that the judgment of the circuit court
setting aside the sheriff's deed should be affirmed.
In State v. Gilmore,2 it was held that the words "the limitation on
the amount to be retained as herein provided shall apply to fees and com-
missions on current, back and delinquent taxes," as used in the statute
19. MO. RnEv. STAT. (1929) § 9953.
20. Millerson v. T. W. Doherty Land & Cattle Co., 241 S. W. 907 (Mo. 1922).
21. 117 S. W. (2d) 225 (Mo. 1938).
22. 342 Mo. 1232, 119 S. W. (2d) 805 (1938).
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limiting the maximum amount of compensation which a collector may re-
tain,2 3 required the collector to include fees and commissions on delinquent
taxes in computing the amount to be retained by him.24  The court con-
sidered the fact that subsequently to the period involved herein the legis-
lature repealed the section under consideration and adopted a new section
"clarifying said law and pertaining to the same subject matter"2 but said
that the legislature did not have the power, by the use of the word "clari-
fying," to give the new law retroactive effect.26
TORTS
GLmNN McCL.ARY*
While the field of Torts, in the period under review, was as active in
the number of cases decided by the Mfissouri Supreme Court as in the
previous periods which have been reviewed in this annual study of the work
of the court, yet the decisions for 1938 do not show any outstanding develop-
ment in any particular aspect of the subject, except in the application of
the humanitarian doctrine. In general, the facts of the various cases do
not seem to have raised many new questions. The decisions in which the
humanitarian doctrine was presented are again given special treatment else-
where in this study of the work of the court, so that the doctrine may be
examined more critically.
23. MO. REv. STAT. (1929) § 9935 (as amended, Mo. Laws 1933, p. 454).
24. As is pointed out in the opinion in State ex rel. Buchanan County v.
Fulks, 296 Mo. 614, 247 S. W. 129 (1922), the court ruled that the words of the
original section (Section 12927, REv. STAT. (1919))-". . . all fees and com-
missions coming into the hands of any collector from any source whatever . . ."
used in connection with limitation upon the amount which a collector could retain,
required him to include fees collected on delinquent taxes. It is to be noted that
the language of the statute under consideration in the above case is even stronger
than that passed upon in the Fulks case.
25. Mo. Laws 1937, p. 545; Mo. STAT. ANN., § 9935, p. 7975.
26. MO. CONsT. art. 2, § 15, art. 14, § 8: the court calls attention to the ques-
tion of whether the collector can, under the 1937 act, retain fees collected on back
taxes if doing so results in his total fees exceeding the constitutional limitation.
*Professor of Law and Acting Dean, University of Missouri. A. B., Ohio
Wesleyan University, 1917; J. D. University of Michigan, 1924; S. J. D., Harvard,
1936.
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I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties of persons in certain relations
1. Possessors of Land
A possessor of land is liable for harm caused to business visitors
(invitees) by a natural or artificial condition thereon if he knows, or by
the exercise of reasonable care he could discover the condition which, if
known to him, he should realize as involving a risk of injury to them and
he has no reason to believe that they will discover the danger or realize the
risk, if he does not make the condition reasonably safe or does not give an
adequate warning. In determining the extent of preparation which a
business visitor is entitled to expect from the possessor, the nature of the
premises and the purposes for which they are used is of importance. His
duty may vary depending whether the premises are a private residence,
a store, or other similar place of business, or a factory. In State ex rel.
Trading Post Co. v. Shain, the evidence was that vegetables on display in a
store where the customer fell were prepared at another place, where the un-
salable leaves and stalks were left, and that vegetable debris on the floor,
causing the customer to fall, was bruised and dark. The court held that this
was not sufficient for the jury on the question whether the debris had been on
the floor for such length of time as to constitute notice to the storekeeper,
and that the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in holding such
evidence to be sufficient for the jury on this question was in conflict with
controlling decisions of the supreme court. In O'Malley v. City of St.
Louis,2 the plaintiff tripped over an irregularity in an incompleted floor
of the new auditorium while attending the dedication ceremonies. The
depression in the center of the floor which was intended at some future
time to receive a carpet, was about three-quarters of an inch lower than
the border of the floor, and there was a wood strip to which the carpet was
to be anchored extending about one-half inch above the border. Reasoning
from analogies of other cases where the offset in streets was greater, the
court ruled that the elevation of the wood strip one-half inch above
the surface of the border, under the facts of this case, did not constitute
actionable negligence. While there were no signs or guards to warn that
1. 342 Mo. 588, 116 S. W. (2d) 99 (1938).
2. 343 Mo. 14, 119 S. W. (2d) 785 (1938).
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the floor at this point was not finished, the plaintiff saw or should have
seen this when she reached the top of the stairway and before she stepped
to pass over the border. But in Philibert v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., the
business visitor was struck from above when cartons of empty jars fell
from an overhead platform or shelf. The plaintiff, an employee of a tele-
phone company, was on the defendant's premises to install a switchboard.
He had gone to the rear part of the factory portion of the building to
consult the defendant's carpenter about constructing a box to be used in
connection with the installation of the switchboard. Whether the plaintiff
exceeded the scope of his invitation by going to the factory room to see
about the box, and thus had lost his status of a business visitor, was held
to be a question for the jury.
The principle that no duty is owed to a trespasser to keep a lookout for
him was applied in two cases. In Angeio v. Baldwin,4 the injuries were
sustained when the plaintiff was struck by a moving car while picking coal
from the ground in the defendant's railroad yard. The plaintiff attempted
to bring his status within the exception to the trespass rule where numerous
persons have been habitually passing over the defendant's track at some
given point, or have been using it as a footpath between different points,
as he and others had been taking coal from the yard. Under this exception,
a duty is owed to keep a lookout for such trespassers. However, the court
clearly distinguished that group of trespassers from the plaintiff in that
here the plaintiff was not using the tracks as a member of the public; instead,
he was in the railroad yard for the purpose of taking property that did not
belong to him. In Ducoulombier v. Thompson,5 the plaintiff was picking
up wheat along the defendant's switch track when he was injured by a
switching movement of the defendant's cars. The plaintiff, however, did
not have any substantial evidence to show that the cars were moved by or
with the authority of anyone who had knowledge that the plaintiff was in
a position of peril from such movement.
It was held erroneous, in Grosvener v. New York Central R. B., to
instruct the jury that whether defendant's conduct in moving cars in the
railroad yard was negligent depended on whether or not it was being made
in accordance with the usual practice and custom prevailing in the defend-
3. 342 Mo. 1239, 119 S. W. (2d) 797 (1938).
4. 343 Mo. 310, 121 S. W. (2d) 731 (1938).
5. 343 Mo. 991, 124 S. W. (2d) 1105 (1938).
6. 343 Mo. 611, 123 S. W. (2d) 173 (1938).
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ant's railroad yard. The custom or practice might very well be a reason-
able one, in the abstract, and yet not one in which the ordinary reasonable
man would indulge under the circumstances of the particular case. The
court quoted the observation of Mr. Justice Holmes: "What usually is done
may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed




The general rule is that landlords are not required, absent a statute
or ordinance, to maintain lights in the common hallways for the benefit of
their tenants and visitors. However, if a landlord undertakes to furnish
lights, what is his duty? This question was presented in Barber v. Kellogg,"
in an action by a tenant against a landlord for injuries sustained when
the tenant fell while descending a winding stairway, where the tenant
pleaded specific negligence in that the landlord failed to furnish sufficient
light for the stairway and failed to have a switch at the top of the stairway
to turn on the light at the bottom of the stairway. The Kansas City Court
of Appeals held that if a landlord undertakes to furnish lights then he
must exercise reasonable care to persons lawfully on the premises; that
the evidence in this case failed to show a breach of duty in that it failed
to show that the defendant had ever assumed the obligation of turning on
the lights; and showed that this had been performed and assumed by the
tenants. The supreme court ruled that if the defendants furnished lights
for the illumination of the stairway and expected the tenants to perform
the duty of turning on the lights, then it was at least a question for the
jury whether reasonable care required that the defendants should furnish
switches at convenient points for this purpose. However, the case was
reversed and remanded because of error in an instruction given for the
plaintiff which authorized a verdict on general negligence when the petition
alleged specific negligence.
3. Municipal Corporations
Injuries resulting from conditions in streets and sidewalks were the
basis of two cases against municipalities. In Blackburn v. City of St.
7. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U. S. 468, 470 (1903).
8. 123 S. W. (2d) 100 (Mo. 1938).
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Louis, a pedestrian brought suit against the city for injuries sustained as
a result of being struck, while on the sidewalk, by an automobile which
was deflected from its course after colliding with an ellipsoidal traffic
button about four inches in height. These traffic buttons were attached to
the surface of the street at a lighted intersection, about five feet from street
car tracks and about twelve feet from the curb, to designate the boundary
of a safety zone for passengers of street cars as authorized by ordinance.
This was held to be a reasonably safe means for regulating traffic, not-
withstanding such buttons were painted and did not have reflectors as
authorized by the ordinance. The maintenance of these buttons to desig-
nate the boundary lines of the safety zones for street car passengers at all
intersections was a governmental rather than a corporate function of the
city, since such traffic buttons alone solely served to regulate traffic. The
court distinguished between inherently dangerous obstructions or plans for
the regulation of traffic and a reasonable device, such as this, where it
seemed unreasonable to believe that they could cause damage unless the
driver of a motor vehicle not only committed a misdemeanor in violation
of the ordinance but also drove in a most unusual and careless manner.
The protection to the public by such regulation greatly outweighed the
injuries that might be caused by careless driving against these buttons.
In Fourcade v. Kansas City,10 the plaintiff recovered against the city
for injuries received from a fall when a coalhole cover in a sidewalk tilted,
the evidence showing that the lid was old, worn and warped, and did not
safely fit the rim at the time of the injury. Since the defendant made no
issue on the question of notice in time for correction thereof before the
injury, it was not error in not requiring a finding that the defendant
defectively constructed the lid and rim. The allegation in the petition that
the defendant defectively constructed the lid and rim only went to the
question of notice to the defendant of the condition of the lid and rim in
time to have corrected the same before the injury.
4. Operator of a Motorcycle
The duty imposed upon a motorcyclist was raised in Oesterreicher v.
Grupp. The trial court had instructed the jury "that under the law it was
9. 343 Mo. 301, 121 S. W. (2d) 727 (1938).
10. 342 Mo. 847, 118 S. W. (2d) 1 (1938).
11. 119 S. W. (2d) 307 (Mo. 1938). The question is raised in connection
with plaintiff's contributory negligence, but it is of greater importance under the
duty problem in general and is, therefore, set forth in this connection.
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the duty of the plaintiff at the time and place described in the evidence to
exercise the highest degree of care in the operation of his motorcycle and
avoid colliding with defendant's automobile." This was held to exact far
greater care, skill and foresight than exacted by the law and hence was
reversible error. The use of the word "and" in lieu of the word "to"
embraced the thought that if humanly possible it was the duty of the
operator of the motorcycle to avoid the collision, and permitted the jury
to measure the operator's obligation to avoid the collision by the care, skill
and foresight exercised by a very competent and prudent person under
like or similar circumstances.
B. Breach of duty established through violation of statute or ordinance
The duty and breach of duty, which constitute negligence, may be
shown through violation of a statute which was intended to protect persons
of the class to which the plaintiff belongs against the kind of injury which
he has received. In Jones v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. B.,1 2 the
plaintiff, a crop-sharing tenant farmer of certain lands, sought to recover
for the damage done to his growing crops by overflows, alleged to have
resulted from the negligent and wrongful failure of defendant to maintain
suitable and adequate openings and outlets across and through its right
of way, so as to permit the drainage and escape into the Mississippi River
of the high water carried in the streams which flow into and through the
general territory in which the plaintiff's farming operations were con-
ducted. A Missouri statute makes it a duty of every company owning or
operating a railroad in this state to cause to be constructed and maintained
suitable openings across and through the right of way and roadbed of such
railroad so as to afford a sufficient outlet to drain and carry off the water,
including surface water, along such railroad, whenever the draining of such
water has been constructed or rendered necessary by the construction of
the railroad. The petition was based upon specific acts of negligence and
did not allude to the statute. The court held that he was not to be pre-
cluded on that account from insisting, on appeal, that his cause of action
was based upon the violation of the statute, and not on specific acts of
negligence. "One who desired to avail himself of a public statute," says
the court, "is not required to plead the statute by distinct mention of it
or reference to it, but is only required to pleaa the facts which bring his
ease within its purview." The court also held that the phrase "surface
12. 348 Mo. 1104, 125 S. W. (2d) 5 (1938).
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water" in the statute includes water overflowing from a stream or water
course as well as that falling as rain upon the surface of the land, and
that highwater outlets into a slough and other depressions, which have been
shut off by railroad embankments, were "water courses" within the mean-
ing of the statute.
A common situation of negligence, predicated on violation of a statute
designed for the safety of the employees of railroads, is found in Arnold v.
Alton R. R.13 There a window in a locomotive flew outward when the
engineer put the locomotive in reverse in making a drop switch, and when
the locomotive was started forward the window slammed back and broke,
causing particles of the glass to strike the fireman in the face. This was
found to be caused by the absence of a hook and screw eye from the clear
vision window in the locomotive, in violation of the Federal Boiler Inspec-
tion Act which applies to and includes all parts and appurtenances of a
locomotive. In Cason v. Kansas City Terminal By.,14 the action was brought
under the Federal Safety Appliance Act for injuries allegedly caused by
a defective hand brake on the freight car on which plaintiff, a switchman,
was riding. In Aly v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis,'5 the action was
brought under the same act for injuries sustained by a switch foreman who
fell when he stepped on the footboard of an engine, which was alleged to
be defective.
C. Res ipsa loquitur
Where a thing which has produced an injury is shown to have been
under the control and management of the defendant, and the occurrence is
such that in the ordinary course of events does not happen if due care has
been exercised, the fact of injury under these circumstances is sufficient to
support a recovery in the absence of any explanation by the defendant
tending to show that he was free from negligence. In Berry v. Kansas City
Public Service Co.,' the plaintiff's evidence clearly showed to the jury -what
negligence on the part of the defendant caused the injury and left no
doubt about the cause of the collision. Under this state of the record there
was no occasion for the application of res ipsa loquitur, so that an instruc-
tion based upon the doctrine was inapplicable. However, in State ex rel.
13. 343 Mo. 1049, 124 S. W. (2d) 1092 (1938).
14. 123 S. W. (2d) 133 (Mo. 1938).
15. 342 Mo. 1116, 119 S. W. (2d) 363 (1938).
16. 343 Mo. 474, 121 S. W. (2d) 825 (1938).
99
et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Reeves v. Shain,17 where defendants did not file any motion to make plain-
tiff's petition charging only general negligence definite and certain, asked
for an instruction on general negligence, and did not ask for any instruc-
tions on specific negligence, they could not complain of a submission on a
theory of general negligence although plaintiff's evidence showed specific
negligence. On the other hand, the fact that the defendant's witness
disclosed the specific defects in a platform which caused injuries to the
plaintiff did not require the plaintiff, in Philibert v. Benjamin Ansehi Co.,18
to submit his case on specific negligence.
D. Imputed negligence
The question of imputed negligence was presented in State ex rel.
Steinbruegge v. Hostetter,' in an action for injuries sustained by a pedes-
trian when struck by a dealer's automobile which was driven by a salesman.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals had held the presumption that an auto-
mobile was driven by a regular employee of the defendant within the scope
of his employment, which arises on proof of the defendant's ownership of
the automobile and that it was being driven by a regular employee of the
defendant, did not disappear upon the dealer's introduction of substantial
evidence to the contrary. This was held to be in conflict with controlling
rulings of the Missouri Supreme Court.
In Vert v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,20 a life insurance company,
not reserving the right to direct how its agent should travel, nor expressly
or impliedly directing his travel, for the purpose of selling old line life
insurance outside the territory in which he was required to collect indus-
trial insurance premiums, was held not liable for injuries to the plaintiff
as a result of the agent's negligence in the operation of his automobile
while returning to such territory after going outside of it for such pur-
pose, although the company knew that he used the automobile for trans-
portation while soliciting such insurance. The fact that the insurance
company's rules, requiring that its agent's representations conform to the
company's instructions, instructing them as to the collection of premiums,
and forbidding them to pay premiums, transfer commissions, allow premium
17. 343 Mo. 550, 122 S. W. (2d) 885 (1938).
18. 342 Mo. 1239, 119 S. W. (2d) 797 (1938).
19. 342 Mo. 341, 115 S. W. (2d) 802 (1938).
20. 342 Mo. 629, 117 S. W. (2d) 252 (1938).
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rebates and cash company or premium checks, did not show the right to
direct or control the agent's physical activities in soliciting prospects to
purchase old line insurance outside of his industrial insurance territory so
as to render the company liable for the injuries.
B. Causation
Assuming negligence on the part of the defendant to have been made
out, there is still the question of causation or responsibility in law to be
determined. The problem on concurrent causation was involved in two
cases, neither of which presented new or novel situations. In Stollhans v.
City of St. Louis,2 ' a pedestrian, due to deep mud on the city sidewalk, was
compelled on a misty night to walk in the street extensively traveled with
fast traffic. While walking on the right side of the street, and while giving
attention to traffic, he was struck by an automobile approaching from the
rear, just after another automobile with very bright lights approaching
from the opposite direction had passed the pedestrian. The defendant
contended that the negligence of the operator of the automobile was an
intervening cause which prevented the city's negligence from being the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The court held the question
whether or not the city's negligence was a concurrent cause of the plain-
tiff's injury was for the jury, and an instruction so worded that the jury
might reasonably believe that the city was not liable, if the injuries were
due in any part to the negligent driving by the operator of the automobile,
was prejudicially erroneous.
Where the concurring force was an act of God, but it was not shown
that the flood or volume of high water was so great that the damage to
the plaintiff would have resulted regardless of any question of the defend-
ant's negligence in failing to maintain sufficient outlets for water to pass
through its roadbed, the defendant was held responsible for the damage,
in Jones v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R.,22 even though some outside
and extraneous force, such as an act of God, might have contributed to the
final result.
F. Defenses in negligence cases
In the period under review there were a number of interesting ques-
tions pertaining to contributory negligence presented to the court. In
21. 343 Mo. 467, 121 S. W. (2d) 808 (1938).
22. 343 Mo. 1104, 125 S. W. (2d) 5 (1938).
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Gardner v. Turk,23 in parent's action against motorist for the death of an
eleven year old son who was struck while walking on the street, where the
evidence showed that the parents knew that the street was heavily traveled,
that pedestrians walked in the street because of a lack of sidewalks and that
son intended to walk on the street when he left home, the question of the
parent's negligence was for the jury. Since the child was not capable of
exercising the care of an adult, those having the custody of and authority
over such child and whose duty it was to care for and safeguard such a
child should, so far as reasonably possible, prevent him from going into a
danger known to them but which, because of the child's immaturity, he
may not appreciate.
Pearrow v. Thompson 24 was an action for injuries sustained when the
plaintiff was struck by freight cars while crossing a switch track at a
public road crossing. Whether the plaintiff, who had looked for trains on
the main track while crossing it nearby with a harrow on his back, who
knew that the cars had been stationary on the switch track for five or six
hours, and who had passed over the crossing below them only a few minutes
before on his way to get the harrow and mule, but who had heard that cars
sometimes got loose and ran down the track, was contributorily negligent
in not anticipating that they might get loose and start rolling between the
time he walked from the main track to the switch track, was held for
the jury.
Where, in an action for injuries received while driving his automobile
and skidding into a barricade in the center of a slippery street on a foggy,
rainy night, the plaintiff's evidence showed that he already had informa-
tion, from previous experience in using his brakes, as to what would happen
if he had to apply them suddenly, yet deliberately drove faster to pass an
automobile ahead of him on a street he knew was partially blocked by
construction work, be was held to be contributorily negligent as a matter
of law in Baranovic v. C. A. Moreno Co.25 The court distinguished the case
from one where the driver is suddenly confronted by an unknown condition.
It is well settled law in Missouri that a guest in an automobile is re-
quired to exercise ordinary care and prudence for his own safety, and may
not intrust his safety absolutely to the driver, yet he is not required to
use the same vigilance as the driver. Whether the guest had exercised
23. 343 Mo. 899, 123 S. W. (2d) 158 (1938).
24. 343 Mo. 490, 121 S. W. (2d) 811 (1938).
25. 342 Mo. 322, 114 S. W. (2d) 1043 (1938).
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reasonable care was raised in Gorman v. Franklin28 and in Buehler v.
Festus Mercantile 00.27 By dictum, in Edwards v. Woods,2 a driver of
a car is not negligent as a matter of law because he rests his arm upon the
doorframe of the car, especially where in doing so his elbow would not
extend beyond the fender of the car.
Where there was no place to walk except in the street, it was held in
Stollhans v. City of St. Louis29 not to be contributorily negligent as a
matter of law to do so, even though it was a misty night. There the plain-
tiff was struck by an automobile approaching from the rear while so walk-
ing, at about the same time that another automobile with very bright lights
was approaching and passing the plaintiff from the other direction. The
court recognized the equal right of a pedestrian to be upon and use the
traveled part of the highway, that while so walking it is not as a matter of
law his duty to turn about constantly to observe the approach of -possible
vehicles from the rear, and that, on the contrary, he may assume that the
operator of an automobile will exercise the requisite care in keeping a
lookout, that under ordinary conditions he will be discovered by the
operator, and that the latter will, as he approaches, slow down and give
an audible signal with his horn.
Where the view of one about to enter upon a railroad crossing is
obstructed by standing cars, the question of what conduct is necessary to
relieve him of contributory negligence was presented in Scott v. Kurn70 and
Rucker v. Alton R. R. 31 At least he is not contributorily negligent as a
matter of law if he fails to stop to look and listen.
An interesting question of pleading the defense of assumption of risk
was presented in Grosvener v. New York Central R. R.,8 2 in an action to
recover for personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Where the assumption of risk is tantamount to contributory negligence it
must be pleaded affirmatively under this act according to Missouri law.
But the court calls attention in a footnote to the principal case that con-
tributory negligence is interposed as an affirmative defense in bar to a
recovery based upon primary negligence under the Missouri law; whereas
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act it is pleaded in mitigation of
26. 117 S. W. (2d) 289 (Mo. 1938).
27. 343 Mo. 139, 119 S. W. (2d) 961 (1938).
28. 342 Mo. 1097, 119 S. W. (2d) 359 (1938).
29. 343 Mo. 467, 121 S. W. (2d) 808 (1938).
30. 343 Mo. 1210, 126 S. W. (2d) 185 (1938).
31. 343 Mo. 929, 123 S. W. (2d) 24 (1938).
32. 343 Mo. 611, 123 S. W. (2d) 173 (1938).
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damages, and under Missouri law evidence in mitigation of damages may
be given under the general denial. The problem is not solved.
G. Hfumanitarian doctrine
Due to the significance of this doctrine in the Missouri decisions, this
phase of Torts is given special emphasis in a special topic which will be
found elsewhere in this issue of the Review.33
H. Burden of proof
After a period in which the court has scrutinized closely instructions
on the burden of proof in negligence cases, apparently lawyers and trial
courts are following more closely instructions that have been approved by
the court. In one case, Grosvener v. New York Central R. R.,34 the trial
court followed an instruction on the burden of proof which had met the
approval of the court in an earlier case,"5 but inserted the sentence:
'Negligence is a positive wrong, and, therefore, in this case is not to be
presumed.' " The court, in a previous decision, had pointed out the error
in stating that negligence was a positive wrong: "A positive wrong is a
wrongful act, willfully committed. . . . In order to commit a positive
wrong there must be an intent." 36
II. FRAUD
Jeck v. O'Meara3 7 was again before the court on a second appeal.38
The action was against the manufacturer and distributor of automobiles
for deceit in inducing the plaintiff to invest money in the company retailing
the automobiles, which investment proved worthless. The manager repre-
sented himself and the manufacturer as though he owned the stock or was
authorized to speak for the owners, and represented that the company was
solvent. The defendants contended that there could be no recovery, even
if the deceit was made out otherwise, because the representation as to the
solvency of the distributor was not in writing as required by Section 2970
33. Discussed by Mr. Becker.
34. 343 Mo. 611, 123 S. W. (2d) 173 (1938).
35. Doherty v. St. Louis Butter Co., 339 Mo. 996, 98 S. W. (2d) 742 (1936).
36. Blunk v. Snider, 342 Mo. 26, 111 S. W. (2d) 163, 165 (1937).
37. 343 Mo. 559, 122 S. W. (2d) 897 (1938).
38. For the first appeal, see 341 Mo. 419, 107 S. W. (2d) 782 (1937), noted
in (1938) 3 Mo. L. Rnv. 69.
[Vol. 4
104
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1939], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss4/1
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1938
of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, which provides that "no action
shall be brought to charge any person upon and by reason of any repre-
sentation or assurance made concerning the character, conduct, credit,
ability, trade or dealings of any other person, unless such representation
or assurance be made in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged
thereby, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." The
court pointed out that the statute does not apply " 'when the primary pur-
pose of such representations was not to induce the extension of credit or
delivery of money or goods to the persons concerning whom they are made
but to secure the execution of a contract to which the person making them
is a party.' " Furthermore, the statute does not apply where the owners
of the stocks of a corporation make false or fraudulent representations
concerning the assets and financial condition of such corporation in pro-
moting and effecting the sale of such stocks. While it was true, in the
instant case, that the defendants were not the owners of the stock pur-
chased by the plaintiff, and were not parties to the agreement to purchase,
the statute was not applicable since the defendant O'Meara spoke at the
conferences as though he was one of the owners of the stock in the dis-
tributor or was authorized to speak for the owners of such stock and for
the company.
The defendants also requested an instruction which would have told the
jury that the plaintiff could not recover, unless it were found that he relied
solely on the alleged false representations, and that he could not recover
if it were found that he relied in whole or in part on the recommendations
of his counsel. The court reiterated its previous position on this question
that it is not necessary to show that the false representations complained
were the sole inducing cause, but that it is sufficient if they were an effective
cause along with other considerations. If they are a material influence in
inducing the plaintiff to act, although they constitute only one of the
several factors which acting together to produce the result, it is sufficient.
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TRUSTS
W. L. NELsoN, JR.*
I. IMPLIED TRUSTS
A. Resulting Trusts
Purvis v. Hardinm was an action to establish a resulting trust in cer-
tain real estate which the plaintiff, a sister of the defendant, alleged had
been purchased with money advanced by the defendant under an oral
agreement providing that he was to purchase the land, sell it and share the
profits with the plaintiff and another brother. Title to the property was
taken in the name of the latter and he later conveyed to the defendant. The
lower court found that the defendant was the owner of the land and that
the plaintiff had no interest in it.
In affirming this decision the supreme court referred to the well-estab-
lished rule that a mere preponderance of the evidence is insufficient to es-
tablish a resulting trust and that such evidence must be "so clear, cogent,
and convincing" that no reasonable doubt can be entertained as to its
truth. It held the test to be the true ownership of the consideration, which
here was furnished by the defendant, and said that the alleged oral agree-
ment could furnish no basis for a resulting trust since it must arise by
operation of law from the facts in the case and not from any agreement.
The court further stated that trustee's mere refusal to execute an express
trust, or his denial of its existence, does not furnish the basis for raising
a constructive trust.
B. Constructive Trusts
Suhre v. Busch2 was a suit to impress a constructive trust on certain
shares of stock which had formerly been owned by the plaintiff but which
were now in the hands of the executors of one Busch. Plaintiff asserted
that Busch had purchased the stock, through an agent, from a broker who
bought it from plaintiff's immediate transferee, and that the broker had
been induced to part with the stock on the alleged agent's representations
*Attorney, Columbia. A.B., University of Missouri, 1933, LL.B., 1936.
1. 343 Mo. 652, 122 S. W. (2d) 936 (1938).
2. 343 Mo. 679, 123 S. W. (2d) 8 (1938).
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that he was buying it to hold for the plaintiff until she was able to redeem
it. The trial chancellor found for the defendants and on appeal that judg-
ment was affirmed by the supreme court.
After pointing out that the machinery of a constructive trust is used
to effect restitution for one deprived of property by the wrongful or fraud-
ulent act of another, the court emphasized the fact that when the broker
here held the stock he was the absolute owner thereof, that the plaintiff
had no interest or right in it at that time, that she lost nothing when the
alleged fraud was perpetrated upon the broker, and that the latter sustained
the damage, if any, which was caused thereby. The court also stated that
the plaintiff had failed to supply the "extraordinary degree of proof"
required to establish an implied trust.
II. REmovA.L OF TRUsTEEs
In Shelton v. McHaney,3 the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust
brought proceedings to remove the trustees named by the testator, alleging
that the trustees had been derelict in their duties in that, among other acts,
they had allowed one of the trustees compensation for his services as an
attorney, had sold certain real estate and shares of stock which made up a
part of the estate, had made expenditures for counsel fees and to physicians
who had consulted with the trustees and testified in the defense of a suit
to set aside testator's will, and had been hostile to the beneficiaries. After
stating the provisions of the will, which vested broad powers in the trustees
and recited that they were substituted in the testator's place and stead as
near as practicable, the court affirmed the lower court's decree, which was
in favor of the defendants.
The court held that improper motive or fraudulent design on the part
of the trustees had not been disclosed and that if they had overstepped the
law or the discretion vested in them reimbursement to the estate would be
ample redress for the plaintiff. It stated that misconduct which would
authorize the removal of trustees must be of such a nature as to endanger
the trust estate, that mere hostility between the trustees and cestuis was
not a sufficient ground for removal, and that removal "calls for the exer-
cise of a sound judicial discretion, which should not be abused."
3. 343 Mo. 119, 119 S. W. (2d) 951 (1938).
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III. R IGHT OF ACTION BY BENEFICIARY
State ex rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe4 was an original pro-
ceeding in prohibition directed against a circuit court judge. A legatee
under a will had filed an affidavit to discover assets, alleging that one
Ethel Funk, also a legatee, was wrongfully withholding certain property,
including a five thousand dollar bond, from the estate. The latter answered
and admitted that she held the property but stated that the bond was being
held in trust for a named cestui. The purported cestui then filed suit
against the executor and Ethel Funk asking that the court order that posses-
sion of the bond be delivered to her.
The trust company, which had been named executor, brought this
proceeding and asked for the writ on the ground that the probate court had
exclusive jurisdiction. It also raised the point that the cestui could not
maintain the circuit court suit against the person alleged to be the trustee
and against the executor, since the latter claimed title adverse to the trustee.
The authority for this contention was the statement in Corpus Juris that "a
cestui que trust cannot maintain a bill in equity against the trustee in pos-
session and a third person who claims a legal title adversely to the trustee
to settle the conflicting claims. " ' The court disposed of this argument on
the ground that inasmuch as it is the policy of equity to bind everyone who
has any interest in the property involved in the litigation, all such persons
are to be made parties to the suit. The preliminary writ was then made
permanent, except as to the alleged trust, the court holding that the probate
court had exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance to determine the other
issues raised by the proceedings in that court.
IV. RIGIHT TO FoLLow TRUST PROPERTY OR PROCEEDS
Brown v. Maguire's Real Estate Agency involved the title to rent
money collected by the agency. Execution was issued on a judgment for
the plaintiffs and the bank in which the agency was in the habit of deposit-
ing rental collections was summoned as garnishee. A day later, but before
notice of the garnishment had reached it, the agency deposited a rent pay-
ment which it had been authorized to collect and remit to the owners of
certain property. These persons filed interpleas, claiming the amount of
4. 343 Mo. 580, 122 S. W. (2d) 909 (1938).
5. 65 C. J., § 938, pp. 1009, 1010.
6. 343 Mo. 336, 121 S. W. (2d) 754 (1938).
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that deposit on the theory that the agency's relation to them was that of
trustee, and that the rent collection was a trust fund which could be traced
to and found in the agency's bank account. The garnishee bank contended
that it had the right to apply this deposit, as well as another small account,
to a note which the agency had executed to the bank. The note was not
due at the time of the garnishment but it contained a provision that the
bank should have a lien on the agency's deposit account. The judgment
creditors' position was that the fund was subject to garnishment because
the relation between the bank and the agency, and between the agency and
the interpleaders, was that of debtor and creditor, but that inasmuch as
the note was not due, the bank did not have the right of set-off.
The supreme court, to which the case had been certified after an ap-
peal by the intervening claimants from the trial court's order that the bank
turn the money into the court, held that the rent money constituted a trust
fund held by the agency for the owners of the property, and that although
the deposit created a debtor and creditor relationship between the agency
and the bank, the agency was a depositor as a trustee, not as an individual,
and that if the bank had knowledge of the trust or could have obtained
such information by reasonable investigation (which was found to be the
case here) it could not set off the trustee's personal debt against the trust
fund. The court further ruled that the bank could apply the amount of
the deposit in excess of the rental collection to the unmatured note, since a
lien was provided for by the note, and the garnishment could not disturb
that lien.
V. LiABwLiTiES ON TRUSTEES' BoNDs
State ex rel. Clark v. Shain7 was a certiorari proceeding to review
the judgment and opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in an
action on a trustee's bond to recover a trust fund, the receipt of which one
Davis, while acting as trustee, had acknowledged from himself as executor.
The bond was expressed to be upon condition that the trustee had been
appointed "to receive, take charge of and administer" the trust fund, and
it provided that if he faithfully performed the trust, paid over and ac-
counted for the money the obligation was to be void. The successor trustee
obtained judgment on the bond in the circuit court but this action was re-
versed by the court of appeals. It held that the surety bond, properly
7. 343 Mo. 66, 119 S. W. (2d) 971 (1938).
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construed, protected only the money which came into the trustee's hands as
trustee, and that there was a failure of proof that Davis, while acting as
executor, had transferred the fund to himself as trustee.
The supreme court, in quashing the writ of certiorari on the ground
that there was no conflict with controlling supreme court decisions, referred
to an earlier case which was decided on very similar facts.8 That case
ruled that a person in charge of a fund in one capacity could not, by mere-
ly signing a receipt for the fund while acting in another capacity, but with-
out actually transferring the fund, shift responsibility therefor from one
set of sureties to another. The court further stated that no decisions had
been cited holding sureties liable for a trustee's fraud in receipting for a
fund which he had not actually received.
Buder v. HoUt9 was a suit in equity by a trustee against the commis-
sioner of finance, who was in charge of a closed bank, to have a deposit of
trust funds set off against two notes which the trustee individually owed
the bank. The court stated the general rule to be that when trust funds are
deposited in a bank the trustee, on the insolvency of the bank, may set
off such deposit against his individual indebtedness to the bank only if he
is personally liable to the beneficiaries for the amount of the deposit. The
plaintiff asserted that there was such a personal liability here because he
and his co-trustee had given surety bonds conditioned that they should, on
the termination of the trust, "well and truly account for and pay over and
deliver" the property coming into their possession as trustees. The court
denied this contention and further said they could find no case holding
that "the principal and his surety under the usual fidelity bond are in-




As in previous years, few new and important points of the law of
succession were decided by the supreme court. Questions of construction
8. State ex rel. Hospes v. Branch, 151 Mo. 622, 52 S. W. 390 (1899).
9. 343 Mo. 666, 117 S. W. (2d) 235 (1938), (1939) 4 Mo. L. Rnv. 332.
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., University of North
Dakota, 1925; LL.B., University of Michigan, 1917; J.S.D., Yale, 1926. Author
of ATxINSON ON WILs (1937).
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of wills predominate, with will contest litigation second in frequency.
Such cases, though of course important to the parties, do little to establish
precedents which will help settle the law. In the field of administration
the decisions are exceeded both in number and in jurisprudential value by
those of the courts of appeals. This is because most questions of probate
court practice are not likely to involve either the title to realty or the
sum of $7500 so as to permit an appeal to the supreme court. Doubtless
the situation will continue until there is a change in our court organiza-
tion'and appellate jurisdiction.
I. CONTEST OF WILLS
Proffer v. Proffer' establishes the rule, forecast by earlier cases, that
the contest of a will devising land involves title to real estate so that an
appeal lies to the supreme court. The jury's decision against the will on
the ground of testator's mental incapacity was held sustained by evidence
of his foolish financial transactions and indulgence in petty thefts after a
long life of honesty. In Fowlkes v. Stephens,2 the judgment below upholding
the will was reversed because the trial court, after defining the mental
capacity required to make a valid will, further instructed the jury that old
age, physical weakness or imperfect memory caused by sickness, or old age,
or forgetfulness of the names of persons testator had known, were not
sufficient to invalidate the will provided the deceased had sufficient intelli-
gence to fulfil the foregoing definition. This part of the charge was ad-
mitted to be a correct statement of an abstract point of law but was con-
demned as argumentative, as commenting on the evidence, and as tending to
mislead the jury into the belief that the named factors were not to be con-
sidered in determining whether deceased had mental capacity as defined in
the previous part of the charge. Earlier lissouri cases sustain this posi-
tion but it seems to the writer that, if this distrust of juries is warranted,
the situation calls for total abolishment of jury trial in Will contest cases.
In Larkin v. Larkin,8 the lower court's direction of a verdict in favor
of the will was sustained against the claim of undue influence. While ad-
mitting that such charges may be proved by circumstances, it was held
that no case for the jury was made out by the will's unequal distribution
among testator's children, or by proof of a statement by the chief benefiei-
1. 342 Mo. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938).
2. 342 Mo. 247, 114 S. W. (2d) 997 (1938).
3. 119 S. W. (2d) 351 (Mo. 1938).
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ary that if it had not been for him there would have been no will. The
court also reiterated its recent holding that the mere showing of a confi-
dential relationship between the testator and the beneficiary did not raise
a presumption of undue influence and further held that the showing of this
relationship did not warrant, by itself, a submission of the case to the jury.
The will in (ampbeZl v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.4 was contested be-
low by the guardian of testator's incompetent brother, who was the sole
heir at law. In their answer, the trustees under the will denied that testa-
tor was of unsound mind or was unduly influenced and further prayed
that the contest be enjoined because it was without basis and inspired by
collateral relatives who had threatened to sue upon the guardian's bond
unless a contest was filed. In holding that the trial court erred in refusing
to strike this equitable counterclaim it was declared that defendant had an
adequate remedy at law, viz., by proceeding with the trial of the contest
upon the issues raised by the denials contained in the answer. This deci-
sion seems correct, for otherwise contestees might avoid jury trial merely
by questioning the motives of contestants. However, in some situations of
this general character a summary judgment for contestees might be war-
ranted if legislation provided for such remedy."
In this general connection it is interesting to notice that if the decedent
had made his disposition by deed rather than by will, there would be court
trial of the issues of mental capacity and undue influence. This is illu-
strated by two deed cases6 decided in 1938. The similarity of the issues
arising in the will and deed cases is shown by the fact that will cases are
cited in the deed cases. 7
II. CONSTRUCTO OF WIuLS
In three cases involving the problem as to whether a devisee took a
fee or merely a life estate under the will, the court refused to hold con-
trolling the doctrine that language sufficient to create a fee cannot be an-
nulled except by language equally clear cutting down the fee. The court
found in each instance that the entire will showed testator's intention to
give only a life estate. Testator, in Presbyterian Orphanage of Missouri
4. 343 Mo. 1041, 124 S. W. (2d) 1068 (1938).
5. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56.
6. Kingston v. Mitchell, 117 S. W. (2d) 226 (Mo. 1938); Platt v. Platt,
343 Mo. 745, 123 S. W. (2d) 54 (1938).
7. Rex v. Masonic Home of Missouri, 341 Mo. 589, 108 S. W. (2d) 72 (1937),
cited in Kingston v. Mitchell, 117 S. W. (2d) 226, 228 (Mo. 1938).
[Vol. 4
112
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1939], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss4/1
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1938
v. Fitterling,8 gave the residue of his estate to his brother to hold and enjoy
the rents and profits with full power to sell and dispose of the same as he
might think best and whatever portion of the estate remained upon the
brother's death was to pass to plaintiff charity. This was held to create
merely a life tenancy in the brother and the power of disposition was con-
strued to be limited to sales for valuable consideration. In Graham v.
StrohP the will bequeathed all testator's property to his wife for the period
of her widowhood, granting her power to sell, exchange, reinvest, lease and
encumber as she might think best. This was followed by an expression of
confidence that she would not disregard the interests of testator's children.
A separate clause provided that if the wife should remarry or in the event
of her death, the remainder of the estate or its substitute was devised to
the children. This was held to create only a life estate in the widow and
the power of disposition was not deemed repugnant to this life estate or
the remainder over. In Wefler v. Searcy0 the will provided that testator's
wife should take all that part of the estate to which she would be entitled
under the law, as her absolute property, and devised the remainder to the
wife to be applied for the support of testator's children during the life and
widowhood of the wife with provision for division of the property among
the children upon remarriage of the wife or upon her death. Testator's
total estate was little, if any, greater than a homestead and personalty suffi-
cient to cover family allowances. The court decided against the contention
that the widow obtained the fee of the area covered by the homestead under
the phrase "as her absolute property," and held that she took only the
life interest she would have taken in case of intestacy. Testator's intention
to this effect is declared to be shown by the provision for the children which
would have been largely or entirely nugatory if the above contention were
upheld.
Bates v. Bates" involves the question as to the time at which the in-
dividuals of a class of survivors are to be determined. By the second
clause of his will testator left $300,000 in trust for his wife for life and at
her death the sum remaining to such of the parties named in the eighth
clause "as may be then living." The eighth clause left the residue to
such of the following parties "as may be then living" including 3/11
8. 342 Mo. 299, 114 S. W. (2d) 1004 (1938).
9. 342 Mo. 686, 117 S. W. (2d) 258 (1938).
10. 343 Mo. 768, 123 S. W. (2d) 73 (1938).
11. 343 Mo. 1013, 124 S. W. (2d) 1117 (1938).
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thereof to trustees for the benefit of testator's sister as thereafter set forth.
A subsequent part of this clause provided that said 3/11 portion of the
residue should be invested and reinvested, the income to be paid to the
sister during her lifetime and at her death the said 3/11 to be equally di-
vided between her two sons and her grandson or the survivor of them. Both
the sister and one of her sons died prior to the wife's death. After the
latter event the widow of the deceased son of the sister claimed that the
remainder interest of the 3/11 of the trust fund vested upon testator's
death in his sister, though enjoyment was postponed during the wife's
lifetime, that on the sister's death this remainder passed to her two sons
by descent and on the death of the son (claimant's husband) claimant took
his share under his will. This claim was based upon the rule of construc-
tion favoring the vesting of estates. However, the supreme court de-
cided against this contention and construed the phrase "as may then be
living" in the second clause as of the death of testator's wife (the life
tenant) and not at the death of the testator upon the ground that the word
survivors or its equivalent must be construed to mean those surviving at
the termination of the particular life estate. In addition the court points
out that from the clear wording of the eighth clause the sister was en-
titled, in no event, to any descendible interest in the fund.
In Marr v. Marr,12 the fifth clause of the will directed the executor "to
use sufficient of funds . . to purchase a security, interesting bearing
in the sum of $500" for the benefit of his grandson. The latter contended
that a sum should be set aside sufficient to yield $500 annual interest. Tes-
tator also left a widow, son, and mother mentioned in his will. The evi-
dence showed that testator had held large property interests but that at
the time of the execution of the will he was close to insolvency and realized
this fact. In rejecting the grandson's contention, it was held that the
words "in the sum of $500" fixed the par or face value of the security to
be purchased. The court did not directly pass on the admissibility of the
evidence as to testator's financial condition, but as both parties treated this
as admissible the court declares that its construction is fortified by these
facts admitted without objection. However, testator's declaration that he
intended the grandson to have $500 was held incompetent as permitting a
will to be made by parol in violation of the statute requiring a writing.
The trial court's allowance of $1000 from the estate as fees to the attorney
12. 342 Mo. 656, 117 S. W. (2d) 230 (1938).
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for the grandson was held improper, being an inducement to will construc-
tion litigation when the wording is plain and unambiguous.13
Buder v. Stocke1 4 involves questions of ademption and payment of
legacies and is probably the most interesting case decided in the field of
succession during the year. The will made in 1926 left to testator's son
"all my holdings of stock" in a brick company "and any and all notes
obligations or claims which I now hold of said company, whether evidenced
by notes or otherwise due me on open account." The charter of the corpora-
tion had been forfeited by the state in 1921 but operation of the business
continued as before. Just prior to the execution of his will, testator pur-
chased the interest of a minority stockholder and thereafter owned sub-
stantially the entire business. The supreme court held that the bequest
was not merely of stock in, and obligations of, the corporation but was
broad enough in language to cover testator's entire equity in the business
and his claims against it, whether it was a corporation, a partnership or an
individual business.15 It was further held that there could be no ademption
of the legacy by virtue of forfeiture of the charter or other facts occurring
prior to execution of the will.
In 1929 testator was adjudged incompetent and remained under guard-
ianship until his death about two years later. The guardians caused the
brick company real estate to be transferred to testator's name and liquidated
the business by paying the debts, in part out of the business personalty
and in part out of individual funds of the testator. It was held that there
was no ademption of the bequest because of these acts of the guardians
and that the son was entitled to the brick company realty, though he could
receive no more under the will than he would have received if there had
been no liquidation by the guardians or if the will had become effective
when the guardianship began. The theoretical basis for holding that the
acts of the guardians did not work an ademption is not made clear. Is it
because their acts did not cause substantial change in the thing given? If
so, it would seem to be immaterial whether the merely formal changes
were effected by the guardians or by the testator himself. Or, is the hold-
ing based upon the doctrine that ademption is founded upon testator's
intention and that transactions of guardians cannot cause ademption in
any case, the legatee being entitled to the value of the thing given at the
13. See note (1938) 3 Mo. L. REv. 330.
14. 343 Mo. 506, 121 S. W. (2d) 852 (1938).
15. See note (1938) 3 Mo. L. Rav. 81.
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time of the commencement of the guardianship? The cases cited seem to
support this view though there is also strong authority to the contrary.1"
The final point in the case has to do with the payment of certain pecun-
iary legacies to testator's children and step-children under a clause of the
will which taken by itself undoubtedly constituted them general legacies.
The residuary clause set up a trust in favor of testator's children and a
subsequent part of the will provided that if the funds on hand were in-
sufficient to pay legacies the executors were empowered to sell a described
farm for this purpose. It was held that this clause did not make the legacies
payable only from funds on hand and the proceeds of the farm but that the
legacies were in fact demonstrative and payable from general assets if the
designated funds proved insufficient.'7  This conclusion is reached both on
the basis of the language of the will and evidence of the condition and value
of testator's estate and of his relationship with the beneficiaries at the time
of execution of the will.
The question as to whether certain instruments are valid deeds creat-
ing estates in future, or are invalid as conveyances because of their testa-
mentary character continues to arise. In Goins v. Melton,", the instrument
was in the form of a warranty deed with an added clause retaining in the
grantor possession and control of the profits for life and also the right to
sell the land, at his death the title to all, or the part unsold, to pass to the
grantee together with all grantor's personal property. The court admits
its inability to lay down any uniform test as to testamentary character but
finds that the reserved power to sell was equivalent to a power to revoke
and the instrument was therefore held testamentary and ineffective as a
deed. In overruling a motion to transfer to bane the court refused to
find that a trust was created with power to revoke, because of absence of
a trustee.
16. See Matter of Ireland, 257 N. Y. 155, 177 N. E. 405 (1931), noted in
(1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 623, (1932) 45 HARV. L. RLV. 710, (1932) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 506, (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 990, (1931) 17 VA. L. REv. 584.
17. For a very recent learned discussion of the devices used by the courts
to prevent failure of legacies through ademption, see Mechem, Specific Legacies
of Unspecific Things-Ashburner v. MaGuire Reconsidered (1939) 87 U. of PA.
L. REv. 546.
18. 343 Mo. 413, 121 S. W. (2d) 821 (1938). See discussion of this case in
division on Property, supra at note 1.
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III. RIGHTS OF FAmY AND HEmRS
By a liberal application of the homestead laws it was decided in
Ahmann v. Kemper"0 that a wife may assert homestead rights in an estate
by the entireties after the death of her husband against an unsecured in-
debtedness incurred by herself and her husband subsequent to the recording
of the deed creating the estate. While not technically involving a question
of inheritance, Eisenhardt v. Siegel" makes clear that an heir or devisee,
who kills his ancestor or testator but is insane and hence is not guilty of
criminal homicide, may take under the intestate laws or under the will.
Clapper v. Lakin2 ' deals with the burden of proof upon the issue of legiti-
macy in a controversy involving inheritance.
IV. ADMNSTRATION OF ESTATES
State ex rel. Pryor v. Anderson22 holds that under our statutes the
probate court has power to name a stranger as administrator forthwith
when the intestate leaves no resident distributees. This state of the stat-
ute law seems to call for amendatory legislation as it gives undue advantage
to swift-moving public administrators at the expense of non-resident dis-
tributees who may wish to become local residents in order to qualify as ad-
ministrators.
In State ex rel. Clark v. Shain2 it was held that the surety on a trus-
tee's bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of the trust was
not liable thereon when the trustee, who was also executor, failed to actual-
ly turn over to trust fund to himself as trustee, being insolvent at the
time that he ified a voucher acknowledging receipt of the funds as
trustee.
State ex rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe24 holds that the probate
court has jurisdiction to determine title to personalty claimed as a gift
from decedent upon a proceeding to discover assets, but that the question
of whether the possessor held a part of the property in trust for another
must be litigated in a separate circuit court action. Another case denying
that the probate court has general equitable jurisdiction is In re Ermeling's
19. 342 Mo. 944, 119 S. W. (2d) 256 (1938).
20. 343 Mo. 22, 119 S. W. (2d) 810 (1938), noted in (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv.
210, (1939) 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 2'77.
21. 343 Mo. 710, 123 S. W. (2d) 27 (1938), discussed in division on Evi-
dence, supra, at note 20.
22. 343 Mo. 895, 123 S. W. (2d) 181 (1938).
23. 343 Mo. 66, 119 S. W. (2d) 971 (1938).
24. 343 Mo. 580, 122 S. W. (2d) 909 (1938).
117
et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Estate,25 involving a guardian's account. There the probate court issued
an order disapproving loans made by the guardian, while the circuit court
on appeal purported to cancel said loans which were secured by deeds of
trust on realty. It was held that the action of the probate court was proper
while that of the circuit court was improper, as that court upon appeal from
probate court had no more equitable jurisdiction than the probate court.
It is significant that this point was decided in the process of holding
that the supreme court had no jurisdiction of the appeal as title to realty
was not involved. Furthermore, it should be noted that the other three
eases treated in this section were decided upon mandamus, certiorari and
prohibition respectively. This illustrates the narrow scope of review by
the supreme court usually afforded under the present law in cases involv-
ing questions as to the administration of estates. Such a state of affairs is
unfortunate because the legal problems arising daily in the course of the
settlement of estates deserve-perhaps above all others-authoritative and
final determination by our highest judicial tribunal.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
JAMES A. POTTER
Only four cases involving questions of workmen's compensation law
were considered by the court during the year 1938.1 Of the four, three
were common law actions for damages, and one was an appeal from an
award of the compensation commission.
Gardner v. Stout2 involved the question of the time of termination of
employment where an employee voluntarily quits. In this case employee,
while performing his regular duties, was criticised by his foreman and as
a result thereof announced to the foreman that he had quit his job, and
then and there left his post of duty. He went immediately to his locker
for his personal belongings and started to leave the building. On his way
down the stairs the foreman assaulted him. Employee filed suit against
25. 119 S. W. (2d) 755 (Mo. 1938).
*Attorney, Jefferson City. A.B., University of Missouri, 1902, LL.B., 1905.
had been awarded, and if the employe sued, he became trustee for employer
1. Only four cases were found. Reference to the record for previous years
discloses that in 1937 eleven cases were considered and in 1936 thirteen.
2. 342 Mo. 1206, 119 S. W. (2d) 790 (1938).
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the owners of the business and the foreman. Defense was that the
compensation law applied. The plaintiff, employee, contended that the rela-
tion of employer-employee had ceased when he quit, and that the compensa-
tion law had ceased to apply at the time of his injury.3
In deciding this issue, the court held that whenever an employee is
discharged or voluntarily quits his employment, the relation of employer-
employee is not severed until the employee has had a reasonable time in
which to leave the premises. Considering the facts of the case, the court
held that the employee at the time of the assault had not had a reasonable
time to leave the premises, that the relationship still existed, and that the
compensation law applied. Hence, it was held that the employee could not
maintain this action against his employers.4
In Edwards v. Woods' the court upheld the right of an injured em-
ployee to maintain an action against a third party where negligence caused
the injury, in spite of the fact that such employee had received compensa-
tion from his employer."
Urseth v. Encyclopedia Britannica,7 involved the construction of sub-
sections (e) and (d) of section 3320. Urseth had been employed as a
traveling salesman on a commission basis, with a drawing account of
$35.00 per week. He was killed in an accident less than a year later. Coin-
3. An interesting situation arose on the pleadings. The employers filed
a demurrer to plaintiff's case, but did not include the foreman in the demurrer.
Plaintiff contended they waived this defense by not including the foreman. How-
ever, the court held that employers preserved this right to have the question
decided by excluding foreman from their demurrer, inasmuch as plaintiff made
a submissible case as against the foreman, so that if he had been included in
the demurrer it would have been necessary to overrule it.
4. The court remanded the case because of an excessive verdict. It was
held as to the foreman that in spite of the compensation law forbidding a suit
at common law against the employers, the injured employee still has his action
against the foreman who committed the assault as a third party, upon whom no
liability could be entailed under the Compensation Law. (Citing Sylcox v. Na-
tional Lead Co., 225 Mo. App. 543, 38 S. W. (2d) 497 (1931); Hanson v. Norton,
340 Mo. 1012, 103 S. W. (2d) 1 (1937).
5. 342 Mo. 1097, 119 S. W. (2d) 359 (1938).
6. The precedent relied upon by the court was McKenzie v. Missouri Stables,
Inc., 225 Mo. App. 64, 34 S. W. (2d) 136 (1930). In construing section 3309
which provides that, "Where a third person is liable to the employe or to the
dependents, for the injury or death, the employer shall be subrogated to the right
of the employe or to the dependents against such third person, . . ." the St.
Louis Court of Appeals held that the statute merely fixed the rights of the
parties, and if the employer sued the third person, he became trustee for employee
for whatever amount might be recovered in excess of the compensation which
had been awarded, and if the employee sued, he became trustee for employer
to the extent of the compensation which the latter had to pay.
However, in the Edwards case there was introduced in evidence an agreement
between the employee, employer and insurer that the employee might maintain
the action.
7. 343 Mo. 1083, 124 S. W. (2d) 1101 (1938).
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putation of claimant's compensation could not be figured on the basis of
annual earnings received from employer, so the commission applied sub-
section (c) of section 3320, and based the award on the average commis-
sions earned by other salesmen who were considered to be in the same
class with the deceased.
The employer contended that sub-section (d) should be applied, and
that the amount of commissions actually earned by deceased should be
divided by the number of days he had been under contract, the result
multiplied by 300, and the result divided by 52 to arrive at his weekly
wage."
In adopting the view of the commission, the court held that sub-sec-
tion (d) applies only to those cases in which the employer has not been in
existence for one year prior to the accident.9
The case of Bunner v. Patti10 deserves more than passing attention.
The plaintiff in a common law action recovered a sum in excess of $7500.00
on the following set of facts: The defendants were the general con-
tractors for the Kansas City Municipal Auditorium. Plaintiff was an
employee of a sub-contractor. Certain employees of the general contractors
negligently unloaded a metal bucket from a steam shovel so that it rolled
on plaintiff and injured him. Plaintiff's immediate employer, a sub-con-
tractor, carried insurance, and plaintiff collected compensation from him.
Plaintiff brought this action against the general contractors on the theory
that they were "third persons" outside the protection of the Compensa-
tion Act, because his employer carried compensation insurance. This
theory is based on sections 3308 (d) and 3309.11
8. Employer's contention was based on the authority of Coble v. Scullin
Steel Co., 54 S. W. (2d) 777, 778 (Mo. App. 1932) and Jackson v. Curtiss-WrightAirplane Co., 334 Mo. 805, 68 S. W. (2d) 715, 720 (1934). In the instant case
the court distinguishes these two authorities on the ground that in each the
employee was employed at a wage of a fixed and definite amount.
9. The case was remanded because of the admission of certain statements
of various officials of employer regarding the earnings and activities of deceased.
The court held that these might be admissible against the employer as admissions
against interest, but they were not admissible against the insurer who was
primarily liable; as against the insurer they were hearsay.
10. 343 Mo. 274, 121 S. W. (2d) 153 (1938).
11. Section 3308 (d) "In all cases mentioned in the preceding subsections,
the immediate contractor or subcontractor shall be liable as an employer
of the employes of his subcontractors. All persons so liable may be made parties
to the proceedings on the application of any party. The liability of the immediate
employer shall be primary, and that of the others secondary in their order, and
any compensation paid by those secondarily liable may be recovered from thoseprimarily liable, with attorney's fees and expenses of the suit. Such recovery
may be had on motion in the original proceedings. No such employer shall be
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The lower court overruled defendants' demurrer. The supreme court
reversed this decision.
The court construes section 3308 (d) in this way: The first "imme-
diate" refers to the contractor who is in charge of any particular division
of the work; he may have one or more sub-contractors under him nearer in
relation to the injured employee. The second and third "immediate" mod-
ifies "employer" and signifies the direct employer of the injured employee.
This section makes the remote, statutory employers secondarily liable with
the exception where the employee's immediate employer carries insurance. 2
Then the question under consideration by the court was: Does the
fact that a sub-contractor carries compensation insurance render the gen-
eral contractor a "third person" within the meaning of section 3309 ?
1
The court held that the last clause of sub-section (d) provides that
no remote employer shall be liable if the injured employee was insured
by his immediate or intermediate employer, but that it does not say that
such remote employer shall no longer be deemed an employer and outside
the protection of the law. It points out that all employers discussed in
this sub-section are treated as being within the act.'4
The court points out that a previous case'5 has held that the object of
the statute was to prevent remote employers from avoiding liability under
the act by having work done by irresponsible independent contractors.
liable as in this section provided, if the employe was insured by his immediate
or any intermediate employer. (Laws 1925, p. 375, Sec. 10.)"
Section 3309--"Injured employe may hold third person, when-effeet.-Where
a third person is liable to the employe or to the dependents, for the injury or
death, the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employe or to the
dependents against such third person, and the recovery by such employer shall
not be limited to the amount payable as compensation to such employe or de-
pendents, but such employer may recover any amount which such employe or his
dependents would have been entitled to recover. Any recovery by the employer
against such third person, in excess of the compensation paid by the employer,
after deducting the expenses of making such recovery shall be paid forthwith to
the employe or to the dependents, and shall be treated as an advance payment
by the employer, on account of any future installments of compensation. (Laws
1925, p. 375, Sec. 11.)"
12. When an employee carries insurance the act makes the insurance carrier
primarily liable and the employer secondarily liable. (Section 3325.)
13. In Langston v. Selden-Breck Const. Co., 225 Mo. App. 531, 37 S. W. (2d)
474 (1931), the St. Louis Court of Appeals had held that the employee could
maintain such a suit. However, the same court in Wors v. Tarlton, 95 S. W. (2d)
1199 (Mo. App. 1936) held to the contrary.
14. In its discussion of the question, the court sets out the arguments for
and against such a conclusion. There can be little doubt that it would be illogical
to discriminate between employers because one requires sub-contractors to carry
insurance and another does not. According to plaintiff's theory, a contractor
who required his sub-contractor to carry insurance would be compelled to (1)
pay the cost of the insurance (2) reimburse the insurer for compensation paid
the employee, and (3) be subject to a common law'action for damages.
15. Pruitt v. Harker, 328 Mo. 1200, 1207, 43 S. W. (2d) 769, 771 (1931).
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